Abstract
Is budgeting policy still a purely national matter or have things changed lately? In the past decades, public budgeting of European countries has been subject both to the pre-determined schedule of the European Semester and to economic and fiscal limits that affect national government’s choices in terms of policies. At first, this chapter sketched out the most important phases that marked the history of Italian national accounts from the 1980s until today. Then, while tracing the evolution of the Italian domestic budgetary process (rules and praxes) and the European Economic Governance, it sheds light on the rationale behind the Italian long-lasting reform process. Overall, the domestic process of reform of the budgetary policy and its link with the supranational level resembles an incremental pattern of development, despite the many critiques of Italy about its apparent reluctance and inability to adapt both to new challenges and to the European regulations.
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Notes
- 1.
That reforming process was the largest among OECD countries, equivalent to approximately 12 per cent of GDP (Goldstein 2006).
- 2.
Mistaken economic forecasts for successive years are rather frequent in Italian economic management, where governments tend to optimistically appraise the expected revenues and growth rates more than what it is justifiable and more than the actual level of both (Damonte 2013).
- 3.
The term ‘spread’ refers to the differential between the Italian ten-year benchmark bonds (BTP) and the German Bund.
- 4.
To accomplish the balanced budget in three years, the government planned cutbacks of 1.2 and 2.3 percentage points of the GDP over the next two years. Nevertheless, it did not manage to achieve the expected result. In this respect, it is possible to distinguish three phases of the evolution of budget policy programming and of its failure, beginning from 2008. The first phase started with the budget for 2009 and foresaw a balanced budget as soon as 2011, which evidently did not take into consideration the upcoming crisis. When the magnitude of the recession became clear, the budget law for 2010 and 2011 did not even mention a balanced budget. The sovereign debt crisis pushed European institutions to narrow the political leeway over national accounts in order to meet the economic and fiscal constraints targeted to recover from the crisis. The last phase is the 2014 one, once again disattained.
- 5.
The other type of budgetary process is the ‘delegation model’: a procedure-oriented approach, predominant in one-party governments and characterised by a leading cabinet. The delegation approach gives a powerful role to the Minister of Finance, who controls the budget by proposing and legislating without any strong tie from other actors and with a rather ample bargaining power vis-à-vis other spending ministers. This leads to having a sort of veto cabinet with enough power to modify the budget almost unilaterally, if the domestic circumstances or international junctures require interventions, or to simply alter the allocation of resources avoiding a costly negotiation within the executive and between the executive and the legislative.
- 6.
Whether it was the financial law, the stability law (after L. 196/2009) or the budget itself (since L. 243/2012), as stated in art. 11 of these norms.
- 7.
According to art. 81 of the Italian Constitution, the budget is covered by the so-called riserva di legge, meaning that only the parliament can legislate on that issue, while the government cannot.
- 8.
Two limits are in place: one lies in the timing, meaning that a spending deviation can be sorted out during the time span of the ongoing budgetary session; the other concerns the availability of financial resources, so that any spending forecast must be sufficient to support that deviation.
- 9.
The safety clauses are tools, established by the decreto taglia-spese, which guarantee financial backing in case the cost of a specific measure is not explicitly mentioned in the budget or if it is a provisional cost (Canaparo 2015). The guarantee was pursued in a twofold way: either setting expenditure ceilings to block any additional expenditure not previously foreseen, in the case of new general measures with financial effects; or resorting to safety clauses in the case of measures attributive to individual rights (Giarda P. and Goretti 2003).
- 10.
This was forbidden by art. 81 co. 3, eventually deleted from the law (Giarda P. 2019). Also, the law exacerbated the marginalisation of the parliament, by creating the Parliamentary Budget Office (Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio, UPB)—a new independent agency designated to monitor respect for the European Semester (ES) requirements (see Sect. 3.4)—which is currently composed of members of the governing majority and lacks effective powers to intervene.
- 11.
This broke with the tradition that assigned the presidency to a member of the opposition party, to act as a mediator (interview with Dr Chiara Bergonzini [6/12/2019]). 2018 is the first year since 1994 that the president of the Senate (Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, Go Italy, Forza Italia, FI) was not a member of the governing majority that took office at the beginning of the legislative term, although FI and the winner of the elections (Five Star Movement, M5S) were able to converge on her name before FI moved to opposition because Salvini (the leader of League) decided to join a coalition with the M5S.
- 12.
The rationale is to prevent the president of a Chamber from being in conflict with the president of the other Chamber (Degni and De Ioanna 2004).
- 13.
This is an epithet forged by the MP Boccia in 2001 and later used by Fini in 2006. See Camera, Ass., res. sten. sed. 18/12/2001, p. 58 (Boccia) and Camera, Ass., res. sten. sed. 14/11/2006, p. 58 (Fini).
- 14.
To give an example (referring only to the Senate), the number of amendments presented in the V Committee was 3700 in 2000, 1700 in 2001, 5000 in 2002, 1900 in 2003, 1400 in 2004, 2000 in 2005 and 4300 in 2006 (Bergonzini 2014), to arrive at 6482 (at the V Committee of the Chamber) in 2020 (Bergonzini 2021).
- 15.
Otherwise, if an amendment is withdrawn in the Committee it is not possible to present it again in parliament. Thus, on some occasions the rejection is deliberately requested to make it possible to present the amendment in the Chamber (Bergonzini 2014).
- 16.
From a normative point of view, the maxi-amendment leaps over the other legislative proposals, thus, once the government submits it to the parliament, it is immediately discussed and voted on. The practice of combining the maxi-amendment with the confidence vote, which is already the norm, guarantees that the maxi-amendment is always approved.
- 17.
In practice, as underlined by some scholars of parliamentary and public law (among others, Ciolli [2013]; Bergonzini [2014]), the measures lacked the requirements of ‘necessity and urgency’ envisaged by art. 77 of the Constitution. This is corroborated by the absence of consequences for the GDP that year and the subsequent use of the economic crisis as a leitmotif of budgetary norms, particularly during the period 2008–2012 (Camera dei Deputati 2012).
- 18.
This violated the lodo Pera-Morando (Bergonzini 2014: 82–86; Gambale and Perrotta 2004), a parliamentary procedure established during the XIV legislature which forbade the government from adding a confidence vote on a text that the Committee had not previously scrutinised. Although governments have repeatedly tried to elude this norm, the president of the V Committee had always intervened and forced the government to withdraw the modifications and to vote on the text approved by the Committee. This allowed the lodo to survive for about fifteen years until 2016, when the government placed the confidence vote on the text passed by the Council of Ministers because of the government crisis and the government’s resignation which did not allow an orderly exam.
- 19.
Interview with Dr Chiara Bergonzini, academic researcher of Constitutional law and expert in parliamentary law of the budgetary process (6/12/2019, own translation).
- 20.
- 21.
The SGP is a set of rules which pursue sound public finances of Member States and coordinate their fiscal policies. The EDP, opened by the European Commission, includes a waiver if the excessive deficit is only temporary and exceptional and if the deficit is close to the ceiling of 3 per cent (European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessive-deficit-procedure_en).
- 22.
The DPF was compiled only in 2010, because it was substituted right away by L. 39/2011 which introduced the Document of Economy and Finance (DEF).
- 23.
The ES (Regulation 1175/2011, Recital 9) finds its legal basis in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art. 121 and 148, stating that the European Union Member States need to coordinate their economic and employment policies to assure the functioning of the monetary union.
- 24.
Moving from previous works (e.g. Scharpf [2001]; Börzel [2005]), the authors found a ‘medium expansion’ of the breadth of the economic policy surveillance put in place by the Commission and a ‘little expansion’ of the coordination of national policies. On the side of depth, they estimated a ‘strong expansion’ of the Commission’s economic policy surveillance and a ‘medium expansion’ of the coordination of national policies.
- 25.
The Six-Pack specified that a country can be walked into the deficit procedure when the requirement of debt-to-GDP ratio under 60 per cent is not respected, even though the deficit is below 3 per cent. However, as specified by the European Commission (2011), the assessment considers ‘relevant factors and the impact of the economic cycle’ when deciding whether to carry out the EDP.
- 26.
The balanced budget rule establishes that a country’s budget situation should be at least balanced with the structural deficit not exceeding a country-specific Medium-Term budgetary Objective (MTO), that is, 0.5 per cent of GDP per year for those states with a debt-to-GDP ratio over 60 per cent or 1 per cent of GDP for states whose debt level respects the 60 per cent limit. After the Fiscal Compact entered into force on 1 January 2013, almost all European countries introduced in their internal legislations a balanced budget rule. The debt brake rule demands from those countries with excessive debt a reduction at an average rate of at least one-twentieth per year (5 per cent) of the excessive percentage points. Countries are expected to provide their report on both deficit and debt, with the latter being an ex ante issuance plan that Member States have to submit to both the Commission and the Council.
- 27.
In this regard, a wide part of the literature is reasonably convinced that European constraint is used as a scapegoat for the Italian economic policy problems, whereas it is a membership constraint more than a legal one. In fact, the real obligation comes from the financial markets and the level of the spread. It seems that ‘the declining financial sovereignty is the consequence of markets’ reduced confidence rather than the effect of European constraints’ (Pisaneschi 2019: 167, own translation). Indeed, it has been argued that the stringency of European rigour on national budgets depends on the control of Member States over their level of deficit and debt. Sanctions increase as long as a country deviates from supranational parameters. According to this line of thinking, the European external constraint simply highlights the Italian debt exposure which affects the sovereign credit rating (interview with Dr Chiara Bergonzini, 6/12/2019).
- 28.
The discussion and a first attempt to introduce the ZBB started in 2012, after the issue of L. 243/2012 (art. 21, co. 1). The uniqueness of the ZBB is that it is built each time starting from zero, meaning without looking at previous appropriations (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 2014: 4).
- 29.
Thanks to the NGEU, the Commission can borrow money on the financial markets, transfer these resources to Member States as grants and repay these funds by increasing taxes (Fabbrini 2022: 197).
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Cavalieri, A. (2023). Budgeting Policy Within the Union: Italy in the European Context. In: Italian Budgeting Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15447-8_3
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