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Salvage and Autonomous Maritime Navigation

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Abstract

The increasing use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) in salvage operations at sea requires a reflection on the adequacy of the current applicable legal framework, while also considering that the ship providing assistance, or the ship to be assisted, may no longer have a master or a crew on board. It means, on the one hand, that the salvage operation presents a lower degree of risk for the salvor; on the other hand, we could say that if the shore-based operator is far from the place where the salvage operations are to be carried out, he may not realize the exact extent of the danger for property and the people. Furthermore, all obligations of conduct of the salvor should be reconsidered, in the light of a new element of evaluation such as the use of artificial intelligence in the management of the ship, also to determine a suitable insurance coverage. This chapter analyzes the problems that may arise from the application of the current conventional law to MASS; it deals with the problem of the salvage reward if the activity is carried out by a MASS; finally, it presents its own concluding remarks.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the EU legal framework on unmanned aerial vehicles, we can report the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, which has provided a preliminary regulatory framework for drones within the European Union. The framework is further implemented by the delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems, and by the implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft.

  2. 2.

    As indicated by the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)) “autonomous transport covers all forms of remotely piloted, automated, connected and autonomous ways of road, rail, waterborne and air transport.”

  3. 3.

    At the end of 1800 the famous inventor Nikola Tesla had already filed a patent request (no. 613,809, of 8 November 1898, application of 1 July 1898, serial number 684,934) entitled “Method of and apparatus for controlling mechanism of moving vessel or vehicles,” in which he underlined the fundamental characteristic of his invention, given by the absence of cables or other mechanical connections: “I require no intermediate wires, cables, or other form of electrical or mechanical connection with the object save the natural media in space.” With considerable clarity, the inventor listed all the possible applications of his invention, currently implemented in the various transport sectors: “The invention which I have described will prove useful in many ways. Vessels or vehicles of any kind may be used, as life, dispatch, or pilot boats or the like, or for carrying letters, packages, provisions, instruments, objects, or materials of any description, for establishing communication with inaccessible regions and exploring the conditions existing in the same, for killing or capturing whales or other animals of the sea, and for many other scientific, engineering, or commercial purposes; but the greatest value of my invention will result from its effect upon warfare and armaments, for by reason of its certain and unlimited destructiveness it will tend to bring about and maintain permanent peace among nations.” On this subject, see the recent Soyer and Tettenborn (2021), pp. 63–80. Among the most dating back works we can mention Crisafulli Buscemi (1933), pp. 191–204. On the theme of the relationship between technological progress and international law of the sea, see also Craven (1985), pp. 1143–1159.

  4. 4.

    See the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)).

  5. 5.

    On this matter, see the Art. 3 of the recent Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council laying down harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative acts, 2021/0106 (COD), and the previous European Parliament resolution 20 October 2020, with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)). The Proposal emphasizes that “Artificial intelligence is a fast evolving family of technologies that can contribute to a wide array of economic and societal benefits across the entire spectrum of industries and social activities. By improving prediction, optimising operations and resource allocation, and personalising digital solutions available for individuals and organisations, the use of artificial intelligence can provide key competitive advantages to companies and support socially and environmentally beneficial outcomes, for example, in healthcare, farming, education and training, infrastructure management, energy, transport and logistics, public services, security, justice, resource and energy efficiency, and climate change mitigation and adaptation.” However, depending on the conditions involving its specific application and use, artificial intelligence may present risks and cause harm, both material and immaterial, to public interests and rights guaranteed by the Union law.

  6. 6.

    Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 98th session, 7–16 June 2017.

  7. 7.

    Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 100th session, 3–7 December 2018. The degrees of autonomy identified are: Degree one: Ship with automated processes and decision support: Seafarers are on board to operate and control shipboard systems and functions. Some operations may be automated and at times be unsupervised but with seafarers on board ready to take control. Degree two: Remotely controlled ship with seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and operated from another location. Seafarers are available on board to take control and to operate the shipboard systems and functions. Degree three: Remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and operated from another location. There are no seafarers on board. Degree four: Fully autonomous ship: The operating system of the ship is able to make decisions and determine actions by itself.

  8. 8.

    On the use of USV for military operations, see Yan et al. (2010), p. 451, according to which “USVs have the potential, and in some cases the demonstrated ability, to reduce risk to manned forces, provide the necessary force multiplication to accomplish military missions, perform tasks which manned vehicles cannot, and do so in a way that is affordable for the navy.” On the use of USVs by the US Navy, see the complete discussion in Savitz et al. (2013). In the study USVs are defined as “maritime vehicles uninhabited by personnel that maintain continuous, substantial contact with the surface” (xiii). For further considerations on the use of drones for military operations, see the most recent Department of the Navy (2021) Unmanned Campaign Framework: 1-37. As an example of military autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (USV) we can mention the Sea Hunter, launched in 2016 as part of the DARPA Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program. See also O’Rourke (2022) Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. In fas.org. and further general considerations on the US Ghost Fleet Overlord Lagrone (2021). News.usni.org: “The Ghost Fleet Overlord program is currently in its second phase, which began in September 2019 and focuses on the integration of government-furnished command-and-control systems and payloads and more complex and challenging naval operations experimentation,” SCO said in a statement. “Phase II is being conducted with the same vessels and industry teams that took part in Phase I and will conclude in early 2022, at which point both Ghost Fleet Overlord vessels will transition to the Navy for further experimentation. The ships will work as part of the Surface Development Squadron based out of San Diego, Calif. Surfdevron. The unit operates two Sea Hunter USVs, the Zumwalt-class destroyers, early Littoral Combat Ships and smaller unmanned aerial and sea vehicles.”

  9. 9.

    See, for example, the Yara Birkeland project, which is nearing completion and it is the result of a collaboration between Yara and Kongsberg. It is one of the first examples of autonomous and zero-emission container ship, totally electric. The ship is a 120 TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units) open top container ship. It will be a fully battery powered solution, prepared for autonomous and unmanned operation. The vessel will reduce NOx and CO2 emissions by reducing diesel-powered truck transport by around 40,000 journeys per year. In addition, short sea shipping connections with autonomous vessels are currently being studied in Europe and the European Commission has founded a research project related to unmanned vessels, called Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN). More recently, the Norwegian maritime authority has identified in the Trondheim fjord the suitable place to test a commercial maritime connection with autonomous vehicles that has been implemented since 2018. At the beginning of 2019, the autonomous boat SEA-KIT Maxlimer successfully made the first sea crossing between the United Kingdom and Belgium: see Autonomous ships: Test areas and research centers making headlines, September 10, 2019, https://safety4sea.com/cm-autonomous-ships-test-areas-and-research-centers-making-headlines. On this topic, see Veal (2018), pp. 1–4; Ringbom (2019), pp. 141–169. Veal et al. (2019), pp. 23–48.

  10. 10.

    Department of the Navy (2021) Unmanned Campaign Framework: 7.

  11. 11.

    Department of Navy (2007) USV Masterplan: 5.

  12. 12.

    On this, see the study conducted by Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) (2015) Funding Scheme: SST.2012.5.2-5: E-guided vessels: the ‘autonomous’ ship - D10.1: Impact on Short Sea Shipping: 3. For MUNIN “Short sea shipping is less complex than deep sea in that an unmanned ship calls at ports more often and Salvage is much easier. Thus, some of the maintenance problems can be reduced or solved at lower cost. Also, close to shore operation is performed in emission control areas where also manned ships need to use cleaner fuels or exhaust cleaning systems. Thus, fuel costs are also less of a problem. Finally, coastal shipping will normally have access to much higher and lower cost communication infrastructure which also reduces cost of operation.” On the MUNIN project, see further considerations in Burmeister et al. (2014), p. 1.

  13. 13.

    As evidenced by Weiger and Pribyl (2017).

  14. 14.

    As reported in Allianz (2019) Shipping safety - Human error comes in many forms. Agcs.allianz.com. Similarly, on the human error in the road traffic incidents, see the Report of the eSafety Working Group (2002), reported by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2016) Saving Lives: Boosting Car Safety in the EU - Reporting on the monitoring and assessment of advanced vehicle safety features, their cost effectiveness and feasibility for the review of the regulations on general vehicle safety and on the protection of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users {SWD(2016) 431 final}: 4.

  15. 15.

    As reported in Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) (2015) Funding Scheme: SST.2012.5.2-5: E-guided vessels: the ‘autonomous’ ship - D10.1: Impact on Short Sea Shipping: 10. On this matter, see further considerations in Ghaderi (2019), p. 152 ss.

  16. 16.

    Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) (2015) Funding Scheme: SST.2012.5.2-5: E-guided vessels: the ‘autonomous’ ship - D10.1: Impact on Short Sea Shipping: 11.

  17. 17.

    As evidenced by Lloyd’s Register (2017) Cyber-enabled ships, ShipRight procedure assignment for cyber descriptive notes for autonomous & remote access ships - A Lloyd’s Register guidance document: 1. Lloyd’s adds that there are multiple reasons to advocate an increase in the ship’s cyber management system: “the potential for better business performance (for example, better fuel economy); the need to comply with environmental and safety legislation; the increased bandwidth provided by modern satellite communications; a shortfall in crew competence (particularly for engineering roles, as complexity and demand for performance increase); the ability to capture and analyse a wide range of data, including operational, service, monitoring, regulation and off-ship storage data; the provision of operational support and guidance; the ability to conduct periodic inspection to enable preventative maintenance; the ability to easily update products based on software (these and other modern ‘cyber’ implementation techniques provide an easy path to product evolution); the fact that a single technology can present multiple design choices, including target, language, development tools, application programme interfaces (APls) and protocols; the ability to future proof ships (by having system components designed to be adapted and extended in function, for example, through software changes); the ability to integrate, flexibility control and optimise systems; the potential for better communication both on and off ship (for example, for data sharing and performing updates and maintenance); the desire for a similar level of robustness as exists in systems based on shore.”

  18. 18.

    As indicated by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2019) ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act): 1.

  19. 19.

    Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 33. The authors underline that “On the 30th September 2020, the United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO) suffered a Cyberattack which disrupted many of its systems. On the same day the French maritime transport and logistics giant CMA CGM S.A. revealed it was also the victim of a malware attack, on 28th September 2020, that affected some servers on its network. This follows similar attacks on Maersk (2017), COSCO (2018) and MSC (April 2020) raising fears that the maritime industry, which accounts for the transportation of 90% of global trade, is regarded as a highly valued target for Cybercriminals.”

  20. 20.

    Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 36. As evidenced in the study “IT/OT convergence is the integration of information technology (IT) systems with operational technology (OT) systems. IT systems are used for data-centric computing; OT systems monitor events, processes and devices, and make adjustments in enterprise and industrial operations.”

  21. 21.

    On this matter, see the The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships - Version 4, produced and supported by BIMCO, Chamber of Shipping of America, Digital Containership Association, International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), InterManager, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), Superyacht Builders Association (Sybass) and World Shipping Council (WSC); it is also possible to analyze the Cyber Security Considerations in Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 32 ss.

  22. 22.

    Very extensive is the list of guidelines and regulatory sources relating to cyber risk management indicated by the Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships - Version 4, cit.: 1: “In 2017, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted resolution MSC.428(98) on Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management System (SMS). The resolution stated that an approved SMS should consider cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the (International Safety Management) ISM Code. It further encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in SMS no later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of Compliance (DoC) after 1 January 2021. The same year, IMO developed guidelines that provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities. As also highlighted in the IMO guidelines, effective cyber risk management should start at the senior management level. Senior management should embed a culture of cyber risk management into all levels and departments of an organisation and ensure a holistic and flexible cyber risk governance regime, which is in continuous operation and constantly evaluated through effective feedback mechanisms. In addition to the IMO resolution, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (April 2018) has also been taken into account in the development of these guidelines. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework assists companies with their approach to risk assessments by helping them understand an effective approach to manage potential cyber risks both internally and externally. As a result of applying the Framework, a ‘profile’ is developed, which can help to identify and prioritise actions for reducing cyber risks. The profile can also be used as a tool for aligning policy, business and technological decisions to manage the risks. Sample framework profiles are publicly available for maritime bulk liquid transfer, offshore, and passenger ship operations. These profiles were created by the United States Coast Guard and NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence with input from industry stakeholders. The NIST’s profiles can be used together with these guidelines to assist industry in assessing, prioritizing, and mitigating their cyber risks. Guidelines are also available from other associations, such as the Digital Container Shipping Association’s (DCSA) ‘DCSA Implementation Guide for Cyber Security on Vessels v1.0.’ The DCSA’s guidelines are based on an analysis of version 3 of these guidelines and the NIST framework. While the target audience for DCSA’s guidelines is the container industry, other segments of shipping may also find them worthwhile to read. The International Association for Classification Societies (IACS) has issued a ‘Recommendation on Cyber Resilience (No. 166).’ This recommendation consolidates IACS’ previous 12 recommendations related to cyber resilience (Nos. 153 to 164) and applies to the use of computer-based systems, which provide control, alarm, monitoring, safety or internal communication functions that are subject to the requirements of a classification society. The IACS recommendation applies to newbuild ships only but can also serve as guidance for existing ships. In due course, IACS is expected to develop Unified Requirements, which will also apply to newbuilds only. This publication is not intended to provide a basis for, and should not be interpreted as, calling for external auditing or vetting the individual company’s and ship’s approach to cyber risk management.”

  23. 23.

    The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships—Version 4, cit.: 3. According to the Guidelines “the maritime industry presents a range of characteristics that affect its vulnerability to cyber incidents, such as involvement of multiple stakeholders in the operation and chartering of a ship potentially resulting in lack of accountability for the IT and OT system infrastructure and ship’s networks; use of legacy IT and OT systems that are no longer supported and/or that rely on obsolete operating systems; use of OT systems that cannot be patched or run anti-virus due to type approval issues; ships that interface online with shoreside parties and other parts of the global supply chain; ship equipment that is remotely monitored and accessed, e.g. by the manufacturers or support providers; the sharing of business critical, data sensitive and commercially sensitive information with shore- based service providers, including marine terminals and stevedores and also, where applicable, public authorities; the availability and use of computer controlled critical systems, which may not have the latest patches installed or be properly secured, for the ship’s safety and for environmental protection; a cyber risk management culture that still has potential for improvement, eg through more formalised training, exercises and clarified roles and responsibilities; frequently the automation system comprises of multiple sub-systems from numerous vendors that are integrated by shipyards with minimal regard to cyber issues.”

  24. 24.

    Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 34.

  25. 25.

    In the Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships - Version 4, cit.: 32, the case of a worm incident on maritime IT and OT is reported, where the ship was built recently, but this system was not connected to the Internet by design, and it was equipped with a power management system that could be connected to the Internet for software updates and patching, remote diagnostics, data collection, and remote operation: “The company’s IT department made the decision to visit the ship and perform vulnerability scans to determine if the system had evidence of infection and to determine if it was safe to connect. The team discovered a dormant worm that could have activated itself once the system was connected to the internet and this would have had severe consequences. The incident emphasizes that even air gapped systems can be compromised and underlines the value of proactive cyber risk management. The shipowner advised the manufacturer about the discovery and requested procedures on how to erase the worm. The shipowner stated that before the discovery, a service technician had been aboard the ship. It was believed that the infection could potentially have been caused by the technician. The worm spread via USB devices into a running process, which executes a programme into the memory. This programme was designed to communicate with its command and control server to receive its next set of instructions. It could even create files and folders. The company asked cyber security professionals to conduct forensic analysis and remediation. It was determined that all servers associated with the equipment were infected and that the virus had been in the system undiscovered for 875 days. Scanning tools removed the virus. An analysis proved that the service provider was indeed the source and that the worm had introduced the malware into the ship’s system via a USB flash drive during a software installation. Analysis also proved that this worm operated in the system memory and actively called out to the internet from the server. Since the worm was loaded into memory, it could affect the performance of the server and systems connected to the internet.”

  26. 26.

    Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 36.

  27. 27.

    In line with this opinion, we can find the statement by Moller-Maersk CEO Soren Skou, that surmises the unlikelihood of unmanned container ships operating at sea for the duration of his life: “Even if the technology advances, I don’t expect we will be allowed to sail around with 400-meter long container ships, weighing 200,000 tonnes without any human beings on board, I don’t think it will be a driver of efficiency, not in my time” (Bloomberg, February 16, 2018).

  28. 28.

    The concept of salvage operation, and the related legal framework in the Italian legal system, can be explored in Severoni (2005a, b) La remunerazione del soccorso tra interesse pubblico e interessi privati, vols. I e II.

  29. 29.

    On this matter, see Calantropio (2019), p. 64; Kas and Johnson (2020).

  30. 30.

    As indicated by Kurowsky et al. (2012), pp. 141–148. See also Ardito et al. (2013), related to a new concept of salvage operations of distressed ships at sea, based on the development of robotized unmanned marine platforms able to (semi-)automatically execute the high-risk operation of linking the emergency towing system of distressed ships to towing vessels, and, more recently, Yoo et al. (2020).

  31. 31.

    See the Annex 2 to the CMI IWG Submission to MSC 99th Session, according to which “it is considered that under the present wording also the electronic restoration of a system from land could be a Salvage operation as long as the vessel was in danger and in navigable waters or any other waters of navigation. Unless this is further specified, this suggests that an entirely shore-based IT-expert who helps to reestablish communication and command of an unmanned ship entitled to a Salvage award.”

  32. 32.

    Severoni (2018), pp. 67–85, which also takes as an example the definition of ship provided by the Italian Navigation Code (Art. 136), as “any construction intended for transport by water, including for the purpose of towing, fishing, pleasure, or for other purposes.” The broad notion that derives from it primarily relies on the element of construction, understood as res connexa and therefore as a set of heterogeneous elements brought together by the work of men, in an element juridically considered in a unitary sense. The construction must have the aptitude to float, a necessary element for it to also possess the aptitude to navigate, or to move by water regardless of the means of propulsion used. It follows that the ship, today as in the times of imperial Rome, is identified with the function that the floating construction is intended to perform, that being navigation—“navis etenim ad hoc paratur ut naviget”—understood in the broad sense of destination for transport as a movement in the water of a manufact used to carry out any activity and regardless of the means of propulsion used. The notion, on the other hand, does not contain any reference to the ship’s crew as a necessary component for its configuration. Soyer and Tettenborn (2021), pp. 63–89.

  33. 33.

    On the role of the shore control center operators and the shore-based operators in general, see Saha (2021). According to the author in the Shore Control Center (SCC) concept “command, control, and/or monitoring of ships will take place from the shore.” Among the definitions reported by the Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 21, we can highlight those of Remote Control, i.e., an “Operational control of some or all ship operations or functions, at a point remote from the ship” and of Remote Control Centre (RCC), that being a site off the ship from which control of an autonomous vessel can be executed. The RCC may be located either ashore or afloat and may exercise varying degrees of control as defined under “Levels of Control.” An RCC may consist of more than one Control Station or Room. A further definition reported by the Code of Practice is that of Remote Monitoring, i.e., “Monitoring some or all ship operations or functions at a point remote from the ship.”

  34. 34.

    Maritime UK (2020) Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems (MASS) UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice - A Voluntary Code Version: 21.

  35. 35.

    See the Work Conducted by the CMI International Working Group on Unmanned Ships. Consolidated analysis of legal Conventions, Annex II, sub-Art. 6 of the Salvage Convention.

  36. 36.

    See the Work Conducted by the CMI International Working Group on Unmanned Ships. Consolidated analysis of legal Conventions, Annex II, sub-Art. 6 of the Salvage Convention.

  37. 37.

    Severoni (2018), pp. 67–85.

  38. 38.

    In this sense Papanicolopulu (2018), p. 187.

  39. 39.

    On this matter, see Kilpatrick (2010), p. 407; Starita (2019), p. 9. Italian navigation code (Art. 489) contains a basic regulation that imposes the obligation to provide assistance to people in danger in the water, in compliance with the spirit of solidarity that informs the maritime world and the degree of civilization of the people of sea, without a right to a reward for the salvage od people: “Absit, o Jupiter, ut lucrum captemus tale ex hominum infortunio” (DIONE, Praes. Orat., VII, quoted by Piantanida L (1806) Della giurisprudenza marittima-commerciale antica e moderna: 13).

  40. 40.

    As evidenced for example by Kenney and Tasikas (2003), p. 151.

  41. 41.

    Veal et al. (2019), p. 23. Some authors (Barnes (2017), p. 185; Papanicolopulu I (2016) The Duty to Rescue at Sea. Peacetime and in War: A General Overview. War and Security at Sea: 495) also apply this duty to the masters of warships or public ships, although Art. 4.1 of the Salvage Convention excludes it: “Without prejudice to article 5, this Convention shall not apply to warships or other non-commercial vessels owned or operated by a State and entitled, at the time of Salvage operations, to sovereign immunity under generally recognized principles of international law unless that State decides otherwise.”

  42. 42.

    Mandrioli (2020), p. 91.

  43. 43.

    Attard and Kilpatrick (2020).

  44. 44.

    On these considerations, see Starita (2019), p. 6; Davies (2003), p. 109; Attard and Kilpatrick (2020). In the case of the Maersk Etienne reported by the two authors: it is a Danish-flagged oil tanker, which was instructed by the Maltese rescue coordination center to attend to a small fishing vessel in distress off the coast of Tunisia in the Gulf of Gabes on 4 August 2020. The ship was diverted off its commercial route, and it rescued 27 migrants. After arriving in Malta, the ship was denied entry into the port, and it remained anchored outside the island’s contiguous zone. Only on 13 September, the migrants were finally disembarked in Pozzallo.

  45. 45.

    Attard and Kilpatrick (2020).

  46. 46.

    Charterparties are contracts that define the rights and the obligations of shipowner and charterer who generally employ the shipowner’s vessel (depending on the specific provisions) for a fixed period or for a specific voyage. On the uncertainty of who bears the risk of rescue-related costs, see in particular Kilpatrick (2010), p. 412 ss. The author adds that the international Conventions also address the issue of deviation as it relates to the rights and liabilities allocated between carriers and shippers under a bill of lading. In this regard, the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), Article IV (4) reads: “Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this Convention or of the contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom.” Similar provisions are contained in the more recent Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, and Rotterdam Rules, exculpating the carrier for losses caused by efforts to save lives at sea.

  47. 47.

    Attard and Kilpatrick (2020).

  48. 48.

    Kilpatrick (2010), p. 403, 433 ss. The author highlights that “While these acts of heroism have been lauded as compliant with entrenched moral and legal obligations, it is often overlooked that they have also come at great expense to shipping industry participants” and the direct and indirect costs arising out of these operations could be staggering.

  49. 49.

    In the Italian legal system under Art. 274 of the navigation code.

  50. 50.

    In compliance with the principle of safeguarding lives at sea, it can be considered that an obligation in this sense derives from Art. 94, paragraphs 3 and 4, letter c of the Montego Bay Convention, which considers the duty of the State to take measures for ships flying its flag to “ensure safety at sea,” among which that to ensure “that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio.” It is further intended that “In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance” (para. 5).

  51. 51.

    In addition to the danger for the salvor, it is also necessary to consider the pressure sometimes exerted by the shipowners or by the charterers, who indefinitely bear the economic costs deriving from the deviations of the route and the delays imposed by the salvage operation: Davies (2003), p. 109.

  52. 52.

    As indicated by Ancis (2019), p. 460.

  53. 53.

    As mentioned in the previous notes, the CART (Cooperative Autonomous Robotic Towing System) project, has developed a system of unmanned robotic marine ships, capable of semi-automatically performing the high-risk operation of connecting the emergency towing system to ships in distress. The innovation aims to reduce the risk to human lives and increase the protection of the environment, helping, for example, to prevent oil pollution at sea during rescue operations. The key idea is to collect a floating object coming from the vessel to be rescued, such as a floating buoy, by tying a knot around it with a floating rope by an unmanned robotic ship that pulls the floating rope, which is connected to the tugboat ring.

  54. 54.

    See the Work Conducted by the CMI International Working Group on Unmanned Ships. Consolidated analysis of legal Conventions, Annex II, sub-Art. 10 of the Salvage Convention.

  55. 55.

    The Nagasaki Spirit, Court of appeal, 4, 5, 6 e 21 dec. 1995. In: Lloyd’s Law Reports, 1996 (I): 459. For the Court “The need to encourage salvors to undertake unusual risks in the general public interest, combined with recognition of the fact that unsuccessful services or ones where no property was saved resulted in payment of any kind, meant that the rewards for success were generous. The jurisdiction was equitable, and it took account of these factors which were extraneous to the individual case.”

  56. 56.

    See the Work Conducted by the CMI International Working Group on Unmanned Ships. Consolidated analysis of legal Conventions, Annex II, sub-Art. 8 of the Salvage Convention.

  57. 57.

    See the Work Conducted by the CMI International Working Group on Unmanned Ships. Consolidated analysis of legal Conventions, Annex II, sub-Art. 14 of the Salvage Convention.

  58. 58.

    On this matter, see the European Commission (2020) White Paper On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust. Brussels, 19.2.2020 COM(2020) 65 final: 2.

  59. 59.

    European Commission (2020) White Paper On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust. Brussels, 19.2.2020 COM(2020) 65 final: 6.

  60. 60.

    As indicated by European Commission (2020) White Paper On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust. Brussels, 19.2.2020 COM(2020) 65 final:13, “Under the Product Liability Directive, a manufacturer is liable for damage caused by a defective product. However, in the case of an AI based system such as autonomous cars, it may be difficult to prove that there is a defect in the product, the damage that has occurred and the causal link between the two. In addition, there is some uncertainty about how and to what extent the Product Liability Directive applies in the case of certain types of defects, for example if these result from weaknesses in the cybersecurity of the product.”

  61. 61.

    European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), sub-Art. 3.

  62. 62.

    European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), sub nr. 7.

  63. 63.

    Under Art. 4.1 of the European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), “The operator of a high-risk AI-system shall be strictly liable for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by that AI-system.”

  64. 64.

    European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), sub nr. 24, according to which the European Parliament “Is of the opinion that, based on the significant potential to cause harm or damage and by taking Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability into account, all operators of high-risk AI-systems listed in the Annex to the proposed Regulation should hold liability insurance; considers that such a mandatory insurance regime for high-risk AI-systems should cover the amounts and the extent of compensation laid down by the proposed Regulation; is mindful of the fact that such technology is currently still very rare, since it presupposes a high degree of autonomous decision making and that, as a result, the current discussions are mostly future-oriented; believes, nevertheless, that uncertainty regarding risks should not make insurance premiums prohibitively high and thereby an obstacle to research and innovation.” Under Art. 4.4 of the aforementioned resolution “The frontend operator of a high-risk AI-system shall ensure that operations of that AI-system are covered by liability insurance that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of this Regulation. The backend operator shall ensure that its services are covered by business liability or product liability insurance that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in Article 5 and 6 of this Regulation. If compulsory insurance regimes of the frontend or backend operator already in force pursuant to other Union or national law or existing voluntary corporate insurance funds are considered to cover the operation of the AI-system or the provided service, the obligation to take out insurance for the AI-system or the provided service pursuant to this Regulation shall be deemed fulfilled, as long as the relevant existing compulsory insurance or the voluntary corporate insurance funds cover the amounts and the extent of compensation provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of this Regulation.”

  65. 65.

    Under Art. 8.2 of the European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), “The operator shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault, relying on either of the following grounds: (a) the AI-system was activated without his or her knowledge while all reasonable and necessary measures to avoid such activation outside of the operator’s control were taken, or (b) due diligence was observed by performing all the following actions: selecting a suitable AI-system for the right task and skills, putting the AI-system duly into operation, monitoring the activities and maintaining the operational reliability by regularly installing all available updates. The operator shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity, device or process driven by his or her AI-system. The operator shall not be liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure.”

  66. 66.

    As stated by Nevejans (2016), p. 5, “Once a new legal and ethical sector surfaces, a general approach to the big theoretical questions needs to be found in the first instance, so as to eliminate any misunderstanding or misconceptions about robotics and artificial intelligence. When we consider civil liability in robotics, we come up against fanciful visions about robots. Here we must resist calls to establish a legal personality based on science fiction. This will become all the more crucial once the liability law solutions adopted in respect of autonomous robots determine whether this new market booms or busts.”

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  1. Department of Legal Sciences, University of Udine, Udine, Italy

    Cecilia Severoni

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    Kyriaki Noussia

  2. Law School, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

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Severoni, C. (2023). Salvage and Autonomous Maritime Navigation. In: Noussia, K., Channon, M. (eds) The Regulation of Automated and Autonomous Transport. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32356-0_6

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