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Mobilizing to Counter Post-agreement Security Challenges: The Case of the “Humanitarian Accord Now” in Chocó

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Confronting Peace

Abstract

This chapter explores how the signing of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement and the subsequent demobilization of the FARC affected ethnically based peace movements in Chocó. We argue that, although the peace agreement was met with overwhelming support by Chocoan civil society, rather than initiating a “demobilizing” effect on collective action for peace, the peace process had a “revamping” effect of ethnic organizing for peace. The opportunities and threats generated by the peace process and its subsequent impacts pushed peace movements in Chocó to give new and improved form and structure to existing efforts, reflecting both innovative thinking in response to a new context and the accumulated, hard-won knowledge of communities and leaders with nearly 30 years of experience in collectively responding to armed conflict.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to the 2005 census, the ethnic composition of Chocó is 82.1% of African descent, 12.7% indigenous, and 5.2% white or mestizo (Censo General 2005).

  2. 2.

    Nearly 80% of voters in Chocó supported the peace deal in the October 2016 referendum.

  3. 3.

    Law 70 of 1993 recognizes that Black communities who have settled on uncultivated lands in the coastal rural areas of the rivers of the Pacific basin, in accordance with their traditional production practices, have the right to collective ownership. It also establishes mechanisms for the protection of the cultural identity and the rights of the Colombian Black communities as an ethnic group, and the promotion of their economic and social development, in order to ensure that these communities have the same opportunities as the rest of the Colombian society.

  4. 4.

    Interviews with an academic expert (N. 01), March 2019, and a regional government officer (N. 02), February 2018.

  5. 5.

    For the concept of strategic displacement, see Steele (2017, Chap. 1).

  6. 6.

    Official victims totals are available at: https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/. Population estimates are based on data from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), consulted on April 7, 2020, at https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2018/informacion-tecnica/presentaciones-territorio/190806-CNPV-presentacion-Choco.pdf.

  7. 7.

    Interview with a social leader from Chocó (N. 03), May 2019.

  8. 8.

    Interviews with a social leader from a community council of Chocó (N. 04), May 2019, and with an academic expert (N. 08), May 2019.

  9. 9.

    For the concept of “civilian autonomy”, see Kaplan (2017).

  10. 10.

    For the concept of “zone of peace”, see Hancock and Mitchell (2007).

  11. 11.

    COCOMACIA is the later iteration of the organization ACIA after it received its land title in 1997.

  12. 12.

    For the concept of noncooperation, see Masullo (2021) and Arjona (2017).

  13. 13.

    For a detailed account of the peace process, see Nasi and Rettberg (2019).

  14. 14.

    Interview with a Black social leader from a regional ethnic-territorial organization (N. 05), April 2018.

  15. 15.

    Interview with a Black social leader from a regional ethnic-territorial organization (N. 06), March 2018.

  16. 16.

    For a detailed account of this process, see Rodríguez Iglesias (2018).

  17. 17.

    As mentioned earlier, nearly 80% of voters in Chocó supported the peace deal in the October 2016 referendum.

  18. 18.

    Interviews with various Chocoan civil society representatives, 2019.

  19. 19.

    Interview with a civil servant from the Inspector General’s Office (N. 07), August 2019.

  20. 20.

    Interview with an ethnic academic expert from Chocó (N. 08), February 2018.

  21. 21.

    Interview with the legal representative of an indigenous ethnic-territorial organization from Chocó (N. 09), February 2018.

  22. 22.

    Interview with an international aid worker (N. 10), March 2019.

  23. 23.

    Gulf Clan (Clan de Golfo) is another name for the AGC neoparamilitary organization.

  24. 24.

    As these two routes are key for the transportation of cocaine to Central America, Bojayá has been historically a geostrategic point for armed groups (Escobar Moreno 2019).

  25. 25.

    Interview with legal representatives of a Black community council of Chocó (N. 11), April 2019.

  26. 26.

    Interviews with a Black social leader from a community council of Chocó (N. 12), July 2019; and with a member of the Diocese of Quibdó (N. 13), June 2019.

  27. 27.

    Interview with a think tank expert (N. 14), February 2020, and with an academic expert (N. 15), February 2020.

  28. 28.

    Interview with a social worker of a Colombian NGO (N. 16), February 2020.

  29. 29.

    A full list of signatories can be found here: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Acuerdo-Humanitario.pdf.

  30. 30.

    The talks between the ELN and the government started in January 2018 under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos and were suspended in January 2019 by President Iván Duque following an attack on a police station by the armed group.

  31. 31.

    The Accord demands an immediate ceasefire and demobilization by all armed groups, leading to a negotiated, definitive political solution (points A, B, and E). Second, it demands respect for the territorial autonomy of the communities (point C), as well as an end to violence, displacement, confinement, recruitment, and illegal economies affecting communities, recognizing the specific impacts of violence against minors, women, and LGBTQ people (Points D, F, G, H, I, and J). The final point asks for accompaniment and monitoring by international partners (point K).

  32. 32.

    Field notes, May 2019.

  33. 33.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s organization from Chocó (N. 17), January 2018.

  34. 34.

    Interview with a member of the Diocese of Quibdó (N. 13), June 2019.

  35. 35.

    By recognizing the Atrato river as a subject of legal rights, the sentence, pronounced by the Constitutional Court in 2016, requires the Colombian state to guarantee the protection and preservation of the river.

  36. 36.

    The subregions are organized around the major rivers of the department: the middle and upper Atrato, lower Atrato, Baudó, San Juan, and the Pacific Coast.

  37. 37.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s organization from Chocó (N. 17), January 2018, and with members of the Inspector’s General Office (N. 07), August 2019.

  38. 38.

    The relationship between the international community and AHY’s Secretariat has been contentious for a number of reasons. First, the international donors perceived that the leaders lacked the administrative capacity to oversee financial resources and chose the Diocese of Quibdó as the administrator of the funds. Second, there was deficient coordination among donor countries with respect to the priorities of the project, something that resulted in continuous delays. Interview with an international aid worker (N. 18), May 2019.

  39. 39.

    As the government used the Humanitarian Accord to put pressure on the ELN to stop kidnapping, the leadership of the Accord expressed publicly that the AHY was an initiative of the ethnic-territorial organizations, and rejected that the government co-opted it for advancing talks with the ELN. Interview with an international aid worker (N. 18), May 2019.

  40. 40.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s regional organization from Chocó (N. 17), May 2019.

  41. 41.

    Interview with social leader from Chocó (N. 19), July 2019.

  42. 42.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s regional organization from Chocó (N. 17), May 2019.

  43. 43.

    Interview with members of community councils (N. 04, N. 11), April/May 2019.

  44. 44.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s regional organization from Chocó (N. 17), May 2019.

  45. 45.

    Institutionalization, understood as the incorporation or co-optation by the state of movement leaders and organizations, has been identified in social movement theory as a central force toward movement deactivation (McAdam et al. 2009, Tarrow 2011, 190).

  46. 46.

    As noted in social movement research, the satisfaction of key claims could reasonably trigger a facilitation mechanism toward movement deactivation (McAdam et al. 2009, Tarrow 2011, 190).

  47. 47.

    For seminal work on the concept of political opportunity structures in social movement research, see Eisinger (1973), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (2011). For a discussion on how the dynamics of civil war, in particular territorial contestation, can create an opening for civilian collective action, see Masullo (2017a, Chap. 3).

  48. 48.

    Interview with a member of the Diocese of Quibdó (N. 13), June 2019.

  49. 49.

    Interview with Richard Moreno, delegate of the Ethnic Unit at the Inspector General Office, December 2017.

  50. 50.

    For instance, with the support of the OAS, various members of the AHY traveled to Arauca, in the northeast of the country, to share their experience with the regional leaders at the end of 2018.

  51. 51.

    Social leader speaking at a Humanitarian Accord event (No. 23), June 2019.

  52. 52.

    Interviews with an academic expert (N. 01), March 2019.

  53. 53.

    The FARC anticipated these dynamics. In 2015, before their demobilization, they aimed to forge alliances with the ELN to try to halt the AGC’s progress in the area (Defensoría Nota de Seguimiento N. 004-17, 2017).

  54. 54.

    Interview with a social worker of a Colombian NGO (N. 16), February 2020. Interview with a member of the Diocese of Quibdó (N. 22), June 2019.

  55. 55.

    Interview with legal representatives of a Black community council of Chocó (N. 11), April 2019.

  56. 56.

    Social leader (No. 21) speaking at an event organized by the Inspector General’s Office, May 2019.

  57. 57.

    Interview with a Black social leader from a community council of Chocó (N. 12), July 2019.

  58. 58.

    For the processes of “scale-shift” and their importance in the strength (and diffusion) of contention, see Tarrow (2005) and Tarrow and McAdam (2005). In light of this literature, one can characterize the AHY effort to establish international allies as a process of “upward scale shift” (Tarrow 2005, 120–140).

  59. 59.

    Interview with a social leader involved in the AHY (N. 25), May 2019.

  60. 60.

    Interview with a social leader from a women’s regional organization from Chocó (N. 17), May 2019.

  61. 61.

    Interview with a member of the Diocese of Quibdó (N. 20), June 2019.

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Rodríguez Iglesias, A., Rosen, N., Masullo, J. (2022). Mobilizing to Counter Post-agreement Security Challenges: The Case of the “Humanitarian Accord Now” in Chocó. In: Allen, S.H., Hancock, L.E., Mitchell, C., Mouly, C. (eds) Confronting Peace. Rethinking Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67288-1_4

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