Abstract
The paper outlines a new interpretation of informational privacy and of its moral value. The main theses defended are: (a) informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere, that is, of the forces that oppose the information flow within the space of information; (b) digital ICTs (information and communication technologies) affect the ontological friction by changing the nature of the infosphere (re-ontologization); (c) digital ICTs can therefore both decrease and protect informational privacy but, most importantly, they can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation of it; (d) a change in our ontological perspective, brought about by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being constituted by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity.
This chapter was originally published in Ethics and Information Technology (2005) 7:185–200.
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Notes
- 1.
Especially in the US, see Garfinkel (2000).
- 2.
Froomkin (2000) still provides a valuable review.
- 3.
- 4.
For a precise definition of agent see Floridi and Sanders (2004b).
- 5.
For a similar point see Moor (1997), who writes “When information is computerized, it is greased to slide easily and quickly to many ports of call” (p. 27).
- 6.
Anonymity is defined here as the unavailability of personal information, or the “noncoordinability of traits in a given respect”, according to Wallace (1999).
- 7.
Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde was first published in 1886.
- 8.
Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet was first published in 1887.
- 9.
Orwell’s 1984, first published in 1949, contains no reference to computers or digital machines.
- 10.
The neologism is constructed following the word “re- engineering” (“to design and construct anew”).
- 11.
Radio Frequency IDentification, a method of storing and remotely retrieving data using tags or transponders.
- 12.
- 13.
The issue of artificial morality is analyzed in Floridi and Sanders (2004b).
- 14.
The term is introduced by Westin (1968) to describe digital profile generated from data concerning a user’s habits online.
- 15.
The outer world, or reality, as it affects the agent inhabiting it.
- 16.
“The best long-term assessment of public attitudes toward privacy is provided by Columbia’s Alan Westin, who has conducted a series of polls over the last 30 years on this issue. On average, he finds that one quarter of the American public cares deeply about keeping personal information secret, one quarter doesn’t care much at all, and roughly half are in the middle, wanting to know more about the benefits, safeguards, and risks before providing information. Customer behaviour in the marketplace – where many people freely provide personal information in exchange for various offers and benefits – seems to bear out this conclusion” Walker (2000).
- 17.
Private communication. The rest of this section is largely based on comments sent to me by Paul Oldfield,
- 18.
- 19.
See Spinello (2005) for a recent assessment of the use of the trespassing analogy in computer-ethical and legal contexts. Charles Ess has pointed out to me that comparative studies have shown such spatial metaphors to be popular only in Western contexts.
- 20.
Moor (1997) infers from this that informational privacy is not a core value, i.e. a value that “all normal humans and cultures need for survival”, but then other values he lists as “core” are not really so in his sense, e.g. happiness and freedom. According to Moor, privacy is also intrinsically valuable, while being the expression of the core value represented by security.
- 21.
For a different view see Volkman (2003).
- 22.
This view is close to the interpretation of privacy in terms of protection of human dignity defended by Bloustein (1964).
- 23.
- 24.
On the tripartite distinction between information as, about or for reality see Floridi (2004).
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Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the seminar Bridging Cultures: Computer Ethics, Culture, and ICT (NTNU, Trondheim, 6 June, 2005) and at the Sixth International Conference of Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE2005, University of Twente, 18 July, 2005). I wish to thank all the participants and especially Phil Brey, Charles Ess, Johnny Søraker, Bernd Carsten Stahl and May Thorseth and the anonymous referees of the journal for their comments. Paul Oldfield and Matteo Turilli read a final version and suggested several crucial improvements. None of them is responsible for any of its shortcomings.
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Floridi, L. (2021). The Ontological Interpretation of Informational Privacy. In: Chiodo, S., Schiaffonati, V. (eds) Italian Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54522-2_4
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