Abstract
Recently, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have argued that the extended consciousness thesis, namely the claim that the material vehicles of consciousness extend beyond our heads, is entirely compatible with, and actually mandated by, a correct interpretation of the predictive processing framework. To do so, they rely on a potent argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis, namely the Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal Signature (DEUTS) argument. Here, we will critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor, arguing for the following three claims. First, we will claim that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on culture and cultural practices does not help them substantiate the extended consciousness thesis. Secondly, we will argue that the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein formalize the boundaries of a subject’s conscious mind is inadequate, as it yields conclusions running counter some of their assumptions. Lastly, we will argue that the DEUTS argument does not establish the extended consciousness thesis, as it licenses a phenomenal bloat objection which is exactly analogous to the “cognitive bloat” objection to the extended mind thesis. We will thus conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s proposed marriage between the extended consciousness thesis and predictive processing fails, and that, contrary to a popular opinion, DEUTS is not a strong argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For the most up-to-date review of the formal aspects of the Free-energy Principle, see Parr et al. (2022)
- 3.
There is now a vast philosophical literature on Markov Blankets, investigating how this conception of Markov Blankets is removed from the one relevant in machine learning and whether Markov Blankets should be conceived as objective features of biological systems or just as modeling tools (Andrews, 2021; Raja et al., 2021; Bruineberg et al., 2022). Here, we will assume for the sake of discussion that the realistic reading is correct, as it seems the one espoused by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, 2019b). See also (Facchin, 2021, 2022; Menary & Gillett, 2020, 2022) for lengthy and sustained critical analyses of the role Markov Blankets may play in the vehicle externalism debate.
- 4.
Notice that in more traditional theories of motor control such a role is played by forward models (also called motor emulators), which have already been used to operationalize sensorimotor contingencies (e.g. Maye & Engel, 2013).
- 5.
There are other ways to formalize the temporal thickness of a model. One is simply that of observing its hierarchical structure, in which hierarchically higher layers generate predictions over longer timescales, and are thus temporally thicker than hierarchically lower ones. But this way of proceeding seems to apply only to hierarchically structured internal (brain-like) models (e.g. Tani, 2016, Ch. 9–10). Hence, it would beg the question against Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, p. 55) understanding of models. Another way to formalize the temporal thickness of a model may be in terms of expected free energy (Corcoran et al., 2020): roughly, the free-energy expected in the future, after active inference has been performed. However, expected free-energy might not accurately model the free-energy expected in the future, and hence it might prove inadequate to capture the temporal thickness of a model (Millidge et al., 2021). We rely on Friston’s (2018) heuristic to avoid these problems.
- 6.
An order parameter (or collective variable) is a variable describing the behavior of the components of the entire system. See (Kelso, 1995, Ch. 1 and 2) for a useful introduction.
- 7.
Notice that here we are dealing with surprisal. Free-energy can be minimized in other ways too, as indicated above.
- 8.
Notice, importantly, that sensory and active states influence each other, and are thus coupled. This, on Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a, p. 69) view, allows Markov Blankets to capture the idea of sensorimotor contingencies.
- 9.
To be fair to Bruineberg et al. (2018b) we wish to point out that they do not make a similar conclusion about Markov Blankets. Still, it seems to us that such a conclusion follows, if one accepts that free-energy minimizing systems must be enclosed by Markov Blankets.
- 10.
A possible worry here is that constraints are typically described as non-causal (e.g. Lange, 2017). Were constraints to be non-causal, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s coupling based argument would be in danger. However, it is possible to understand constraints as causal (cf. Ross, 2020), and that seems sufficient to rescue Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s argument.
- 11.
Importantly, the environmental duplication need not be total:only the environmental factors with which S is dynamically entangled need to be duplicated in TS. Non-phenomenology-shaping aspects of the environment might still systematically differ.
- 12.
To our knowledge, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein do not provide an explicit definition of cultural practices. However, it seems that they interpret cultural practices as relatively stable, socially regimented, ways of interaction, which induce a relatively stable sensory flow to which an agent can attune its expectations (cfr. Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2020). This way of understanding cultural practices might derive from Kiverstein’s past work on the skilled intentionality framework, which explicitly understands practices as “stable ways of doing things” (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; see also Rietveld et al., 2018 for a presentation of the framework). Many thanks to a colleague for having pointed this out.
- 13.
Notice that, according to Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, this is exactly the role that the “wider” Markov Blanket should play in cases of dynamical entanglement.
- 14.
We won’t, for example, discuss in details Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s complex proposal of a diachronic account of constitution, and we have glossed over a variety of themes explored in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s book.
- 15.
One could challenge this verdict, arguing that many external signs (e.g. traffic lights, stop signs, etc.) do play a role in settling our expectations about the precision of the incoming sensory signals, thereby functioning like a vehicle controlling our precision estimates (see Clark, 2016, Ch. 8 and 9). We doubt, however, that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein can leverage such a challenge against us. This is because this case for vehicle externalism about precision estimation is built upon a parity argument for vehicle externalism (cfr. Constant et al., 2019a, pp. 16–18). But Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, Ch. 1) do not endorse such a parity principle based form of vehicle externalism, and are in fact quite critical of it.
- 16.
Many thanks to two colleagues for discussion on these issues.
- 17.
- 18.
This holds true also in some dynamical models (e.g. Schmidt & Richardson, 2008; Chemero, 2009, pp. 85–98). Intriguingly, (Kirchhoff et al., 2018) seem to point to a different, more demanding, notion of coupling. However, as far as we can see, such a notion of coupling is still lacking an operationalization.
- 19.
Recall that, in this context, “model” simply refers to the internal states of a Markov Blanket.
- 20.
One might object that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein resort to Markov Blankets only to formalize the boundaries of the mind, which need not coincide with the boundaries of the conscious mind. Yet, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, p. 104) take the machinery PP describes to be the physical machinery of consciousness. And Markov Blankets presumably individuate the boundaries of that machinery. It is also worth noting that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, pp. 62–63) introduce Markov Blankets to deal with Chalmers’s (2019) argument against CVE. It thus seems natural to think that, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, Markov Blankets should identify the boundaries of the conscious mind.
- 21.
We chose this example because Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020, p. 12) clearly state that they do not wish to consider oxygen as a constituent of the phenomenal machinery.
- 22.
Kaplan’s (2012) mutual manipulability criterion is another criterion that relies on counterfactual interventions to tell apart the genuine constituents of a subject’s mental machinery from factors that merely causally impacing it. Importantly, however, Kaplan’s criterion requires at least two counterfactual interventions: a “bottom-up” intervention on the putative vehicle and a “top-down” intervention on the relevant (allegedly extended) cognitive phenomenon. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, in contrast, seem only to require “bottom up” interventions on the putative vehicle. So, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s criterion is distinct from Kaplan’s.
- 23.
To be fair, in that paper Kirchhoff and Kiverstein do not deal with CVE directly, but only with cognitive vehicle externalism. However, since Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, p. 104) take the PP explanations of cognitive phenomena to be also an account of phenomenal consciousness, the argument they offer to block the cognitive bloat should also block the consciousness bloat.
- 24.
So much so, that there can be interoceptive perceptual illusions; see (Iodice et al., 2019) for a nice example.
- 25.
Facchin (2021, pp. 15–24) expands on this line of argument in the context of vehicle externalism about cognition, and deflects several intuitive objections to it.
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Facchin, M., Negro, N. (2023). Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness: Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head and the DEUTS Argument Won’t Let It Leak Outside. In: Casper, MO., Artese, G.F. (eds) Situated Cognition Research. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39744-8_12
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