A Problem We Fueled: Learning Lessons from Corruption in Afghanistan

Abstract

Although U.S. officials came to see corruption as undermining the mission in Afghanistan, they failed to sufficiently appreciate or act on a crucial dimension of the problem: U.S. policies and practices incentivized graft and greatly contributed to the growth of corruption after 2001. Layers of contracting enriched the well-connected; weak oversight led to fraud and abuse; the volume of injected money was too much for Afghanistan’s small economy to absorb; and U.S. partnerships with corrupt, abusive actors perpetuated a culture of impunity that alienated the population. The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan for years relied on the survival of the Kabul government; Afghan leaders knew this, and that blunted whatever leverage Washington seemingly had over the political elite in Kabul. The United States repeatedly prioritized stability over justice, and in the end, got neither. U.S. policymakers should take several lessons from Afghanistan, to apply in similar contexts: strengthen U.S. oversight and accountability for civilian and military spending; calibrate levels of U.S. spending to not exceed a country’s absorptive capacity; invest in understanding the nature and scope of corruption; hold host country leaders accountable particularly for high-level corruption; prioritize anticorruption controls when developing the capacity of partner security forces; and invest long-term in civil society actors who are building social cohesion, transparency, and accountability within their political system.