Abstract
The emergence of forensic neuropsychology—an empirical science assuming on the philosophical level a causal vision of the world and humans in particular—coincided with the change in the paradigm of criminal policies: in connection to increasing security concerns in many European societies, legislators have introduced new legal regulations targeting the elimination, or at least a reduction of (the) risk of specific types of crime (mainly sexual and violent crime). The contemporary criminal policy, based on fear and on the will to eliminate future threats, creates a singular frame for the interpretation of neuroevidences. Such an evidence most probably be evaluated as a source of indicators or even and instrument for assessment of the offender’s future dangerousness. Within forensic neuropsychology the problem of whether a psychopath can be held responsible for the crimes of rape and murder with extreme cruelty has also emerged. This dilemma was brought to the fore by the case of Brian Dugan. This case is an example of the entering new qualitative evidence into practical legal discourse. Evidence that brings with it scientific assumptions that the human behavior is determined by its neurobiological constitution. Such an assumption cannot be adapted to legal anthropology, but at the same time neuroscientific evidence cannot be ignored in cases with “neuro-element” (e.g. psychopathy)—such evidence must be critically assessed by legal decision-makers (judges). Therefore, it is necessary to develop and discuss in the field of the theory of evidence the directives for assessing such “anthropological intrusions” in practical legal discourse.
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Notes
- 1.
See: MacNeill Horton Jr. (2010), pp. 3–5.
- 2.
In this sense, forensic neuropsychology is de facto the same as forensic neuropsychiatry, which centers on formulating a legal assessment of somebody’s behaviour based on the knowledge of relations between the state of the brain and mental disorders. In this chapter, I do not include in the discussion the ongoing dispute about the demarcation between neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry. The only difference I highlight here is the difference in their origins: neuropsychology stems from psychology, neuropsychiatry from medicine, in the area where psychiatry integrates with neurology. The consequence of this difference in genealogy is the currently perceived institutional difference between the positioning of professions of neuropsychologist and neuropsychiatrist (the former does not belong to medical professions), but the area of interest is in principle the same for both and focuses on relations between the brain and behaviours.
- 3.
Indianapolis Union Railway v. Walker, 318 N.E.2d 578 (1974), no. 1-573A88. https://law.justia.com/. Accessed Nov 20, 2019. The case which made possible the quoted ruling was the case Jenkins vs. United States, which states that “psychologists may qualify as experts on the question of mental disease or defect under the standards set forth.” These standards consist of two requirements: (1) “the subject of an inference must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman,” (2) “the witness must have such skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth”—see: Vincent E. Jenkins, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962), no. 16306. https://law.justia.com. Accessed 20 Nov 2019.
- 4.
For more detailed data, see: Kaufman (2012), p. 73.
- 5.
Adopted by the popular vote on February 8, 2004, in force since February, 8 2004 (FedD of June 20, 2003, FCD of April 21, 2004)—see: Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of April 18, 1999. https://www.parlament.ch/en/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/how-does-the-swiss-parliament-work/Rules-governing-parliamentary-procedures/federal-constitution. Accessed Nov 21, 2019.
- 6.
- 7.
See: Gkotsi and Gasser (2016), pp. 59–60.
- 8.
In case of Poland, a change of criminal law was introduced: (1) by the law of November 22, 2013 on proceedings involving people with mental disorders threatening life, health, or sexual freedom of other (Dziennik Ustaw 2014, posting 24 with later changes) and (2) by the law od February 20, 2015 on the change to the Criminal Code and some other laws (Dziennik Ustawa 2016, posting 396). The first of the two laws, called lex Trynkiewicz (from the name of the sex offender Mariusz Trynkiewicz), was deemed to be in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (ruling dated November 23, 2016, K 6/14).
- 9.
See: Gkotsi and Gasser (2016), pp. 58–59.
- 10.
See: Gkotsi and Gasser (2016), p. 61.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Cf. Glenn et al. (2009), pp. 5–6.
- 17.
See: Glenn et al. (2009).
- 18.
- 19.
See: Slaughter et al. (2003).
- 20.
My description of this case is based on: Hughes (2010).
- 21.
This diagnostic instrument assesses 20 aspects of personality and behaviour using a partly structured interview.
- 22.
See: Kiehl et al. (2004).
- 23.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). https://cases.justia.com. Accessed 30 Nov 2019.
- 24.
Hom (2003), p. 831.
- 25.
Ibidem. Classification of question (1) as relating to civil law and question (2) as relating to criminal law has neither logical nor normative character, i.e., neither the (logical) nature of civil and criminal cases, nor the current law predetermine that the question (1) may appear only in civil cases, and the question (2) only in criminal cases. Quite the opposite: the question about the mental condition of the perpetrator may surface also in a civil case (in which assigning responsibility may be based on the determination of guilt of the perpetrator of harm), and the question about the scope of harm suffered by the victim of the crime may be crucial in a civil case. The classification is realistic, i.e. is based on the observation that the question about cognitive impairments occurs more often in cases seeking compensation (in other words, in civil cases), and the question about the mental state of a perpetrator of a deed, negatively viewed by law, occurs more often in criminal cases. This is the reason why I refer to two types of Forensic Questions, and use adjectives “civil” and “criminal” in quotation marks, as metaphor-labels.
- 26.
Ibidem, p. 833.
- 27.
See: ibidem, pp. 833–842.
- 28.
See: Berlucchi (2009), p. 1001.
- 29.
See: Witzel et al. (2008), pp. 120–125.
- 30.
Ibidem, p. 124.
- 31.
See: a phenomenological analysis of legal responsibility in: Romanowicz (2013).
- 32.
- 33.
See: Gkotsi and Gasser (2016), p. 63.
- 34.
- 35.
See: Nugent (2012), p. 259.
- 36.
Gkotsi and Gasser (2016), p. 63.
- 37.
See: Barth (2007).
- 38.
- 39.
See: Aggarwal (2009), pp. 241–242.
- 40.
An example of insufficient methodological awareness of neuro-researchers consisting of a lack of recognition of direct exploratory possibilities of the neuropsychological methods and accepted in neurosciences ontological assumptions (among them, in the determinist anthropology), could be the following assertion: “Recent advances in neuroscience show that decision-making is not merely a psychosocially determined mental process; instead, it is a bio-psychosocially determined neuropsychological process. As such, decision-making might not be as free and voluntary as presupposed in forensic psychiatry.”—Witzel et al. (2008), p. 120. Did the discussed by these authors “recent advances in neuroscience” capture empirically the causative relations between states of the brain and human behaviour, or did they only describe occurrences of correllations?
- 41.
See: Aggarwal (2009), p. 240.
- 42.
- 43.
See: Hardcastle (2015), p. 60.
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Romanowicz, M. (2021). Neuroscientific Evidence in Courtroom: Clash of Two Anthropological Paradigms. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_11
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