Abstract
In the modern age dominated by technical thinking and overabundance of information, judges, as never before, have become dependent on expert witness opinions without having necessary assessment tools at their disposal. Legal dogmatics, especially that of civil law procedure and penal law procedure, needs data feedback from argumentation theory to be used to augment and change the existing legal order concerning court expert institution, and to provide basis for developing techniques that could help lay people in the court environment in evaluation of experts and their opinions in a way inaccessible for legal dogmatics alone. On the other hand, it should be stressed that every theory of legal argumentation always has to take into consideration a given legal culture with its traditions, values, rules and legal science. The tools that are used to accomplish this are based on Douglas Walton’s logical argumentation, Bayesian probability and Bayesian belief networks. The author’s own way of combining Bayesian network with Walton’s critical questions method is viewed as a new tool that employs a questionnaire to gather data to be subsequently used in Bayes theorem calculations. The degree to which the argumentation theory tools prove to be useful depends on the amount of data gathered during the argumentation evaluation and the number of opportunities when dialectical critical testing can be performed.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Walton and Zhang (2013).
- 4.
- 5.
Bocheński (1993).
- 6.
Ibidem, p. 243.
- 7.
Cf. Walton (1997), pp. 82–83: “being in a position to know”.
- 8.
Ibidem, p. 102.
- 9.
Walton (2013).
- 10.
- 11.
Walton (2016).
- 12.
Hahn and Hornikx (2016), p. 1837.
- 13.
- 14.
See Walton (1997) p. 258.
- 15.
- 16.
Harris et al. (2016), p. 1502.
- 17.
Godden and Zenker (2016).
- 18.
Dalhman et al. (2015).
- 19.
See below.
- 20.
- 21.
At least in the Polish law. See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).
- 22.
- 23.
Harris et al. (2016), p. 1504.
- 24.
Cf. Walton and Zhang (2013), pp. 1–2.
- 25.
Walton and Zhang (2016), pp. 64–68.
- 26.
- 27.
See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).
- 28.
In Polish legal system See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).
- 29.
Understood in this instance as a fallacious use of an argument form expert authority based on abuse of authority to deflect critical questioning.
- 30.
Cf. Walton (1997), pp. 259–261.
References
Bench-Capon T (2002) Agreeing to differ: modelling persuasive dialogue between parties without a consensus about values. Inf Logic 22(3):231–245
Bocheński JM (1993) Co to jest autorytet? In: Logika i filozofia. Wybór pism. Warszawa
Bustamante T, Dahlman Ch (eds) (2015) Argument types and fallacies in legal argumentation. Springer, pp 3–19
Ciurria M, Altamimi K (2014) Argumentum ad verecundiam: new gender-based criteria for appeals to authority. Argumentation 28(4):437–452
Dalhman C, Wahlberg L, Sarwar F (2015) Robust trust in expert testimony. Humana Mente J Philosophical Stud 28:17–37
Dzierżanowska J, Studzińska J (2019) Biegli w postępowaniu sądowym cywilnym i karnym. Warszawa
Fenton NE, Neil M (2000) The Jury observation fallacy and the use of Bayesian networks to present probabilistic legal arguments. Math Today 6(36):180–187
Fenton NE, Neil M, Lagnado DA (2013) A general structure for legal arguments about evidence using Bayesian networks. Cogn Sci 37:61–102
Godden D, Zenker F (2016) A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency. Synthese Library 195:1715–1740
Goodwin J (2011) Accounting for the appeal to the authority of experts. Argumentation 25(3):285–296
Hahn U, Hornikx J (2016) A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation. Synthese Library 193(6):1833–1873
Hahn U, Oaksford M (2006) A Bayesian approach to informal argument fallacies. Synthese Library 152:207–236
Hahn U, Harris A, Oaksford M (2013) Rational argument, rational inference. Argument Comput 4(1):21–35
Harris AJL, Hahn U, Madsen JK, Hsu AS (2016) The appeal to expert opinion: quantitative support for a Bayesian network approach. Cogn Sci 40:1499–1533
Jaynes ET (1986) Bayesian methods. General background. In: Maximum entropy and Bayesian Methods in Applied Statistics Proceedings of the Fourth Maximum Entropy Workshop University of Calgary. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Mommsen T (1867) Historia Rzymska vol. 1–4. Warszawa
Olson EJ (2002) What is the problem of coherence and truth. J Philos 94:246–272
Walton D (1997) Appeal to expert opinion. Arguments from authority. Pennsylvania
Walton D (2013) Methods of argumentation. New York
Walton D (2016) Some artificial intelligence tools for argument evaluation: an introduction. Argumentation 30(3):317–340
Walton D, Zhang N (2013) The epistemology of scientific evidence. Artif Intell Law 21:173–219
Walton D, Zhang N (2016) Ratio. Juris 29(1):59–82
Zeidler K, (2011) Restytucja dóbr kultury ze stanowiska filozofii prawa. O trudnych przypadkach na granicy kultury i prawa, Warszawa
Zeidler K (2020) Aesthetics of law. Gdańsk University Press - Wolters Kluwer
Zenker F, (ed) (2012) Bayesian argumentation: the practical side of probability. Synthese Library
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pretkiel, B. (2021). Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence as an Argument from Epistemic Authority. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-83840-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-83841-6
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)