Abstract
The concept of causation lies at the intersection of metaphysics, epistemology, and science. Some recent publications, especially Brading, (2019), have emphasized the importance of causality to Du Châtelet’s Institutions. Others, such as Stan (2019), have argued for a strong Wolffian influence on the latter, challenging the “received” narrative that reads Du Châtelet as a Leibnizian. In this paper, I will trace Du Châtelet’s conception of causality back to its Leibnizian roots . I will show, pace Stan, how she conceives of immanent and transient causation in a way that is rather similar to Leibniz.
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Notes
- 1.
On the persistence of Leibnizianism in Germany see Stan (2017), for example.
- 2.
I mostly use the translation by Judith Zinsser, PhilWrit2009, 62–103.
- 3.
Zinsser writes: “Du Châtelet added this comment to her text for this 1744 edition: ‘*It will easily be seen here that the principles of Leibnizian philosophy underlie this statement.’ She added the asterisk and the reference to Leibniz to indicate her continued adherence to Leibniz’s ideas on matter.” For a corresponding passage, see for example a letter from Leibniz to de Volder: “But, accurately speaking, matter is not composed of constitutive unities, rather it results from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon founded in things, like the rainbow or the perihelion. And there is no reality in anything except the reality of unities, and so phenomena can always be divided into lesser phenomena that could appear to other more subtle animals, and the smallest phenomena will never be reached. By contrast, substantial unities are not parts, but the foundations of the phenomena.” Letter to de Volder, 30. June 1704, in: GP II, 268. English translation follows Lodge (2013), 303.
- 4.
See Institutions, Chap. 3, “Of Essence, Attributes, and Modes,” of the Institutions for her explanation. By “properties” Du Châtelet means primary constituent aspects of a being; “modes,” then, are secondary manifestations or characteristics.
- 5.
“Le Feu n’est point la cause de l’élasticité […]. Il la détruit dans l’air & dans tous les corps.” (Diss1744, II, chap VIII).
- 6.
It should be noted, however, that Du Châtelet rather argues that fire is “perpetually antagonistic” to gravity, as it rises away from the center of gravity (Diss1744, II, chap. VII; PhilWrit2009, 80), so the similarities must not be exaggerated too much.
- 7.
This alone would give rise to doubts concerning Hartmut Hecht’s claim that “her work (in the Institutions) is still a mere [!] interpretation of Leibniz’ thoughts.” Hecht (2012), 68.
- 8.
Fifth letter to Clarke, 18. August 1716, GP VII, 396 f.
- 9.
The vacuum should here be understood as the absence of hard bodies, not as absolutely empty space, since all space is filled out by fire or ether.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
In the Principia (1999, 414), we read that “a fuller explanation will be given of how to determine true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and, conversely, of how to determine from motions, whether true or apparent, their causes and effects. For this was the purpose for which I composed the following treatise.”.
- 13.
This relates to a complicated question concerning the spatial situatedness of simple substances or monads in Leibniz. They either aggregate into composed and extended bodies like bricks can form a house, and they are therefore spatially situated within the bodies themselves; or simple substances cannot be conceived as situated within space at all, since space exists only within the realm of perceptions of the substances themselves. Du Châtelet, just like Kant, Boscovich and other contemporaries, probably would have assumed that Leibniz held on to the former position, while many modern scholars rather attribute the second position to Leibniz. See, for example, De Risi (2007) and Lyssy (2016), esp. part III and V.
- 14.
For example, he argues that even in collision, which is the paradigmatic case for all mechanical causation, even the apparent passion of a body “is spontaneous or arises from an internal force, though upon an external occasion.” GM VI, 251; Loemker (1989, 448). The occasion, however, would not be the proper cause of any change of motion. Since for Leibniz the motion of any two bodies is relative and we can see either of them at rest, the ascription of motion goes along with an ascription of causal efficiency. For example: “Thus in order to say that something is moving, we will require not only that it change its position with respect to other things but also that there be within itself a cause of change, a force, an action.” Animadversiones…, GP IV, 369; Loemker (1989, 393). Emphasis added. For a more comprehensive discussion, see also Lodge (2003).
- 15.
See, for example Leibniz’s Specimen Dynamicum; for an explanation and interpretation, e.g. Duchesneau (1994).
- 16.
This idea goes back to the early Leibniz, e.g. in A II, 1, 2nd Edition, 103; or in the Theoria Motus Abstracti, A VI, 2, 265.
- 17.
I am building here on my own interpretation of Leibniz proposed in Lyssy (2016). The conatus does not require an external stimulus or occasion, but its efficiency will correspond to external stimuli via the pre-established harmony.
- 18.
It seems to be the case that Du Châtelet assumes that simple beings are in space and time, while De Risi (2007) and I argue that this is not the case for Leibniz’s monads. In this regard, Du Châtelet seems to align more with Wolff.
- 19.
Consequently, she speaks of an “enchaînement” of consequences (§ 139), echoing Leibniz’s idea of correspondence between the chain of reasons and the chain of causes. Leibniz uses the expressions “series rerum” and “catena rerum” synonymously. Admittedly, this idea of a ‘chain of beings’ is much older, being featured prominently in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, see also Lovejoy (1936). However, it is Leibniz who emphatically highlights that the chain of causal events corresponds to the chain of reasons and who insists that such a correspondence is a metaphysical assumption necessary for science – an idea that distinctly echoes throughout Du Châtelet’s use of the PSR.
- 20.
Brading (2019, 38) points out that Du Châtelet’s derivation of the principle of continuity is based on a very different argument than the one we find in Leibniz.
- 21.
- 22.
Another example: “One created being is more perfect than another if one finds in it that which will supply a reason a priori for what happens in the other. And it is because of this that it is said to act upon the other.” Monadology, § 50; Loemker (1989, 648), my emphasis.
- 23.
“Ainsi, si l'on veut que le mouvement se fasse avec raison suffisante, c'est-à-dire, qu'il soit possible, il faut admettre dans les Corps cette force résistante, ou force passive, sans quoi on ne pourroit jamais déterminer quelle force seroit nécessaire pour faire un effet donné.” (Inst1740 8.142, my emphasis.) – Reichenberger (2011, 163) points out that in her discussion of Newton’s impressed forces, Du Châtelet carefully avoids talking about forces being impressed on bodies from the outside.
- 24.
“[…] ce ne sont que des Phénomenes qui resultent de la confusion, qui régne dans nos organes, & dans nos perceptions.” (Inst1740 8.152).
- 25.
Du Châtelet agrees with Leibniz that any science of motion, as proposed by Newton’s rational mechanics, would require a solid metaphysical foundation: “Je suis persuade que la physique ne peut se passer de métaphysique, sur laquelle elle est fondée, j’ai voulu donne une idée de la métaphysique de M. Leibniz que j’avoue être la seule qui m’ait satisfaite quoiqu’il me reste encore bien des doutes.” Letter to Frederic II, 25 April 1740 (LettB II, 13) We can take such an assessment as directed against Newton, who was understood as trying to explain phenomena geometrically.
- 26.
This is how her theory of fire is received by her correspondent La Mettrie, for example, who asks rhetorically whether she had not confirmed with her Dissertatio that “pour élever la matière à la faculté de sentir, que pour la faire végéter; il ne donne d’autre principe que l’Ether, ou le feu”? La Mettrie, Julian Offray (1747): Histoire naturelle de l’âme, 7. Cited after Hagengruber (2012, 49).
- 27.
I’d like to thank Joseph Carew for helpful comments and corrections.
Abbreviations
(Diss1739) Du Châtelet, É. 1739. Dissertation sur la nature et la propagation du feu. In Recueil des pièces qui ont remporté le prix de l’Académie royale des Sciences en 1738, ed. Académie royale des Sciences, 85–168. Paris: Imprimerie royale.
(Diss1744) Du Châtelet, É. 1744. Dissertation sur la nature et la propagation du feu. Paris: Prault fils.
(Inst1740). Du Châtelet, É. 1740. Institutions de Physique. Paris: Prault fils.
(Inst1740eZ) Du Châtelet, É. 2009. Selected Philosophical and Scientific Writings, translated by I. Bour and J. Zinsser, edited by J. Zinsser, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 115–200.
(Inst1742) Du Châtelet, É. 1742. Institutions physiques de madame la marquise Du Chastellet adressés à M. son fils: Nouvelle édition, corrigée et augmentée considérablement par l'auteur. Amsterdam: Aux dépens de la Compagnie.
(PhilWrit2009) Du Châtelet, É. Selected Philosophical and Scientific Writings, translated and edited by Judith Zinsser, translated by Isabelle Bour: Chicago & London. The University of Chicago Press.
For Leibniz’s writings, I use the following abbreviations: A = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1923- (Darmstadt / Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). Cited by series, volume, and page. DM—Discours on Metaphysics. Cited by paragraph. GP—Die philosophischen Schriften, C. I. Gerhardt (ed.) 7 vols, 1875–90. (Berlin: Weidmann; reprint Berlin: Olms, 1960). References include volume and page. GM—Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, C. I. Gerhardt (ed.). 7 vols, 1849–63. (Berlin: A. Asher; reprint Berlin: Olms 1962).
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Lyssy, A. (2022). Leibnizian Causes in a Newtonian World—Émilie Du Châtelet on Causation. In: Hagengruber, R.E. (eds) Époque Émilienne. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89921-9_9
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