Abstract
This chapter explains the main features of drive theory as advanced in the secondary literature. I use Mattia Riccardi’s article “Virtuous Homunculi: Nietzsche on the Order of Drives” and its five-fold account of drives as a model unfolding each component of this framework in greater detail. In examining these five aspects of drive theory, I explore each feature’s principal problems. For this last component, the critical part, I utilize Tom Stern’s incisive article “Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives” which analyzes the problematic philosophical and philological features of Nietzsche’s drive theory. In combining Stern’s insights with my own, I demonstrate that applying the Separation Thesis to drive theory itself marks the way forward. To this end, I conceive of drives as implexes: they are the symbolic intersection between cognitive and affective components. I then argue that the task of genealogy is to trace how earlier, more ancient threads of these systems come to form new practices, discourses, and principally subjects. Finally, with this drive model now worked out schematically, I turn my attention to explaining drives in light of the Internalization Hypothesis in Chap. 4.
Another critical issue raised in this chapter is the homunculi problem. Of the five-fold features of drives explained in this Chap. 3 one aspect stands out as the most problematic: drives evaluate. The idea that drives can evaluate some object or action as ‘good’ leads to the Homunculi problem where drives are like little agents. Riccardi attempts to solve this problem by relying on Dennett’s intentional theoretic stance model. I demonstrate that Riccardi is an insincere intentionalist and that his solution conjures up more difficulties than it solves.
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Notes
- 1.
For psychological accounts of drives, see BGE 117, GS 49, HH1 138. For biological accounts, obviously GM II 16, D 119, BGE 13 and GS, 349 and GS 1. For metaphysical accounts, see the infamous passage of BGE 36 and WP 461. There are secondary works that explore each of these readings. In the main, I explore the principal psychological accounts of drives in this chapter.
- 2.
The causal relationship between drives and agency is difficult to navigate. There are, what I would call reductive accounts where agency is causally reducible to the collection of drives which make up the physiological/mental confluence that is the person. Then, there are softer, causal theories which suggest that drives are merely persuasive in that they direct what we find choice-worthy and in addition influence the process of decision-making in evaluating actions deemed worthy of choosing. I explore two representative interpretations (i.e. Leiter for the former and Katsafanas for the latter) from each camp below.
- 3.
Matias Riccardi, “Virtuous Homunculi: Nietzsche on the Order of Drives”, Inquiry an International Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1) 21–41 (2018).
- 4.
Tom Stern, Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives Journal of the American Philosophical Association Vol 1. Issue 1 Spring (2015) 121–140, 122.
- 5.
Christopher Fowles, “The Heart of Flesh: Nietzsche on Affects and the Interpretation of the Body” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 58, Number 1, January 2020, 113–139.
- 6.
Mark Alfano, Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology Cambridge University Press, 2019, 69.
- 7.
John Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, (Oxford University Press, 2004), 11–12.
- 8.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 40.
- 9.
Stern, “Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives”, 127.
- 10.
Far more on this see my paper, Brian Lightbody, “Can We Truly Love That Which is Fleeting? The Problem of Time in Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization.” Florida Philosophical Review (1) 25–42 2010.
- 11.
According to Peter Tse, one-shot learning is the unique human, all too human ability. “to make associations among arbitrary categories of things and events.” As Tse concretizes the idea: “In contrast, (to animals), a three-year old child can pretend that a block is a truck and then, a moment later, pretend that it is a monster. This capacity to instantly remap the referent of an object file is unique to humans and is at the heart of why our cognition can be truly symbolic.” Tse, Peter, Ulric. “Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality.” Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness Vol. 1 Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. MIT Press, 2008, 269–297, 269–271.
- 12.
Alfano, Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology, 51.
- 13.
Alfano, 51.
- 14.
Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology”, 752.
- 15.
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 91.
- 16.
Brian Leiter, “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche,” in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator, ed. Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 219.
- 17.
Brian Leiter, Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, Oxford University Press, 2019, 3.
- 18.
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 8.
- 19.
Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 100.
- 20.
Brian Leiter, Moral Psychology With Nietzsche, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 9.
- 21.
See Leiter’s discussion of Daniel Wegner’s The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2002) on 141–142 of Moral Psychology With Nietzsche along with Leiter’s discussion of “Libet experiments” which test RP (Readiness Potential) in Leiter’s earlier paper, “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will”, Philosopher’s Imprint, Vol. 7 No. 7, 2007 1–15, 13.
- 22.
Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology’. In K. Gemes and J. Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013), 752.
- 23.
Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology’. In K. Gemes and J. Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013), 752.
- 24.
G.E.M Anscombe Intentions Anscombe, Elizabeth, Intention, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957) secs. 5–8.
- 25.
There are many important works in the secondary literature that emphasize the biological and physiological aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy. See Gregory Moore’s Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor, (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Daniel Ahern’s Nietzsche as Cultural Physician, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Richard S.G. Brown’s two articles, “Nihilism: “Thus Speaks Physiology” in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics edited by Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 133–144. “Nietzsche: That Profound Physiologist”, in Nietzsche and Science Eds (Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer, (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2004) 51–71. Wayne Klein’s Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). In what follows, I will choose to examine Brian Leiter’s “type-fact” position for its lucidity and comprehensiveness.
- 26.
This is an objection Robert Brandom makes to all forms of genealogical inquiry in his work: “Reason, Genealogy and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity.” The Howison Lectures in Philosophy delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, March 13, 2013. For a transcript, see: www.pitt.edu/~brandom/downloads/RGHM%20%2012-11-21%20a.doc. I respond to Brandom in Brian Lightbody “Hermeneutics vs. Genealogy: Brandom’s Cloak or Nietzsche’s Quilt” The European Legacy, Vol. 25 Issue 6, 2020, 635–652 Vol 2.
- 27.
See for example: Alfred Mele, Effective Intentions (Oxford University Press, 2009) Chapter Five ‘Intentional Actions Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will” for a plethora of critical concerns directed at the experimental design of Libet tests.
- 28.
For a lucid summary of constitutivism see Luca Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 2009, 303–333.
- 29.
Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzsche’s Constitutivism: Oxford University Press, 2013, 39.
- 30.
Paul Katasafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzsche’s Constitutivism Oxford University Press, 2013, 204.
- 31.
Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics, 207.
- 32.
Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics, 208.
- 33.
Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and The Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (1971).5–20.
- 34.
Stern, “Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives,” 126.
- 35.
Stern, “Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives”, 122.
- 36.
Alfred Mele Akrasia, “Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires”, Noûs Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), 281–302.
- 37.
Stern, 123.
- 38.
Stern, 123.
- 39.
Also see “Every ideal presupposes love and hatred, admiration and contempt. Either the positive emotion is the primum mobile or the negative emotion. For example, in all ressentiment ideals hatred and contempt are the primum mobile.” (KGW VIII.2.10.9).
- 40.
Lanier R Anderson, “What is a Nietzschean Self?” In Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (eds) Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 205–235, 216.
- 41.
Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, (Oxford University Press: 1995), 174.
- 42.
Peter Poellner “Affect, Value, and Objectivity”, in Nietzsche and Morality Edited by Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhabu, (Oxford University Press, 2007) 227–262, 229. Poellner goes on to write: “Nietzsche’s claims that (i) all evaluation at the ground level involves ‘affects’, including prominently emotions, and that (ii) evaluative experience strikes us pre-reflectively as perceptual, point towards a construal of (some) ‘affects’ as apparent perceptions of value.” (235).
- 43.
Christopher Janaway, “Genealogy and Naturalism” Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy” edited by Ken Gemes, Simon May (Oxford University Press), 2009 51–69, 55.
- 44.
Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, 214.
- 45.
Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology’. In K. Gemes and J. Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 726–55 Paul Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 94.
- 46.
Christopher Fowles “The Heart of the Flesh, 114.
- 47.
Mattia Riccardi “Virtuous Homunculism”, 23.
- 48.
One of the issues with drives is the inability of the theory to make any sense of psychological causation. They appear in the words of Riccardi: “At first sight, Nietzschean–and of course, Freudian–drives are likely to appear as obsolete remnants of 19th century-theorizing.” Mattia Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, Oxford University Press, 2021, 67.
- 49.
See John Dupre, “How to be Naturalistic Without Being Simplistic in the Study of Human Nature,” in Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Mario De Carlo and David MacArthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 289. Also see chapter four of Brian Lightbody, The Problem of Naturalism: Analytic Perspectives, Continental Virtues (Lanham: MD, Lexington Press, 2013) Chapter 4.
- 50.
Daniel Dennett, Intentional Systems Theory, Microsoft Word - dennett_ready_for_CE _2_.doc (tufts.edu), 20.
- 51.
Dennett, “Intentional Systems Theory”, Microsoft Word - dennett_ready_for_CE _2_.doc (tufts.edu), 20.
- 52.
Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Dynamic Metapsychology: This Uncanny Animal, (New York: Palgrave 2014), 138.
- 53.
Welshon, Nietzsche’s Dynamic Metapsychology, 138.
- 54.
See Mattia Riccardi’s Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology Oxford University Press, 2021) pp. 49–50.
- 55.
There is another reading which I will not examine: the normative interpretation proposed by Clark and Dudrick. I will not engage with this reading for two reasons. One, my goal is to take Nietzsche’s thesis in Beyond Good and Evil section 230 and GM II 16 more particularly seriously in that both passages suggest that Nietzsche is attempting to translate “man back into nature.” The normative reading, as I understand it, instead, attributes rationality to drives themselves in order to account for their ranking within the ‘soul.’ The idea of rank here according to Clark and Dudrick is irreducible to causal etiology. As Clark and Dudrick mention: “One drive has a higher rank than another not in virtue of causal efficaciousness, its ability to win cases of conflicts, but in virtue of being recognized as having a right to win in such cases.” Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick. The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 150. They invoke Sellars’ distinction between the realm of causes and that of reasons to buttress their argument. See Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 169. “In characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what it says.”
However and this leads me to my second reason for rejecting a more fulsome discussion of this view point, I find Riccardi’s criticism of this model to be particularly devastating. As he demonstrates, their project is incoherent. He writes:
In my view, these difficulties stem from a deeper problem at the heart of C&D’s normative reading and ultimately deriving from their oscillation between the naturalistic model of the mind defended by Dennett and the anti-naturalistic one underlying the Sellarsian framework. On the one hand, the followers of Sellars who argue that psychological descriptions cannot be further analyzed into causal ones typically deny that they can be applied at the subpersonal level. In other words, they propose that the normative-causal distinction be straightforwardly aligned with the personal-subpersonal distinction. This crucial feature of the standard Sellarsian story, however, is clearly rejected by C&D, for they want to ascribe normative features to the subpersonal drives. On the other hand—and precisely to find support for the idea that agent-like features can also be found at the subpersonal level—they fall back on Dennett’s understanding of the personal- subpersonal distinction. However, though Dennett does argue that personal-level predicates can also be meaningfully applied to a person’s parts, he allows descriptions so couched to be further analyzed into causal ones. Thus, at least in principle, there is for Dennett no limit to the further decomposition of the mind’s functions all the way down to elementary processes manageable of causal description. There is no place for irreducible normativity in this picture, nor for any strict compartmentalization between ‘space of reasons’ and ‘space of causes.’ (Mattia Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 58). My interpretation is an attempt to flesh out what a sincere intentionalist system theoretic model would look like.
- 56.
Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, 160.
- 57.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 6.
- 58.
Riccardi “Virtuous Homunculi”, 24.
- 59.
Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 49.
- 60.
Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, 160.
- 61.
Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, 163–164.
- 62.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 51.
- 63.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 51
- 64.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 53.
- 65.
Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 42
- 66.
See Brian Lightbody Nietzsche’s Will to Power Naturalized Translating the Human into Nature and Nature into the Human (Lanham Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017) 100.
- 67.
Neil Campbell, Biology. Menlo Park California, Benjamin and Cummings, 1991. Also see George F. R. Ellis, “On the Nature of Emergent Reality” in The Reemergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, Oxford University Press, 2006), 79–109.
- 68.
Enrique d’Harcourt Rowold, Lara Schulzea, Sandra Van der Auwera, Hans Jörgen Grabea “Paternal transmission of early life traumatization through epigenetics: Do fathers play a role?” Medical Hypotheses Volume 109, November 2017, Pages 59–64. Youngeun Choi and Susan E. Mango, “Hunting for Darwin’s gemmules and Lamarck’s fluid: Transgenerational signaling and histone methylation” Biochimica et Biophysica Acta (BBA)—Gene Regulatory Mechanisms Volume 1839, Issue 12, December 2014, Pages 1440–1453.
- 69.
“Indeed, Nietzsche’s Larmarckian tendencies—which we’ve noted before—erode the boundary between these two kinds of selection (natural and social).” Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 192.
- 70.
Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology”, 2013 744 and The Nietzschean Self, 101. Katsafanas writes: “We have already seen that drives do not just blindly impel an agent to act. Rather drives operate by influencing the agent’s perception and reflective thought, generating affective orientations.”
- 71.
Stern, “Against Nietzsche’s Theory of Drives”, 122.
- 72.
David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. I.1 v: 12.
- 73.
Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 60.
- 74.
Robert Dahl quoted from Power a Radical View Second Edition by Steven Lukes (London: Palgrave, 2005).
- 75.
Lukes Power A Radical View, 20.
- 76.
Lukes, Power A Radical View, 20.
- 77.
Riccardi, “Virtuous Homunculi”, 37.
- 78.
“Thus consider an individual who sees a moderately large animal in his or her proximity. The drive to nourishment might prompt the individual to interact with that animal as if it were a potential source of food; so, for instance, under the influence of that drive perceptual capacities would be trained to help figure the quickest route toward that animal.” Riccardi’s utilizes Geme’s recruitment model of drives and extends its capacities to emotions. Ken Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38 (1): 38–59, 2009, 51.
- 79.
Mattia Riccardi, “Virtuous Homunucli”, 37.
- 80.
For a recent work that summarizes the physiology of emotions see Lisa Feldman Barret, How Emotions are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (New York: Mariner Books, 2018). Chapter 4 The Origin of Feeling, 56–84.
- 81.
Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 67.
- 82.
Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 67.
- 83.
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- 84.
Panksepp, J. (2011). Cross-species affective neuroscience decoding of the primal affective experiences of humans and related animals. PLoS ONE 6:e21236. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.
- 85.
Panksepp, J., Normansell, L., Cox, J., and Siviy, S. (1994). “Effects of neonatal decortication on the social play of juvenile rats.” Physiol. Behav. 56, 429–443. https://doi.org/10.1016/0031-9384(94)90285-2.
- 86.
Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Dynamic Metapsychology: This Uncanny Animal, 121.
- 87.
Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 68.
- 88.
Cezary Zechowski, “Theory of drives and emotions—from Sigmund Freud to Jaak Panksepp Psychiatry. Pol. 2017; 51(6): 1181–1189 1184–1185. “Tertiary processes include cognitive functions, thoughts and planning as well as reflection, regulation of emotions, and “free will”, called Intention-in-Action by Panksepp and mentalization by Fonagy.” (1185) These functions of which drives also share some features emerge from other parts of the brain according to Panksepp.
- 89.
See Panksepp, J. B., and Huber, R. (2004). Ethological analyses of crayfish behavior: a new invertebrate system for measuring the rewarding properties of psychostimulants. Behav. Brain Res. 153, 171–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2003.11.014.
- 90.
Panksepp, J., and Yovell, Y. (2014). Preclinical modeling of primal emotional affects (Seeking, Panic and Play): gateways to the development of new treatments for depression. Psychopathology 47, 383–393. https://doi.org/10.1159/000366208.
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Lightbody, B. (2023). Drives in the Secondary Literature. In: A Genealogical Analysis of Nietzschean Drive Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27148-9_3
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