Abstract
I argue that the first book of the Republic is an integral part of the whole work. I focus on the definitions proposed by the three main interlocutors in that book. Since justice for Plato is each individual doing their own work and not meddling in the affairs of others and each class in the good city has their own work, each class has their own specific way to be just. On my view, each interlocutor presents the definition of justice relevant to the class they represent in the good city. Each view of justice in the first book offers a partial understanding of justice and forms a proper part of the definitions of justice in the good city. Socrates’ refutation of each definition of justice presents problems that must be resolved for the proper understanding of how that conception of justice fits with the whole. I show how Plato resolves problems Socrates raises in the first book in other parts of the Republic. My reading also has the advantage of exhibiting how Plato’s definition is neither empty nor ignores our ordinary conception of justice.
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Notes
- 1.
I limit my discussion to Books II–VII, since those books are where I locate Plato resolving these sets of problems raised in Book I concerning the three interlocutors’ definitions.
- 2.
The respective work of each class is what they owe to the rest of the city, and this work contributes to how the city functions as a whole.
- 3.
I provide some defense of the view in the paper, but much more needs to be said and cannot be developed in this chapter.
- 4.
This seems to be the view of Kraut (1992, 316). He claims the definition by itself does not tell us what kind of order we should bring about in our soul, so it follows on his reading that we do not know the proper work of each part.
- 5.
- 6.
To be clear, I take good character to be what any citizen of the just city must have, and, in the lower two classes, these are virtues as Socrates claims in Book VII to be more akin to those of the body, produce by habit and practice (518d–e). So one can have good character but lack knowing the Good, which only philosopher-kings grasp.
- 7.
The craftsmen in the just city only make as much as is needed to maintain its moderate way of life. So, any cheating or lying would imply both a lack for at least one citizen and an unjust gain for another.
- 8.
When rejecting Cephalus’ definition of justice, Plato refutes the view by appealing to the following example: you have borrowed a weapon from a friend when they are of sound mind (sōphronountos), but now they are mad (maneis). It would now be unjust to return the weapon.
- 9.
To be clear, the auxiliaries do not know the Good but rather can recognize who is good, those who have any or all of the virtues, from those who lack them. They cannot distinguish them by means of a rational account.
- 10.
One instance is Crito 48b.
- 11.
See Gorgias 512a and 481a. Both passages imply that death could be a benefit to someone. But death need not be a benefit either. Socrates’ case in Crito is an example. Socrates is simply not wronged in being killed. So, killing here could remain neutral: the auxiliaries do no wrong in killing their enemy.
- 12.
Accepting the view of justice that each does their own work and not the work of others, the rulers of this immoderate city want more, hence attacking another city for its goods, but the auxiliaries can only pit another class against these rulers by offering them goods and the possibility of rule. One could argue that this is unjust. But the other class only agrees because of the immoderate desires already present in them. So, we can see that it might be possible that the rulers are benefited by being killed or being dethroned, since they are not just rulers, but it is hard to argue that the other class is benefited, the one that overthrows its rulers, since they will fail to be just rulers as well given that they also have excessive desires.
- 13.
I share a similar view as Leo Strauss on this particular issue (1964, 73). I do not take Plato to identify justice with beneficence or claim that the former entails the latter. Strauss, though, takes Polemarchus’ view on justice to remain preserved in the discussion of the just city. My view is distinct in the sense that I take all three views to be present in the just city but not as preserved, per se, but as revised, resolving the problems Socrates raises. I also distinguish a distinct enemy that the auxiliaries have, immoderate desires and bad character, and not simply foreign regimes. This is important, since I take it that neither the auxiliaries nor philosopher-kings have interest in attacking another city or being enemies with them, since they have no need or desire for war, given that the source of war is going beyond need.
- 14.
The claim here is made by Glaucon, and he uses another term for “strong” (“errōmenos”), but it is hard to imagine Socrates denying this claim that knowledge is the strongest power to have. It sits at the top of the divided line.
- 15.
We cannot reject this view, even though it is part of the noble lie, since both the beginning of Book IV and the compulsion of philosopher-kings entail this view: No one group of the city is to be made extremely happy at the expense of the happiness of the whole city (420b–c, 519e–520a).
- 16.
Once again, I appear to have a similar view as Strauss. We both hold that just character is produced by doing the work of philosophy; knowing the Good is the advantage of the stronger. But Strauss excludes this completely from the life of the philosopher when they are ruling (1964, 127–28). But, as I show, Plato asserts that both lives have advantage insofar as having real virtue is always to one’s advantage, that is, the life in the cave ruling the city and the life contemplating the Good and the interconnection between all intelligible things.
Works Cited
Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bloom, A., trans. 1991. The Republic of Plato. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books.
Irwin, T. 1995. Plato’s Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kahn, C. 1993. Proleptic Composition in the Republic, Or Why Book 1 was Never a Separate Dialogue. The Classical Quarterly 43: 131–142.
Kraut, R. 1992. The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic. In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut, 311–337. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strauss, L. 1964. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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This chapter is dedicated to Edward C. HalperHalper, Edward. I took my first course from him in the Fall of 1996 on PlatoPlato. The third week into the term, he analyzed an argument in the Symposium, and it was at that moment I realized how I read and tried to do philosophy up to that point was all wrong. The chapter also was indirectly inspired by that class. HalperHalper, Edward claimed that the definitionDefinition of justiceJustice in Book IV was empty. I thought that this had to be wrong. This is my attempt to answer that charge as well as how Book I is often read. I have no idea whether this is Halper’sHalper, Edward view or not or whether he agrees with anything in this paper. I hope that it reflects how he has taught me to read PlatoPlato, with a close eye to detail, arguments, themes, and scenery. I would also like to thank Roslyn Weiss, who read two drafts of this paper and gave extensive comments that greatly improved what I have written. She whole-heartedly disagrees with my interpretation but was gracious in both her comments and our extended conversation of my interpretation. I also received very helpful, detailed comments from two anonymous reviewers enabling me to improve my arguments.
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Wiener, C. (2022). A Reading of the First Book of the Republic: A Look to the Whole. In: Bloom, D., Bloom, L., Byrd, M. (eds) Knowing and Being in Ancient Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98904-0_14
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