Abstract
Despite their increasingly expanding empire, technical norms have scarcely attracted the attention of legal scholars. This article tries to understand the working of such norms by approaching the issue from the standpoint of the notion of “artefactual normativity”—i.e. normativity concerning artefacts and their characteristics—and then by analysing a strikingly growing class of technical norms more or less explicitly directed at influencing behaviour. What emerges from this analysis is a non-legal form of normativity which involves the subject in a process of continuous observation, surveillance and direction of his/her conduct whose final aim is his/her self-identification with certain imposed standards. The paper ends with a section on the standardisation of the language of regulation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
ISO and IEC stand, respectively, for the International Organization for Standardization and its “sister organization”, the International Electrotechnical Commission. The definition of a standard and the following quotations in the text are found at the ISO/COPOLCO site (https://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html).
- 2.
The ISO/IEC Guide (see the preceding note) defines consensus as the result of a systematic procedure for removing opposition and dissent: “consensus is general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. … Consensus is an essential procedural principle, requiring the resolution of substantial objections. … The aim is to resolve substantive issues before the final stages of development”. Once these final stages are reached, any conflict and discussion about the standards adopted is banished to the advantage of “technical harmonization”. On consensus see also Sect. 10.5, notes 7 and 8 and the text corresponding to the notes.
- 3.
See, e.g., Azzoni (1991).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Is it an accident that scholars of the new forms of regulations speak of influencing behaviour? E.g., Davis et al. (2012, pp. 10, 15); Fisher (2012, p. 237); Dadush (2012, p. 407), and most paradigmatically Sunstein (2016). Now, the aim of legal norms is not to influence behaviour. According to a reasonably reliable and agreed characterisation, a legal norm entails at least the following features: (1) it is a binding rule of conduct issued by the competent state authority; (2) it determines right and duties of the subjects to whom it is addressed; and (3) abidance by subjects is enforced by the state coercion. Such a norm does not violate the subjects’ autonomy. On the contrary, it presupposes it.
- 7.
See note 2 above and the text corresponding to the note.
- 8.
As the ISO/IEC Guide emphasises, consensus is not synonymous with unanimity. This is correct. In fact, according to the ISO procedure it is up to the president of the competent expert committee to decide if and when there is sufficient consensus about the proposed standards (Van Waeyenbege 2014, p. 99).
- 9.
Of course, as it is well known, it is not at all difficult to abstract the “institutional framework” of democracy from its political content. For example, the ISO procedures for the elaboration of standards contemplates “majority” (Van Waeyenbege 2014, pp. 96–97; Carreira Da Cruz 2014, p. 128), but that doesn’t mean that they are democratic. As a matter of fact, “the exchanges between stakeholders are based upon scientific, technical or empirical data. This is reflected into the fact that the participants are appointed to the different committees because of their expertise in the field concerned and not by a political legitimation” (Van Waeyenbege 2014, p. 99, my translation). This shift from democratic legitimation to a legitimation based on technical expertise has far reaching depoliticising effects. As Lisa Duggan remarks in his Twilight of Equality?, “The most successful ruse of neoliberal dominance is the definition of economic [more in general public] policy as primarily a matter of neutral, technical expertise. This expertise is then presented as separated from politics and culture, and not properly subject to specifically political accountability or cultural critique” (Duggan 2003, p. xiv).
- 10.
See the quotation from Habermas at the beginning of the paper.
- 11.
For example, the university professors who do not achieve the levels of “efficiency” prescribed by the indicators of the Italian National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and Research Institutes (ANVUR) are excluded from participating in the national commissions for the National Scientific Qualification (ASA). Nor is this the only “exclusion from the game”. For a penetrating criticism of the evaluation procedures of the Italian National Agency see Pinto (2012).
- 12.
Thanks to Andrea Gentili for having suggested this thought to me.
- 13.
“Indicators… often present the world in black and white, with few ambiguous intermediate shades. They take flawed and incomplete data that may have been collected for other purposes, and merge them together to produce an apparently coherent and complete picture” (Davis et al. 2012, pp. 8–9).
References
Azzoni, G. M. (1991). Cognitivo e normativo: il paradosso delle regole tecniche. Milano: Angeli.
Bayertz, K. (1994). The concept of moral consensus: Philosophical reflections. In K. Bayertz, The concept of moral consensus: The case of technological interventions in human reproduction (pp. 41–57). Dordrecht: Springer.
Boisson De Chazournes, L. (2014). Standards, régulation internationale et organisations internationales. In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 69–92). Brussels: Bruylant.
Büthe, T. (2012). Beyond supply and demand: A political-economic conceptual model. In K. E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, & S. Engle Merry (Eds.), Governance by indicators: Global power through quantification and rankings (pp. 29–51). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carreira Da Cruz, M.-A. (2014). La responsabilité sociétal comme champ d’extension de la norme: le cas d’ISO 26000. In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 117–144). Brussels: Bruylant.
Dadush, S. (2012). Impact investment indicators: A critical assessment. In K. E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, & S. Engle Merry (Eds.), Governance by indicators: Global power through quantification and rankings (pp. 392–434). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davis, K. E., Kingsbury, B., & Engle Merry, S. (2012). Introduction: Global governance by indicators. In K. E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, & S. Engle Merry (Eds.), Governance by indicators: Global power through quantification and rankings (pp. 3–28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Duggan, L. (2003). The twilight of equality? Neoliberalism, cultural politics, and the attack on democracy. Boston: Beacon Press.
Fisher, A. (2012). From diagnosing under-immunization to evaluating health care systems: Immunization coverage indicators as a technology of global governance. In K. E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, & S. Engle Merry (Eds.), Governance by indicators: Global power through quantification and rankings (pp. 217–246). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frydman, B. (2014). Prendre le standards et les indicateurs au sérieux. In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 5–65). Brussels: Bruylant.
Galletti, M., & Vida, S. (2018). Libertà vigilata. Una critica del paternalismo libertario. Roma: IF Press.
Habermas, J. (1968). Technology and science as ideology. In J. Habermas, Towards a rational society: Student protest, science, and politics (pp. 81–122). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Luhmann, N. (1969). Legitimation durch Verfahren. Neuwied: Luchterhand.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1979). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society (2nd ed.). London: Routledge, 1991 (reprinted 2007).
Ost, F., & van de Kerchove, M. (1987). Jalons pout une théorie critique du droit. Brussels: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis.
Pinto, V. (2012). Valutare e punire. Napoli: Cronopio (reprinted 2014).
Restrepo Amariles, D. (2014). The mathematical turn: L’indicateur Rule of Law dans la politique de développement de la Banque Mondiale. In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 193–234). Brussels: Bruylant.
Sunstein, C. R. (2016). The ethics of influence: Government in the age of behavioral science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vaesen, K. (2013). Artefactual norms. In M. J. de Vries, S. O. Hansson, & A. W. M. Meijers (Eds.), Norms in technology (pp. 119–136). Dordrecht: Springer.
Valaguzza, S. (2017). Nudging pubblico vs. pubblico: nuovi strumenti per la regolazione flessibile di ANAC. Rivista della regolazione dei mercati, 1, 91–121.
Van Waeyenbege, A. (2014). Le norms ISO, CEN et celles issues des consortiums privés: bric à brac ou système pour l’Union europeénne? In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 93–115). Brussel: Bruylant.
Vinokur, A. (2014). La normalization de l’université. In B. Frydman & A. van Waeyenberge (Eds.), Gouverner par le standards et les indicateurs: De Hume aux rankings (pp. 235–261). Brussels: Bruylant.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Silvia Vida for her inspiring assistance during the writing of this paper. I owe a great deal to her and Matteo Galletti’s book (Galletti and Vida 2018).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Artosi, A. (2021). Technical Normativity. In: Chiodo, S., Schiaffonati, V. (eds) Italian Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54522-2_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54522-2_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54521-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-54522-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)