Abstract
Both pragmatism and pluralism are considered as methodological alternatives to monism, reductionism and universalism, and also to methodological imperialism. First, a historical framework in Suppes ([1978] 1981) provides a precedent for the current emphasis on methodological pluralism, while methodological pragmatism, which is explicit from Rescher (1977), has often had supporters, with greater or lesser intensity and conceived from different epistemological angles. From the 1980’s to the initial years of this century, there has been a renewed interest in methodological pragmatism and pluralism, particularly since 2006. Second, there is a thematic view, which is focused on the central tenets of pragmatism and pluralism to outline their consequences for scientific research as alternative to the influential conceptions mentioned. The emphasis on practice, which leads to efficacy in realizing the collective goals of research, and the recognition of the diversity in scientific research, which is in tune with the polyhedral character of reality (natural, social and artificial) and its ontological levels (micro, meso, macro), contribute to the methodology of science in its twofold condition of analytical and prescriptive (in the sense of indicative patterns). Third, the structure and origin of this book is presented in connection with the previous steps.
I am grateful to Nicholas Rescher for his remarks on this paper, the final version of which I prepared at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (London School of Economics).
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Notes
- 1.
Besides the methodological component, pragmatism and pluralism can be considered in the semantic, logic, epistemological, ontological, axiological and ethical aspects of science.
- 2.
- 3.
Perspectivism can be seen as a form of pluralism, mainly from an epistemological viewpoint, cf. Giere (2006a). Ronald Giere has explored “the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of scientific pluralism,” Giere (2006b, p. 26).
But the analysis made here is broader than that view. Furthermore, this paper is focused on the methodological approach, which has a connection with an ontological basis and includes the development of the epistemological component.
- 4.
- 5.
The sciences of design are included in the third group, cf. Simon (1996).
- 6.
Some of the problems can be seen in the trajectory followed by the methodological conceptions of logical positivism, logical empiricism and the received view, which were focused on verification, verificability and empirical confirmation, cf. Suppe ([1974] 1977).
- 7.
“One form or another of reductionism has been central to the discussion of unity of science for a very long time,” Suppes ([1978] 1981, p. 5).
- 8.
On the characterization of methodological universalism and methodological imperialism, see Gonzalez (2012).
- 9.
The social turn in science is also dominant in the book edited by Galison and Stump (1996).
- 10.
Also, from a critical point of view, see Chang (2012).
- 11.
These epistemological differences can be seen in the basis of the initial conceptions of American pragmatism. Rescher drew attention to these differences and has opted for Charles S. Peirce. See Rescher (2012b).
- 12.
In the problem-solving of naturalist kind, there can be pragmatic components of an internal character — in the heuristic processes — and of an external nature (how to do the research with collaborators), including the sciences of the artificial as empirical sciences. See Simon, “The Scientist as a Problem-Solver,” in Simon (1991, 368–387).
- 13.
“In my interpretation, Peirce accepted the basic idea of the correspondence theory, but wanted to find a coextensive characterization of this concept.” Niiniluoto (1999, p. 101).
- 14.
These conceptions with their bibliographical contributions can be found in Gonzalez (2006).
- 15.
This is a broader discussion than the methodological controversy between natural sciences and social sciences around the distinction Erklären-Verstehen, where there are at least nine options, cf. Gonzalez (2015b, 173–179) available in: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2015.1119418 (accessed on 25.1.2017).
- 16.
Nevertheless, some authors have “explored an alternative vision of the ‘Unity of Science’ offered by the work of Vienna Circle cofounder Otto Neurath, which sees an irreducible variety of scientific disciplines cooperating for concrete purposes” Kellert et al. (2006b, p. vii). In this vein, see Richardson (2006).
- 17.
On the characterization of monism, see Kellert et al. (2006b, x).
- 18.
“Interdisciplinarity is one of the most acute challenges of contemporary science and university policy. It is widely believed that the most fertile novel ideas are born in the interface areas of various disciplinary approaches. The progress of science – including natural, human, and social sciences – thus requires the creation of research environments which foster interaction between scholars from different fields” (Niiniluoto 2020, 231).
- 19.
The notion of “consensus” has been considered by Rescher, who has defended pluralism against a “dogmatic uniformitarianism” and a “relativistic indifferentism.” See Rescher (1993).
- 20.
The distinction between applied science and application of science is suggested by Ilkka Niiniluoto (1993, 1–21; especially, 9 and 19). A development of this methodological distinction is in Gonzalez (2013a) and Gonzalez (2015a, 2, 4, 12, 18, 31–34, 37–40, 70–71, 149–151, 317–321, 325, 330 and 335).
- 21.
Scientific research during the crisis generated by Covid-19 has clearly exemplified the three kinds of social mediation.
- 22.
- 23.
John Worrall has made it explicit Karl Popper did not believe in something like “the” scientific method, conceived as a systematic way to achieve well founded results (Worrall 2001, 114). “As a rule, I begin my lectures on Scientific Method by telling my students that scientific method does not exist” (Popper [1956], 1992, 5).
- 24.
This is the case of pluralist interpretations, cf. Kellert et al. (2006b, xi–xiii)
- 25.
“Philosophers who advocate pluralism can and do differ as to the extent of the plurality they attribute to the sciences, the strength of the pluralism they adapt, and the broader philosophical implications they draw from it” (Kellert et al. 2006b, p. x)
- 26.
This principle is an issue that Rescher insists on in the context of the future knowledge. Cf. Rescher (2012a).
- 27.
On the issue of the “formal” and “nonformal” conditions for reductions in science, see the influential analysis made in Nagel (1961, 354–366). This double set of conditions can be used to consider the philosophico-methodological costs of the reduction.
- 28.
An analysis that highlights the dynamic aspect of the emergency, as opposed to the traditional emphasis on the structural facet of the emergency, is found in Humphreys (2016).
- 29.
See, for example, the case of economics, Rosser ([1999], 2004).
- 30.
- 31.
The methodology of science deals with the advancement of knowledge, so, from an internal point of view, it presupposes the distinction between data, information and knowledge. From an external point of view, the methodology of science is the expression of the research activity of some agents in institutions (public or private).
- 32.
This also has consequences for technology, cf. Gonzalez (2015c).
- 33.
This collection includes the following titles: Progreso científico e innovación tecnológica (1997), El Pensamiento de L. Laudan. Relaciones entre Historia de la Ciencia y Filosofía de la Ciencia (1998), Ciencia y valores éticos (1999), Problemas filosóficos y metodológicos de la Economía en la Sociedad tecnológica actual (2000), La Filosofía de Imre Lakatos: Evaluación de sus propuestas (2001), Diversidad de la explicación científica (2002), Análisis de Thomas Kuhn: Las revoluciones científicas (2004), Karl Popper: Revisión de su legado (2004), Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective (2005), Evolutionism: Present Approaches (2008), Evolucionismo: Darwin y enfoques actuales (2009), New Methodological Perspectives on Observation and Experimentation in Science (2010), Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher (2011), Conceptual Revolutions: From Cognitive Science to Medicine (2011), Freedom and Determinism: Social Sciences and Natural Sciences (2012), Creativity, Innovation, and Complexity in Science (2013), Bas van Fraassen’s Approach to Representation and Models in Science (2014), New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics: Theoretical and Practical (2015), The Limits of Science: An Analysis from “Barriers” to “Confines” (2016), Artificial Intelligence and Contemporary Society: The Role of Information (2017), and Philosophy of Psychology: Causality and Psychological Subject (2018). See https://cifcyt.udc.es/coleccion-gallaecia/ (Accessed on 9.5.2020).
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Gonzalez, W.J. (2020). Pragmatism and Pluralism as Methodological Alternatives to Monism, Reductionism and Universalism. In: Gonzalez, W.J. (eds) Methodological Prospects for Scientific Research. Synthese Library, vol 430. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52500-2_1
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