Abstract
This chapter sets out the concept of corporate "governing", as an ongoing change process of institutions associated with corporate governance. This institutional evolution is then reviewed through academic lenses provided by international research on the subject, explaining how governance can best be understood in terms of current theoretical frameworks, namely: New Institutional Economics (NIE), Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) and Institutional Theory (IT). These approaches are then used to reflect on the findings of each of the six country chapters, concluding with their theoretical and practical implications.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Duty of care is the requirement that directors be present, informed, and engaged, using good and independent judgment, consulting experts for their advice and trusted information where necessary and staying abreast of legal developments, good governance, and best practices that affect the company of which they are a board member—https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/duty-care.asp.
- 2.
Neoclassical economics is a broad theory that focuses on supply and demand as the driving forces behind the production, pricing, and consumption of goods and services. It emerged in around 1900 to compete with the earlier theories of classical economics—https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/neoclassical.asp.
- 3.
For a comprehensive list of advancements seek.
- 4.
Husted, B., & Serrano, C. (2002). Corporate governance in México. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(3), 337‒348.
- 5.
Espinoza Aguiló, T., & Espinoza Aguiló, N. (2012). Family business performance: Evidence from Mexico. Cuadernos de Administración, 25(44), 39‒61.
- 6.
Vázquez, P., Carrera, A., & Cornejo, M. (2020). Corporate governance in the largest family firms in Latin America. Cross-Cultural & Strategic Management, 27(2), 137‒163.
- 7.
Sandoval-Arzaga, F. (2021). Radiografía de la Empresa Familiar Latinoamericana. Estudio Preliminar. Instituto de Familias Empresarias para México y Latinoamérica, Escuela de Negocios, Tecnológico de Monterrey.
- 8.
https://gcg.pe/ Good Corporate Governance (GCG) Certificate.
- 9.
Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV)—Securities and Exchange Commission of Peru.
- 10.
Bolsa de Valores de Lima (BVL)—The Lima Stock Exchange.
- 11.
Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores—Securities Market Superintendency.
- 12.
https://amecbrasil.org.br/?lang=en, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/, https://www.esganalytics.ai/, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc , https://www.iaasb.org/, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance-regionalroundtablesandprogrammes.htm.
References
Aguilera, R.V. (2003). Are Italy and Spain Mediterranean sisters? A comparison of corporate governance systems. In corporate governance in a changing economic and political environment (pp. 23–70). Palgrave Macmillan.
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015). Connecting the dots: Bringing external corporate governance into the corporate governance puzzle. The Academy of Management Annals, 9(1), 483–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503
Aguilera, R. V., Florackis, C., & Kim, H. (2016). Advancing the corporate governance research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 172–180.
Aguilera, R. V., & Grøgaard, B. (2019). The dubious role of institutions in international business: A road forward. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(1), 20–35. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-018-0201-5
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447–465. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2003.10196772
Aguilera, R. V., Judge, W. Q., & Terjesen, S. A. (2018). Corporate governance deviance. First published online July 2016. Academy of Management Review, 43(1), 87–109.
Aguilera, R. V., Kabbach-Castro, L. R., Lee, J. H., & YOU, J. (2012). Corporate governance in emerging markets. Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st century, pp. 319–344.
Aguilera, R. V., Marano, V., & Haxhi, I. (2019). International corporate governance: A review and opportunities for future research. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(4), 457–498.
Aldrich, H. E., & Pfeffer, J. (1976). Environments of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 2(1), 79–105.
Banner, S. (1997). What causes new securities regulation? 300 years of evidence. Washington University Law Quarterly, 75, 849.
Bevir, M. (2009). The construction of governance. International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior.
Bevir, M. (2011). Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma. The SAGE handbook of governance, 1–16.
Bhaumik, S., Driffield, N., Gaur, A., Mickiewicz, T., & Vaaler, P. (2019). Corporate governance and MNE strategies in emerging economies. Journal of World Business, 54(4), 234–243.
Bos, S., Pendleton, A., & Toms, S. (2013, January 15). Governance thresholds, managerial ownership and corporate performance: Evidence from the UK. managerial ownership and corporate performance: Evidence from the UK.
Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. (2003). Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for a complex world. Harvard Business Press.
Chait, R., Ryan, W., & Taylor, B. (2005). Leadership as governance. Cambridge.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Steier, L. P. (2003). Extending the theoretical horizons of family business research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 331–338.
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica. Blackwell Publishing, 4(16), 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x.JSTOR2626876
Coffee, J. C., Jr. (2005). A theory of corporate scandals: Why the USA and Europe differ. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(2), 198–211.
Coglianese, C., & Michael, M. L. (2006). After the scandals: Changing relationships in corporate governance.
Davis, G. F., & Cobb, J. A. (2010). Resource dependence theory: Past and future. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 28, 21–42.
Dean, M. (2010). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. Sage publications.
Dimaggio, P. (1998). The new institutionalisms: Avenues of collaboration. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics., 154, 696–705.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.
Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What is agency? American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 963–1033.
Espinoza Aguiló, T., & Espinoza Aguiló, N. (2012). Family business performance: Evidence from Mexico. Cuadernos De Administración, 25(44), 39–61.
Fiss, P. C. (2007). Institutions and corporate governance. The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, pp. 389–410.
Fligstein, N. (1990). The Transformation of Corporate Control. Harvard University Press.
Fligstein, N. (1997). Social skill and institutional theory. American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 397–405.
Foucault, M. (1994). La “Gouvernance.” Dits Et Écrits, III, 635–657.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991, October 25). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices and institutional contradictions. In Walter W. Powell, Paul J. Dimaggio (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, pp. 232–263
Gao, C., Zuzul, T., Jones, G., & Khanna, T. (2017). Overcoming institutional voids: A reputation-based view of long-run survival. Strategic Management Journal, 38(11), 2147–2167.
Greif, A. (2008). Commitment, coercion and markets: The nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange. Springer.
Healy, R. (2014). Corporate political behavior: Why corporations do what they do in politics. Routledge.
Hill, J. G. (2012). Why did Australia fare so well in the global financial crisis? In Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, and John C. Coffee, Jr. (Eds.), The Regulatory Aftermath of The Global Financial Crisis, Cambridge University Press.
Horn, L. (2012). Corporate governance in crisis? The politics of EU corporate governance regulation. European Law Journal, 18, 83–107.
Husted, B., & Serrano, C. (2002). Corporate governance in México. Journal of Business Ethics., 37(3), 337–348.
Janis, I. L. (2008). Groupthink. IEEE Engineering Management Review, 36(1), 36.
Jiménez-Seminario, G. (2018). Minding the corporate governance gap: The institutional construction of corporate governance in Chile. University of Liverpool.
Kashwan, P., MacLean, L. M., & García-López, G. A. (2019). Rethinking power and institutions in the shadows of neoliberalism:(An introduction to a special issue of World Development). World Development, 120, 133–146.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1997). Why focused strategies. Harvard Business Review, 75(4), 41–51.
Lefort, F., & Walker, E. (2000). Corporate governance: Challenges for Latin America. Abante, 2(2), 99–111.
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 289–307.
Mcnulty, T., Pettigrew, A., Jorome, G., & Morris, C. (2011). The role, power and influence of company chairs. Journal of Management & Governance, 15, 91–121.
Ménard, C., & Shirley, M. M. (2005). Handbook of new institutional economics. Springer.
Ménard, C. & Shirley, M. M. (2012). New institutional economics: From early intuitions to a new paradigm. Working paper No 8, September, 2012, Ronald Coase Institute.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions. Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. (1970). An economic theory of the growth of the Western World. The Economic History Review, 23, 1–17.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review., 16, 145–179.
Pacheco, D. F., York, J. G., Dean, T. J., & Sarasvathy, S. D. (2010). The coevolution of institutional entrepreneurship: A tale of two theories. Journal of Management, 36, 974–1010.
Park, S. H., Zhang, Y., & Keister, L.A. (2020). Governance innovations in emerging markets. Academy of Management Perspectives, 34(2), 336–339. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.3017.0177
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press.
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2003). Institutional change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle cuisine as an identity movement in French gastronomy. American Journal of Sociology, 108, 795–843.
Salancik, G. R., Pfeffer, J., & Kelly, J. P. (1978). A contingency model of influence in organizational decision-making. Pacific Sociological Review, 239–256.
Sandoval-Arzaga, F. (2021). Radiografía de la Empresa Familiar Latinoamericana. Estudio Preliminar. Instituto de Familias Empresarias para México y Latinoamérica, Escuela de Negocios, Tecnológico de Monterrey.
Schneider, B. R. (2013). Hierarchical capitalism in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations (2nd ed.). Sage.
Scott, W. R., & Davis, G. F. (2007). Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural, and open systems perspectives. Prentice-Hall.
Sewell, J. W. H. (1993). A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation. American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 1–39.
Simon, H. A. (1991, May 1). Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.2.25. ISSN 0895-3309.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 801–843.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, 840(2008), 99–128.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure and process. OUP Oxford.
Tricker, R. (2012). The evolution of corporate governance. The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance, pp. 39–61.
Vázquez, P., Carrera, A., & Cornejo, M. (2020). Corporate governance in the largest family firms in Latin America. Cross-Cultural & Strategic Management, 27(2), 137–163.
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (2013). A behavioral theory of corporate governance: Explicating the mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency. The Academy of Management Annals, 7, 607–661.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics of internal organization.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jiménez-Seminario, G. (2023). Theoretical Framework. In: Callund, J., Jiménez-Seminario, G., Pyper, N. (eds) Corporate Governing in Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85780-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85780-6_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-85779-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-85780-6
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)