Abstract
In the third Critique, Kant discusses the ideal way of hosting a dinner party in the context of aesthetic judgment. As opposed to the pure aesthetic judgment, which is the main focus of that text, hosting a good dinner party involves an applied aesthetic judgment. In this chapter, I describe politeness as an applied form of artistic creation that promotes an environment of aesthetic pleasure conducive to sociality. Whereas Alix Cohen (“The Ultimate Kantian Experience: Kant on Dinner Parties,” 2008) and Karen Stohr (On Manners, 2012) concentrate on how politeness, morality, and duty are interconnected, I look at how politeness is an other-directed artistic activity that—much like the creation of an artwork—must stimulate aesthetic pleasure in others to be fully successful. This chapter has two parts. First, I offer an interpretation of politeness that is inspired by Kant’s suggestion that hosting a dinner party is an exercise in the applied aesthetic judgment of agreeableness. This highlights how polite action relies more upon an artistic finesse than upon rule-following. I set out two criteria that must be satisfied for politeness to be fully achieved. A fully polite action must: (1) actually cause pleasure in the recipient; and (2) express one’s personal style. When one of these criteria is satisfied without the other, then partial politeness results. I then use this conception of politeness to respond to some criticisms that one might level against politeness. In the second part of the chapter, I turn back to Kant’s discussion of dinner parties so as to deepen our understanding of how exactly the applied aesthetic judgment imbedded in politeness seeks to promote pleasure in social settings. This involves an examination of the underlying values that orient polite action at the dinner party.
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Notes
- 1.
For more on this distinction, see: Frankfurt’s (2003: 322–336) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”
- 2.
The conception of politeness I am developing depends upon both having the right motive and actually creating the desired effect. Thus, if a politely intended action does not actually stimulate agreeableness, then that action is only partially polite. This is further discussed below.
- 3.
I would like to thank Beka Adair Ruse for suggesting this term to me.
- 4.
This differs from the case I discussed above. There I defended against the criticism of dishonest politeness in cases where there was a genuine desire to promote social agreeableness.
- 5.
Karen Stohr supplies an example of something along these lines when writing about: “gifts that are actually disguised insults, such as a weight loss book or a fur coat given to a known animal rights advocate” (Stohr, 2012: 129). This indicates that she would agree with my conclusion that such acts are not actually polite, despite any pretense: “If we know that the giver’s intention is to embarrass or humiliate us, it’s hard to make the case that we even need to say ‘Thank you,’ much less feel grateful” (Stohr, 2012: 129).
- 6.
Stohr (2012: 83) also argues that it is not hypocrisy to be polite when grumpy, because it is “a way of expressing our commitments to important moral ideals in the face of our own weakness and failings.”
- 7.
- 8.
Alix Cohen observes further ways in which the agreeableness of the dinner promotes this tone, as “Kant does not specify the actual benefits of the food, but we can suppose that it has to do with tempering the disputes, lightening the tone of the conversation and thus making the experience as a whole more cheerful and pleasant” (Cohen, 2008: 316–317).
- 9.
For a discussion of woman’s missing desire, see Benjamin’s (1988) Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination.
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Adair, S. (2021). Politeness as Social Artistry. In: Xie, C. (eds) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Advances in (Im)politeness Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81592-9_3
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