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Algorithmic Antitrust: A Critical Overview

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Algorithmic Antitrust

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 12))

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Abstract

This chapter introduces the key issues, economics, and competition concerns surrounding algorithmic antitrust. It provides an overview of recent developments in the economics and legal issues raised by digital platforms and algorithms in the areas of abuse of dominance, algorithmic pricing and collusion, and mergers. The general theme is that while much has been made of the possible anticompetitive effects of the large digital platforms, there is little hard evidence to support many of the core premises underpinning current competitive assessments of large digital platforms and the need for the reform of competition law. This chapter seeks to redress this imbalance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vestager (2019, 2020).

  2. 2.

    Zuckerberg (2020).

  3. 3.

    Crémer et al. (2019).

  4. 4.

    ADLC/BKartA (2019).

  5. 5.

    AdC (2019).

  6. 6.

    van Gorp and de Bijl (2019), MEA&CP (2019).

  7. 7.

    Furman (2019).

  8. 8.

    CMA (2018, 2019) and House of Lords (2016).

  9. 9.

    ACCC (2019).

  10. 10.

    Stigler Report (2019).

  11. 11.

    Mateus (2020); Stigler Center (2019); Schweitzer et al. (2018); Furman (2019); Crémer et al. (2019), ADLC/BKartA (2019), Monopolskommission (2015), and ACCC (2019).

  12. 12.

    Furman Report (2019).

  13. 13.

    Crémer et al. (2019).

  14. 14.

    European Commission (2020).

  15. 15.

    European Commission (2020).

  16. 16.

    Digital Servies Act package—ex ante regulatory instrument of very large online platforms acting as gatekeeper. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex-anteregulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers.

  17. 17.

    Rainie and Anderson (2017).

  18. 18.

    Ohlhausen (2017).

  19. 19.

    Zingales and Lancieri (2019, pp. 7–8).

  20. 20.

    Crémer et al. (2019, p. 54).

  21. 21.

    Crémer et al. (2019, pp. 2–3).

  22. 22.

    Tucker (2018).

  23. 23.

    Veljanovski (2001); Spulber (2002); Varian (2018); Tucker (2018).

  24. 24.

    Case IV/M.1069 WorldCom/MCI, Commission Decision of 8 July 1998. Case IV/M.1069 WorldCom/MCI, Commission Decision of 8 July 1998.

  25. 25.

    Case No. COMP/M.1795 Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann, Commission Decision of 14 April 2000.

  26. 26.

    Rochet and Tirole (2003).

  27. 27.

    Lear (2019).

  28. 28.

    Cases COMP/34.579 MasterCard, COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, COMP/38.580 Commercial Cards, Commission Decision of 19 December 2007.

  29. 29.

    Kahn (2017).

  30. 30.

    Rochet and Tirole (2006, p. 664).

  31. 31.

    OECD (2019).

  32. 32.

    Auer and Petit (2015).

  33. 33.

    Hylton (2019, p. 2).

  34. 34.

    Furman Report (2019).

  35. 35.

    Chiou and Tucker (2017).

  36. 36.

    Aron (2016).

  37. 37.

    OECD (2019, p. 156).

  38. 38.

    Page and Lopatka (2006).

  39. 39.

    Veljanovski (2010).

  40. 40.

    Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft (Tying)) Tying of Internet explorer to its PC operating system, Decision of 2009. For in depth discussions of the DoJ’s Microsoft case see Page and Lopatka (2006) and McKenzie (2000).

  41. 41.

    Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Decision of 27/06/2017.

  42. 42.

    Case AT.40.099 Google Android, Decision of 18/07/2018.

  43. 43.

    Case AT.40.411 Google Search (Adsense), Press release 20/03/2019.

  44. 44.

    Bergqvist and Rubin (2019).

  45. 45.

    Fed. Trade Comm’n, File No. 111-0163, Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc. (Jan. 3, 2013) at p. 2. For analysis of this decision see Salinger and Levinson (2015) and Yun (2018).

  46. 46.

    Case AT.40.462 Amazon Marketplace. Press release ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into possible anti-competitive conduct of Amazon,’ European Commission, 17 July 2019.

  47. 47.

    European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigations into Apple’s App Store rules’, Press Release, 16 June 2020.

  48. 48.

    European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into Apple practices regarding Apple Pay Brussels,’ 16 June 2020.

  49. 49.

    FCO, Press Release of 17 July 2019, Bundeskartellamt obtains far-reaching improvements in the terms of business for sellers on Amazon’s online marketplaces.

  50. 50.

    STREETMAP.EU LTD V GOOGLE INC [2016] EWHC 253 (CH).

  51. 51.

    Caccinelli and Toledano (2017).

  52. 52.

    European Commission (2017, para. 149).

  53. 53.

    United States of America v. David Topkins, Plea Agreement, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, No. CR 15-00201 WHO.

  54. 54.

    Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority, Online sales posters and frames, Case 50,223, 12 August 2016.

  55. 55.

    Case C-74/14 Eturas’ UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba EU:C: 2016:42, Judgment of the Court, 21 Jan 2016.

  56. 56.

    European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines four consumer electronics manufacturers for fixing online resale prices, Cases AT.40465 (Asus), AT.40469 (Denon & Marantz), AT.40181 (Philips) and AT.40182 (Pioneer), decisions of 24 July 2018.

  57. 57.

    Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority, Digital piano, and digital keyboard sector: anti-competitive practices 50565-2 (non-confidential), 8 October 2019. Also see OFGEM Infringement by Economy Energy et al., of Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 with Respect to an Anticompetitive Agreement, July 26, 2019.

  58. 58.

    Mehra (2016); Ezrachi and Stucke (2016, 2017).

  59. 59.

    Ezrachi and Stucke (2016, p. 233).

  60. 60.

    Ezrachi and Stucke (2016, p. 37).

  61. 61.

    Veljanovski (2020).

  62. 62.

    Veljanovski (2020).

  63. 63.

    Vestager (2017).

  64. 64.

    Ezrachi and Stucke (2016, Part III).

  65. 65.

    CMA appoints Stefan Hunt to top digital role,’ Press Release, 18 May 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-appoints-stefan-hunt-to-top-digital-role.

  66. 66.

    Coscelli (2019).

  67. 67.

    Lear Report (2019).

  68. 68.

    OECD (2020b).

  69. 69.

    Cunningham et al. (2019).

  70. 70.

    Grise et al. (2020).

  71. 71.

    Furman Report (2019, para. 1.154).

  72. 72.

    Furman Report (2019, para. 1.155).

  73. 73.

    Case M.8228 Facebook/WhatsApp, Decision of 17 May 2017.

  74. 74.

    COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick, Decision of 11 March 2008.

  75. 75.

    Gautier and Lamesch (2020).

  76. 76.

    Id.

  77. 77.

    Id.

  78. 78.

    Latham et al. (2020).

  79. 79.

    Id.

  80. 80.

    Bourreau and de Streel (2019); OECD (2020a).

  81. 81.

    Condorelli and Padilla (2020).

  82. 82.

    Lear Report (2019, para. II.268).

  83. 83.

    Crémer et al. (2019, pp. 3–4).

  84. 84.

    Furman Report (2019).

  85. 85.

    Lear Report (2019).

  86. 86.

    Lear Report (2019).

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  1. Case Associates, London, UK Institute of Economic Affairs, London, UK

    Cento Veljanovski

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  1. The Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Washington, DC, USA

    Aurelien Portuese

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Veljanovski, C. (2022). Algorithmic Antitrust: A Critical Overview. In: Portuese, A. (eds) Algorithmic Antitrust. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85859-9_2

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