Abstract
The chapter is concerned with self-knowledge and self-inquisitiveness, the cognitive-epistemic interest in oneself. I want to preserve the link to “curiosity”, since the term is used in the wider epistemological context, but I want to avoid the strange sounding “self-curiosity”. So, I shall be using “self-inquisitiveness” rather than “curiosity about oneself”, since the latter sounds like bad English, and “curiosity about oneself” is quite a mouthful. And I shall simply stipulate here that the two are synonymous.
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Notes
- 1.
Thanks go to the reviewer for pressing me on this point.
- 2.
Translation by S. Mitchell, Penguin (2018, Lao Tzu 2006).
- 3.
For a discussion of Cassam see Miščević (2017).
- 4.
See Miščević (2016).
- 5.
“Phronesis”, which Grube translates as “wisdom”.
- 6.
On the point of caring about truth (of one’s beliefs) see the summary of proposed readings in Christopher Rowe’s 2011 chapter on self-examination in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates. On the general topic of self-examination see also Richard Kraut (2006), “The Examined Life” in Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Socrates, Blackwell.
- 7.
I am quoting these examples in order to point out that psychologists are as interested in self-attached CD knowledge as philosophers are; see below for more.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
For epistemic humility see Roberts and Wood, p. 237 ff.
- 11.
Compare papers from Alicke and Dunning (2005), especially in Parts 2 and 3 of the collection.
- 12.
Christopher Rowe mentions a reading that is particularly relevant for us here:
On the interpretation in question (self-examination as the examination of one’s belief-sets) this process has to do with examining and sorting one’s own individual beliefs, keeping some and throwing others away—a kind of individual intellectual therapy (even if everyone would, presumably, end up with exactly the same, true, set of beliefs).7 That—on the same interpretation—is what Socrates helps others to achieve, but also, and more importantly, aims to achieve for himself: “Socrates is more concerned with testing his own soul. And he tests it to see if it has true beliefs, assuming that they [sc. beliefs, presumably] determine character” [footnote points to Irwin 1979 (= Gorgias’ commentary): p. 182, on Gorgias 486D]. Seen in this way, self-examination is a means of self-improvement, which will—so Socrates hopes—throw up real truths along the way. (2011: 203)
Rowe in fact disagrees with this reading, but the reading is congenial to our questions in the present chapter. Julia Annas, on the contrary, claims that for early Plato, self-knowledge, properly understood, is knowledge of what is impersonal and is most truly real (1985: 136). See also Moore (2015) for a more recent reading.
- 13.
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Miščević, N. (2020). Self-inquisitiveness: The Structure and Role of an Epistemic Virtue. In: Curiosity as an Epistemic Virtue. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57103-0_10
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