Abstract
As described earlier at the beginning of Chapter 2, we reason about multiplayer games using solution concepts, principles according to which we identify interesting subsets of the outcomes ofa game. While the most important solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, there are also a large number of others, only some of which we will discuss here. Some of these concepts are more restrictive than the Nash equilibrium, some less so, and some noncomparable. In subsequent chapters we will introduce some additional solution concepts that are only applicable to game representations other than the normal form.
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© 2008 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
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Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y. (2008). Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games. In: Essentials of Game Theory. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01545-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01545-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-00417-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-01545-8
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