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Blockchain Based Organizations and the Governance of On-Chain and Off-Chain Rules: Towards Autonomous (Legal) Orders?

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Blockchain, Law and Governance

Abstract

G. Tomasi di Lampedusa was an Italian writer from Sicily who lived in the first half of the last century when Italian society was on the verge of change. At that time, the need to blur the line between the rich and the poor, the noble and the bourgeoisie was strong and widespread. The latter were gaining their ‘place’ in high society: someone who was born the son of a farmer could indeed die as the owner of buildings and land. This was a deep shock for those noblemen who had always relied on the past glory and wealth of their ancestors; accepting that something was changing meant they had to welcome the ‘newcomers’ and blend in with them. With this picture of society in mind, G. Tomasi di Lampedusa, described the ability of a person to adapt to the status quo, writing: “Changing things so everything stays the same”. Those who were not capable of accepting change and acting accordingly, risked indeed failing and losing everything.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    di Lampedusa (2002).

  2. 2.

    DiMatteo et al. (2019), Schrepel (2019), Szostek (2019) and Kraus et al. (2019).

  3. 3.

    Natarajan H et al., Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain, mber 2017. See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/177911513714062215/Distributed-Ledger-Technology-DLT-and-blockchain

  4. 4.

    Wang F. et al., Financing Open Blockchain Ecosystems: Toward Compliance and Innovation in Initial Coin Offerings, 2018. Bertoli (2018), pp. 395–428; Chaum (1983), pp. 199–203; (2014) The economics of digital currencies. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2014/q3/the-economics-of-digital-currencies. Ali R. et al. (2014) Innovations in payment technologies and the emergence of digital currencies.

  5. 5.

    (2019) Crypto-assets need common EU-wide approach to ensure investor protection. pp. 157–1391. Jabotinsky (2018) and Philipp and Chris (2018). European Parliament (2016) REPORT on virtual currencies.

  6. 6.

    The term was first used to describe the scope of the US Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1996. In synthesis the technological neutrality approach sees technological improvement as a tool that is different from those that were available before. Being just a question of form, they can be regulated according to the normative provisions already in force which simply have to be amended to include the new tools. As such, there should be the same online and off-line rules. To see an example of the technological neutrality approach see the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records. https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/MLETR_ebook.pdf; Kresse (1987), Reed (2007) and Ali (2009).

  7. 7.

    Zamfir (2019).

  8. 8.

    Sjostrom Jr (2016) and Drake (2013).

  9. 9.

    US: U.S. Court of Appeals for the first Circuit (2001). Sec v. SG Ltd, 265 F.3d 42, 46, 13 September, 2001; U.S. southern district Court of Florida (2018) United Corporation v. BITMAIN INC, et al., case 1:18-cv-25106-KMW; Italy: Brescia first degree Court (2018). decree 7556/2018, 18 July 2018; Florence, first degree Court (2019) Judgment n. 18/2019, 21 January 2019; Brescia Court of Appeal (2018) decree no. 207/2018 endorsing first degree judgment; France: Nanterre Commercial Court (2020), decision 26 February 2020; Paris court of Appeal (2013), case n. 12/00161 SAS Macaraja c/SA Credit industriel et commercial, 26 October 2013 (see here: https://www.lesechos.fr/finance-marches/banque-assurances/la-justice-francaise-assimile-le-bitcoin-a-de-la-monnaie-1182460).

  10. 10.

    UK Cryptoassets Task Force (October 2018) final report, available here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752070/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf; see also UK Jurisdiction Task Force (2019) Report Legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts, available here https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/stories/cryptoassets-dlt-and-smart-contracts-ukjt-consultation/; FATF (2014) Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks. See Handerson and Raskin (2019). University of Chicago Coase-Sandro Institute for law & Economics Research Paper No. 858. Available here https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265295. Annunziata (2018).

  11. 11.

    Nakamoto (1997).

  12. 12.

    Morales A. (2018). Thinking Too Small: When Digital Scarcity Hurts The Future of Blockchain Games. Medium. De Filippi and Hassan (2018) and Ammous (2018).

  13. 13.

    Ryadel (2019). DRM – when it’s legit to remove it and how to do that. Medium.

  14. 14.

    Within the European Union, see the European Union Directive, 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. O.J.L 167; within US, see: U.S. Copyright Act (2016) paras 17 et 109. See Rivaro (2014). Heath C. (1999). Parallel Imports and International Trade. Lehman (1995) and Ficsor (2002).

  15. 15.

    Xu et al. (2019), Aaronson (2013), Goldwasser et al. (1989) and Goldreich and Oren (1994).

  16. 16.

    Lambda (2018). P2P Network Systems- A Go-To Guide for Understanding How They Work. Medium.

  17. 17.

    Low and Mik (2020).

  18. 18.

    Goldreich et al. (1997).

  19. 19.

    As clearly synthesized by the EBA: “a Bitcoin transaction occurs through a two-step phase: - Person A holds in a digital wallet ‘public’ and ‘private’ keys, generated via cryptography. Person B also holds ‘public’ and ‘private’ keys. The private keys are used to control the ownership of their respective Bitcoins. Public keys are essential for identification and private keys (which are kept secret by the holders) are used for authentication and encryption.—Person A generates a transaction that includes A’s address, B’s address and A’s private key (without disclosing what A’s private key is). The transaction is broadcast to the entire DLT network, which can verify from A’s private key that A has the authority to transfer the crypto-asset to the address it is sending from”. See EBA (2019), Report, quoted, at. 9.

  20. 20.

    Buterin (2018) On Public and Private Blockchains. Ethereum Blog, 2015. Duffield and Hagan (2014) and Bonneau and Miller (2015).

  21. 21.

    de Vries A (2018) Bitcoin’s Growing Energy Problem | Elsevier Enhanced Reader, pp. 801–805.

  22. 22.

    Vukolic (2016).

  23. 23.

    The attempt towards the democracy of the blockchain system was made clear, by the time it was discovered that the Bitcoin code contained a bug potentially allowing miners to maliciously inflate Bitcoin’s supply. See BitcoinCore (2018). CVE-2018-17144 Full Disclosure at https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/. See Yermack (2017) and Wright and De Filippi (2015).

  24. 24.

    Buterin (2018). The Ethereum so-called Casper will eventually convert Ethereum from a Proof of Work to a Proof of Stake; the decision is easy to grasp. See: https://github.com/ethereum/casper.

  25. 25.

    Low and Mik (2020).

  26. 26.

    Lai and Lee (2018) and XXu et al. (2017).

  27. 27.

    Antonopoulos (2017), p. 50.

  28. 28.

    Bodó and Giannopoulou (2019), Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) and Swan (2015).

  29. 29.

    OCSE (2010). The tokenisation of assets and potential implications for financial markets; EU (2019). Consultation document on an EU framework for markets in crypto-assets available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/2019-crypto-assets-consultation-document_en.pdf; Chimienti et al. (2019), Spink et al. (2019), Vos (2019) and Robinson II (2019).

  30. 30.

    Amongst others, WizKey, an Italian based company, has developed an Ethereum-based decentralized network that serves financial transactions and achieves other financial processes such as securitization, factoring and covered bond issuance. See: https://www.wizkey.io/en/platform/; see also the projects developed between Banks and financial institution: https://cryptonomist.ch/2020/03/18/banca-sella-bitcoin-hype/; https://www.coindesk.com/intesa-sanpaolo-trade-data-bitcoin-blockchain?amp=1.

  31. 31.

    US: U.S. Court of Appeals for the first Circuit (2001). Sec v. SG Ltd, 265 F.3d 42, 46, 13 September, 2001; U.S. southern district Court of Florida (2018) United Corporation v. BITMAIN INC, et al., case 1:18-cv-25106-KMW; Italy: Brescia first degree Court (2018). decree 7556/2018, 18 July 2018; Florence, first degree Court (2019) Judgment n. 18/2019, 21 January 2019; Brescia Court of Appeal (2018) decree no. 207/2018 endorsing first degree judgment; France: Nanterre Commercial Court (2020), decision 26 February 2020; Paris court of Appeal (2013), case n. 12/00161 SAS Macaraja c/SA Credit industriel et commercial, 26 October 2013 (see here: https://www.lesechos.fr/finance-marches/banque-assurances/la-justice-francaise-assimile-le-bitcoin-a-de-la-monnaie-1182460).

  32. 32.

    Wright and de Filippi (2018) and Narayanan et al. (2016).

  33. 33.

    Schrepel (2020) and Shirky (2011).

  34. 34.

    To understand how a Bitcoin improvement occurs see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips.

  35. 35.

    To understand how an Ethereum improvement occurs see https://eips.ethereum.org.

  36. 36.

    Wrigley (2020).

  37. 37.

    Antonopoulos (2017), p. 26.

  38. 38.

    Rodrigues (2019).

  39. 39.

    Low and Ernie (2017).

  40. 40.

    For some hard fork examples see: Ethereum blockchain forking permanently into Ethereum and Ethereum Classic (2016); Bitcoin forked into Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin cash (BCH) in 2017. Also, the same year, it forked again into Bitcoin gold (BTG) forking and merging with ZClassic which in turn was a fork of ZCAsh: together they formed in 2018 BTCP.

  41. 41.

    USSDC of Florida (2018) United Corporation v. BITMAIN INC, et al. case 1:18-cv-25106-KMW.

  42. 42.

    Sklaroff (2017).

  43. 43.

    Zamfir (2018) and Szabo (1997a, b).

  44. 44.

    Gardner (2012).

  45. 45.

    Finck (2018), De Filippi and McMullen (2018), Beck et al. (2018) and Merkle (2016).

  46. 46.

    To better grasp the concept of DApp, see: https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/383/what-is-a-dapp. As DApp examples see: Gnosis, Gnosis Ltd., last updated Jan. 2018. gnosis.pm; Civic, Civic Technologies, Inc., 2018. www.civic.com; and CryptoKitties, Axiom Zen, n.d. www.cryptokitties.co.

  47. 47.

    The Swarm city: a blockchain based “city” grounded on a smart contract deployed on blockchain. The city functions as a marketplace; through blockchain technology it allows people—the participant—to communicate, to trade and to earn external reputation (see https://swarm.city).

  48. 48.

    Schiller (2018), Savelyev (2017), Rühl (2019), Di Ciommo (2018), Woebbeking (2019), Schrepel (2019), Levi and Lipton (2018) and Mik (2017).

  49. 49.

    See The LAO (2019a, b). A taxonomy for LAOs: making sense of the emerging LAO ecosystem (available here: https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/a-taxonomy-for-laos-making-sense-of-the-emerging-lao-ecosystem-1122b035fe1a).

  50. 50.

    Smith and Barrett (2016).

  51. 51.

    Mik (2017) and Zamfir (2015).

  52. 52.

    Tadelis (2013).

  53. 53.

    Szabo (1997a, b).

  54. 54.

    Wu (2003). To a clear summary on where is the US Congress and Supreme Court with regard to the net neutrality bill, see: the WIRED Guide to Net Neutrality (2018) available here https://www.wired.com/story/guide-net-neutrality/.

  55. 55.

    Decentralized Autonomous Organization, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/dao [https://perma.cc/2KXE-3MYU].

  56. 56.

    Tezos, one of the first blockchains allowing token holders to modify the rules of the underlying blockchain protocol in a fully automated way (https://tezos.com).

  57. 57.

    Wang et al. (2017).

  58. 58.

    These rules might correspond to the social norms and principles taken from living society that a given blockchain community decides to abide by. Per praxis, they are named in the blockchain White Paper.

  59. 59.

    Koh (1997).

  60. 60.

    Clean App (n.d.). Blockchain Governance 105: International Law. Global blockchains = global blockchain governance. CryptoLaw Review. Available here: https://medium.com/cryptolawreview/blockchain-governance-105-international-law-3c7ebd025a43; see also Maupin (2017).

  61. 61.

    Crawford (2019), Salerno (1996), Bobbio (1994), Simma and Alston (1992), Bassiouni (1990), Abi-Saab (1987), Verdross (1968), Fitzmaurice (1958), Sørensen (1960), McNair (1957) and Schwarzenberger (1955).

  62. 62.

    Cappiello (2019), Givari (2018), Kotuby (2013) and Kolb (2006).

  63. 63.

    Segall (2015).

  64. 64.

    https://slock.it.

  65. 65.

    The DAO White Paper available here: https://github.com/the-dao/whitepaper.

  66. 66.

    In: If Rockfeller was a Coder, Reyes has argued that: “The DAO would “hold the trust property in the form of digital assets,” and there would be trustee token holders as well as certificate token holders. Only a trustee token, and not a certificate token, would be endowed with the right to transfer or otherwise dispose of the DAO’s property”, in Reyes (2019).

  67. 67.

    See Slockit, Slock.it DAO demo at Devcon1: IoT + Blockchain, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49wHQoJxYPo.

  68. 68.

    https://ethereum.org/developers/.

  69. 69.

    According to the DAO White Paper, the DAO token holder would receive rewards defined as any ETH received by the DAO generated from the projects to fund new projects or to distribute the ETH to DAO token holders.

  70. 70.

    Within the US the platforms trading fiat and crypto currencies must be registered at the Financial Crime enforcement Network (FINCEN) as a monetary services business and provide customers the possibility to exchange virtual currencies for other virtual or fiat currencies.

  71. 71.

    Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Securities exchange act of 1934. Release No. 81207 / July 25 2017: Report of investigation pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Report, at 7–8.

  72. 72.

    EB134- Emin Gün Sirer and Vlad Zamfir: on a Rocky DAO. (June 6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ON5GhIQdFU8.

  73. 73.

    According to the SEC, “voting rights were limited. DAO token holders were substantially reliant on the managerial efforts of Slock.it, its co-Founders and the Curators. Even if an investor’s effort helps to make an enterprise profitable, those efforts do not necessarily equate with a promoter’s significant managerial efforts or control over the enterprise”. See, SEC Report quoted at 13.

  74. 74.

    Thompson (2016).

  75. 75.

    Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. 940, F.2d, 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991); See SEC Report, quoted, at 11.

  76. 76.

    Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. 940, F.2d, 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991); See SEC Report, quoted, at 15.

  77. 77.

    US: U.S. Court of Appeals for the first Circuit (2001). Sec v. SG Ltd, 265 F.3d 42, 46, 13 September, 2001; U.S. southern district Court of Florida (2018) United Corporation v. BITMAIN INC, et al., case 1:18-cv-25106-KMW; Italy: Brescia first degree Court (2018). decree 7556/2018, 18 July 2018; Florence, first degree Court (2019) Judgment n. 18/2019, 21 January 2019; Brescia Court of Appeal (2018) decree no. 207/2018 endorsing first degree judgment; France: Nanterre Commercial Court (2020), decision 26 February 2020; Paris court of Appeal (2013), case n. 12/00161 SAS Macaraja c/SA Credit industriel et commercial, 26 October 2013 (see here: https://www.lesechos.fr/finance-marches/banque-assurances/la-justice-francaise-assimile-le-bitcoin-a-de-la-monnaie-1182460).

  78. 78.

    Zamfir (2019).

  79. 79.

    For an overview on such a broad issue see, among others: Boschiero (2005), Konradu and Fix-Fierro (2005), Goldman (1964, 1993) and Schmitthoff (1964).

  80. 80.

    Barlow (1996), Lessig (1999), Goldsmith (1998), Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004), Appelbaum et al. (2001), Goldsmith and Wu (2006), Loader (1997), Trotter (1994) and Mefford (1997).

  81. 81.

    Marrella and Yoo (2007) and Mann (2006).

  82. 82.

    Wright and de Filippi (2018).

  83. 83.

    Johnson and Post (1996).

  84. 84.

    Contra: S. Bond, while Secretary General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration in Paris, found that arbitration clauses were determining, as applicable, the national provision. From this, he derived that parties prefer domestic law to international law (see Bond 1990). However, this conclusion seems not to be the correct one: a closer scrutiny of the case law leads to the opposite conclusion. Fouchard et al. (sous la direction) (1997).

  85. 85.

    Berman and Felix (1998).

  86. 86.

    Contra there are some academics who confer upon lex mercatoria a more restricted role. According to them, lex mercatoria could only be used to solve disputes among merchants (Jones 2003). The settlement of mercantile disputes by merchants: an approach to the history of commercial law. Lecture addressed at the University of Chicago Law School Symposium: The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant Oct. 16–17, 2003). Or, lex mercatoria could be used only to fit the gap left by existing national law (see Berger K.P. (1999), The creeping codification of the lex mercatoria, at 40).

  87. 87.

    See Berman H. J. (1982). Contra, according to some academics there should be a distinction between “macro” lex mercatoria, containing principles and rules shared by all, or the majority, of states; and micro lex mercatoria which should correspond to the legal principles contained in a given contract. Maniruzzaman (1999).

  88. 88.

    Hayek (1973) (cited by Marrella F., Yoo C. at 7).

  89. 89.

    Maestri (2017).

  90. 90.

    ESMA (2019). Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Cryptoassets, ESMA 50-157-1391; Jabotinsky (2018) and Hacker and Thomale (2017). European Parliament (2016) Report on Digital Currencies (2016/2007(INI)) at 22.

  91. 91.

    For a complete list see: Open Source Initiative, The Approved Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/licenses.

  92. 92.

    Stallman (1999) and Raymond (2000).

  93. 93.

    Padoa Schioppa (2005).

  94. 94.

    Schrepel (2020) and Wright and De Filippi (2015).

  95. 95.

    Ortolani (2019) and Cappiello (2019).

  96. 96.

    Cappiello (2020).

  97. 97.

    Schwab (2016).

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Cappiello, B. (2021). Blockchain Based Organizations and the Governance of On-Chain and Off-Chain Rules: Towards Autonomous (Legal) Orders?. In: Cappiello, B., Carullo, G. (eds) Blockchain, Law and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52722-8_2

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