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Algorithmic Protection of the Core Area of Private Life. On the Deployment of Artificial Intelligence in Computer and Network Surveillance as a Duty of the State

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Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems (ICASL 2022)

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Abstract

This article considers solutions to problems associated with State surveillance measures and interference into the privacy of the targeted individuals. Given that in-depth investigative measures to obtain digital evidence regularly encounter more than needed for the performance of State obligations, it argues for the deployment of artificial intelligence algorithms to protect fundamental rights during measures’ preformation. On the premise of the State’s duty to restrict intrusion into the individual’s privacy to a necessary minimum, which should take into account the current state of the art of the technology, it is proposed that the technology should already be used to pre-censor intimate or non-relevant data during the evidence’s seizure and to reduce serendipity (chance discoveries) in the criminal investigations.

This text is a faithful translation of the original German version of the article Gleizer, Algorithmischer Kernbereichsschutz: Zum Einsatz von Künstlicher Intelligenz in der Online-Durchsuchung als Staatspflicht, in: Beck/Kusche/Valerius, Digitalisierung, Automatisierung, KI und Recht. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020, p. 535 ff.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is also the view of Hilgendorf (2020), p. 405 (412).

  2. 2.

    Regarding the admissibility of data diversion in the course of the ongoing transmission process, Soiné (2018), p. 497 (502); conversely Roggan (2017), p. 821 (826) with further references; cf. also Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Division VI, Bisignani Case—Decision n. 254865 (27.11.2012).

  3. 3.

    See also, albeit not using this designation, Rüscher (2018), p. 687 (690 ff.); also, conversely, Singelnstein and Derin (2017), p. 2646 (2647).

  4. 4.

    Concerning the exclusion of such recordings of “background conversations” during the surveillance of communications under Article 100a StPO, cf. BGHSt 31, 296.

  5. 5.

    Already cautioned by Lobe (2020), p. 74.

  6. 6.

    This is also the view of Rüscher (2018), p. 678 (690); Roggan (2017), p. 821 (826 ff.); Eschelbach, in: Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier (eds.) (2018), § 100c recital 5.

  7. 7.

    The acoustical monitoring differs from computer and network monitoring in that it exposes the concerned individual to a more dangerous situation and a higher vulnerability, since the individual has a higher level of trust in their personal equipment, furthermore benefitting from and manipulating technical means belonging to them. This also impairs the integrity of private information technology systems. The information technology systems deployed for this purpose are neither at the disposal of the prosecution authorities nor are they owned by them, but by the concerned individual. If we bring home a simple household appliance like a smart television, then are we ourselves bringing a spy into our home? Since we are dealing with an interference of particular quality and intensity, it should be explicitly authorized. On a case of an unauthorized monitoring of sexual intercourse, Záboji (2016).

  8. 8.

    In this sense, see Rüscher (2018), p. 678 (691); Roggan (2017), p. 821 (826); Singelnstein and Derin (2017), p. 2646 (2647).

  9. 9.

    Instructive in this context BVerfGE 133, 277 (325 ff.).

  10. 10.

    BVerfGE 120, 274.

  11. 11.

    Which is also the view of Singelnstein and Derin (2017), p. 2646 (2647); probably also Roggan (2017), p. 821 (826).

  12. 12.

    BVerfGE 109, 279 (319). Whether this criterion created by BVerfGE is sufficient and legitimate is a question that cannot be discussed in more detail here.

  13. 13.

    Roggan (2017), p. 821 (826).

  14. 14.

    BVerfGE 109, 279 (374 f.); 120, 274 (338).

  15. 15.

    See Hilgendorf (2020), p. 405 (412).

  16. 16.

    For both requirements, see instead of all, Kingreen and Poscher (2019), p. 95, recital 330 (regarding proportionality), p. 99, recital 352 (regarding the guarantee of the essence).

  17. 17.

    See under 3.2.1.

  18. 18.

    BVerfGE 120, 274 (302 ff.).

  19. 19.

    In this regard, for the first time, BGHZ 13, 334 (338); cf. also BVerfGE 35, 202 (219 ff.); 54, 148 (153); 27, 1 (6).

  20. 20.

    Kingreen and Poscher (2019), p. 121 recital 441.

  21. 21.

    BVerfGE 54, 148 (153); 99, 185 (193).

  22. 22.

    BVerfGE 120, 274 (314).

  23. 23.

    BVerfGE 120, 274 (314).

  24. 24.

    BVerfGE 120, 274 (335 ff.).

  25. 25.

    The question whether the essence coincides with the essence of human dignity can remain open, given its apparent irrelevance for the argument developed here. For that, see Häberle (1983), p. 234 ff.; conversely, Schneider (1983), p. 190 ff.; Barrot (2012), p. 158 ff.; Dammann (2011), p. 141 ff.; see also Warntjen (2007), p. 76 ff.; Duttge (1995), p. 180 ff., who defend the concept of minimum conditions for the core area.

  26. 26.

    See instead of all others Damman, (2011), p. 102 ff.; a clarifying summary of the most important approaches of legal science is given by Rottmeier (2017), p. 100 ff.

  27. 27.

    BVerfGK 11, 164 (172).

  28. 28.

    BVerfGE 6, 32 (41).

  29. 29.

    Dammann (2011), p. 13.

  30. 30.

    Regarding this sphere-related theory, cf. instead of all others Barrot (2012), p. 29 ff.

  31. 31.

    In this sense, also Dammann, (2011), p. 49 ff.

  32. 32.

    Significant is BVerfGE 80, 367 (373) (“diary II”), wherein the Court decided that “the mere recording of information in a diary does not exclude that information from being accessed by the State. The usability rather depends upon the nature and significance of its content”.

  33. 33.

    The criterion of direct relationship is being applied by the Federal Constitutional Court since the Diary-II-decision: BVerfGE 80, 367 (375). Regarding the criterion, Dammann, (2011), p. 43 ff., 51 f., who pointed out with good reason that a direct relationship only exists when “the revealed content of thoughts itself shows a relation to the offence, in other words, is related to the planning or commission of a criminal conduct. Not sufficient is the existence of hints of a tendency of committing offences or other traits of character of the expressing individual indirectly related to the solution of an offence”. Cf. also BVerfGE 80, 367 (382 f.).

  34. 34.

    BVerfGE 113, 348 (391); NJW 2007, p. 2753 (2754); BVerfG NJW 2009, p. 2431 (2436); BVerfG 26. Juni 2008, Az.: 2 BvR 219/08, recital 19 ff.

  35. 35.

    BVerfGE 80, 367 (382), Tagebuch II—dissenting vote.

  36. 36.

    In the same way, also Dammann, (2011), p. 43 with further references.

  37. 37.

    Dammann, (2011), p. 51.

  38. 38.

    In this sense, Dammann, (2011), p. 51.

  39. 39.

    Dammann, (2011), p. 40.

  40. 40.

    BGHSt 57, 71.

  41. 41.

    The same should apply to keyboard input still pertaining to the sphere of the remitter arising during the use of information technology systems (see Lobe (2020), p. 74), because it is also “characterized by contents of conscience that occur subconsciously” (BGHSt 57, 71 [77]).

  42. 42.

    BGHSt 57, 7 (77).

  43. 43.

    In this regard see Barrot (2012), p. 92 ff.; Dammann, (2011), p. 50 f.

  44. 44.

    BVerfGE 120, 274 (337); cf. also BVerfGE 109, 279 (318); 113, 348 (391 f.).

  45. 45.

    For the application of an accompanying judicial control see Perne (2006,) p. 1486 (1489 ff.).

  46. 46.

    Dammann, (2011), p. 50 f.

  47. 47.

    Kingreen and Poscher (2019), p. 95 recital 330 ff.

  48. 48.

    See Roggan (2017), p. 821; Wolter and Greco, in: Wolter (ed.), (2016), § 100a recital 2.

  49. 49.

    In this regard Wolter and Greco (2016), § 100a, recital 56; Eschelbach (2018), § 100a, recital 25; Beulke and Ruhmannseder (2011), p. 180 (184 ff.).

  50. 50.

    BVerfGE 109, 279 (322).

  51. 51.

    Similarly, see Hilgendorf (2020) p. 405 (412): “Applied to the information and communication technology, this means that the State must protect its citizens against threats which emanate from novel technical possibilities. It equally follows that the State must observe closely the technological evolution, because only then it is able to fulfil its protection obligation in due time” (translated from the German original).

  52. 52.

    For an introduction, see Lenzen (2018), p. 52 ff; Kelleher (2019), p. 1 ff. A very interesting explanation of similar processing methods of human neuronal networks can be found in Carr, What the internet is doing to our brains: the shallows, New York 2011, p. 17 ff.

  53. 53.

    Regarding Hilgendorf’s convincing claim for more attention to an inclusion of technical subjects in the training of future generations of legal experts, see Hilgendorf, Digitalisierung (fn. 2), p. 405 (421).

  54. 54.

    Lenzen (2018), p. 55.

  55. 55.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 12.

  56. 56.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 14.

  57. 57.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 16.

  58. 58.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 16; for a technical explanation, see Skansi (2018), p. 32 (37 ff.).

  59. 59.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 20; for a technical explanation, see Skansi (2018), p. 107 ff.

  60. 60.

    In this regard, Pham and Triantaphyllo., In: Maimon/Rokach (eds.) (2008), p. 391; see also Russell and Norvig (2016), p. 768 ff.

  61. 61.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 159 ff.

  62. 62.

    Kelleher (2019), p. 25.

  63. 63.

    Vacca (2012), p. 486.

  64. 64.

    Hilgendorf. In: Bendel (ed.) (2019), p. 355 (367).

  65. 65.

    Lenzen (2018), p. 75 ff.; Nida-Rümelin/Battaglia. In: Bendel (ed.) (2019), p. 167 (172); more in-depth, see Mainzer (2019), p. 245 ff.; Russel and Norvig (2016), p. 57 ff.

  66. 66.

    Greco (2020), p. 29–62.

  67. 67.

    Regarding the prognosis of the solution to the core area dilemma as proposed by the Federal Constitutional Court, see Dammann, Kernbereich (fn. 26), p. 40 ff., 50; cf. also BVerfGE 109, 279 (320).

  68. 68.

    Cf. instead of all others Singelnstein, in: Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, München 2019, § 477, recital 24 ff.

  69. 69.

    Regarding the prohibition of circumvention, Wolter, Beweisverbote und Umgehungsverbote zwischen Wahrheitserforschung und Ausforschung, in: Roxin/Widmaier (eds.), 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof. Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, Vol. IV: Strafrecht, Strafprozeßrecht, München 2000, pp. 964–1009.

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  1. Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Orlandino Gleizer

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Dário Moura Vicente

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    Rui Soares Pereira

  3. Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Ana Alves Leal

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Gleizer, O. (2024). Algorithmic Protection of the Core Area of Private Life. On the Deployment of Artificial Intelligence in Computer and Network Surveillance as a Duty of the State. In: Moura Vicente, D., Soares Pereira, R., Alves Leal, A. (eds) Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems. ICASL 2022. Data Science, Machine Intelligence, and Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47946-5_10

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