Abstract
This chapter presents another aspect of the impact of AI on the judicial decision-making process. As anticipated in Chap. 5, accessibility to the whole collection of the case-law, in a jurisdiction, is the basis for software purportedly predicting future decisions. Against this backdrop, the analysis must develop from two interlaced aspects. Firstly, the role that public access to, and publication of, judicial decisions traditionally have within the legal systems. Secondly, the difference that still exists in the impact of the precedent in common law and civil law legal systems. Software based on the mining of precedents may prove more accurate and meaningful in those legal orders that are based on stare decisis. What is the impact, over the long term, in jurisdictions which are not bound to the precedent, where the aim of consistency in the interpretation of the law is delivered by the Supreme Courts?
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Notes
- 1.
Charalabidis (2018), p. 1: “Data about policy-making, software code (open sources), documents, minutes, financial data and so on has been opened resulting in a large repository of government data that can be on open data portals and government websites”.
- 2.
- 3.
See European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their Environment, Appendix 1, p. 17.
- 4.
- 5.
Charalabidis (2018), p. 2.
- 6.
See Gray and Darbishire (2011), p. 7.
- 7.
The so-called Sebastopol Principles, released in California on Dec. 8th 2007 by 30 open government advocates (available at http://www.opengovdata.org/home/8prinicples), setting forth that government data shall be considered open if the data are made public in a way that complies with the principles below: 1. Data Must Be Complete; 2. Data Must Be Primary; 3. Data Must Be Timely; 4. Data Must Be Accessible; 5. Data Must Be Machine Processable; 6. Data Must Be Non-Discriminatory; 7. Data Formats Must Be Non-Proprietary; 8. Data Must Be License-free.
- 8.
See De Filippi and Maurel (2015), p. 2.
- 9.
In particular, the Open Data Directive provides for: (1) publishing of dynamic data and the up-take of APIs (routine protocols and other tools for building software applications, regulating the interaction between software components); (2) limitation of the cases in which public bodies can charge more than the marginal costs of dissemination for the re-use of their data; (3) transparency requirements for agreements between private and public sector, about the re-use of the latter’s data. In particular, the directive should apply also to data from public-funded research, via open access. For a complete overview, see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-legislation-reuse-public-sector-information.
- 10.
- 11.
Jasanoff (2006), p. 42.
- 12.
See Gray and Darbishire (2011), p. 8.
- 13.
Dove (2015), p. 157. It must not be overlooked that such theory has raised a relevant criticism, as to the risk of creating a ‘data divide’ (along with the digital divide), as large numbers of people would not be able to take advantage of ‘openness’, rather would suffer the flaws of being the victims of such divide (e.g. being unable to protect the interests related to their personal data, accessed and used by others): see Gurstein (2011).
- 14.
Dove (2015), p. 158.
- 15.
At the European level, France is one of the countries that recently passed a law to enhance open access of State data, called ‘law for a digital Republic’ (2016). For a general overview on the evolution see Kambrun-Favennec (2018), p. 83 ff.
- 16.
Dove (2015), p. 162.
- 17.
Gray and Darbishire (2011), p. 8.
- 18.
And, to be fair, “it is not always obvious how the twin goals of opening data and protecting privacy can be mutually reconciled”: Dove (2015), p. 163. It is worth noting that the topic has been addressed in such terms since the very beginning of the debate on ‘open government’: Michael (1981), p. 265 ff.
- 19.
Gray and Darbishire (2011), p. 40.
- 20.
Jimenez Gomez (2014), p. 229: “nosotros aquí hablaríamos de un concepto de eficiencia entendida como propia del contexto judicial y, por tanto, consideraríamos la eficiencia judicial como el grado óptimo en el uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos disponibles en la oficina judicial al servicio de la administración de justicia, guardando todas las garantías legales, es decir, teniendo en cuenta dentro de este concepto no solo los recursos disponibles sino también las garantias”.
- 21.
Sudbeck (2006), p. 268 ff. The topic touches on a large range of aspects that almost fall behind the scope of this study, delving on the concept of privacy acknowledged by the different jurisdictions. An American approach seems to consider that open access to records would imply disclosure of personal data, such as security numbers etc. A European approach would highlight that even though judicial decisions are public, the access to record is limited, not only for the reasons reported here, but also with regard to conviction and sentence. The attitude, on the two side of the ocean is very different.
- 22.
Hannah-Moffat and Struhers Montford (2019), p. 175.
- 23.
Blankley (2004), p. 414: The specific categories of documents published online include civil court filings, bankruptcy filings, criminal documents, opinions (both “published” and “unpublished”), and even attorneys’ briefs and motions.
- 24.
See Benesty (2017), p. 1 ff.
- 25.
Sudbeck (2006), p. 270. It must be acknowledged that the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not apply to court records.
- 26.
Sudbeck (2006), p. 271.
- 27.
- 28.
Sudbeck (2006), p. 282 f., providing a list of recommendations to reduce the negative impacts of public access to criminal records, i.e. Excluding publication of non court-generated documents.
- 29.
Xanthaki (2008), p. 27 ff.
- 30.
Di Paolo (2011), p. 4045.
- 31.
While researching for this paragraph, I came across the website of a private society, named ECRIS, after the European database, that in this case stands for European Criminal Records Services. Against a sum of money, the platform offers access to the information in each national record, compliant with the domestic regulation, taking advantage of the fact that, thanks to the real ECRIS, the request set through one country’s central record office allows discovering all the convictions ever reported by an individual in the EU countries.
- 32.
And, in my opinion, it should not be openness in such sense; reusability of criminal record data appears to be non-compliant with the minimum core of privacy. In this sense, it is important to raise awareness, especially in the open data movement advocates, of the specificity of this area of data.
- 33.
- 34.
Zeno Zenchovich (2009), p. 36 f.
- 35.
Bing and Havrold (1977), p. 230.
- 36.
Cadoppi (2014), p. 180.
- 37.
MacCormick and Summers (1997), p. 4.
- 38.
- 39.
Postema (1987), p. 9.
- 40.
Mattei (1996), p. 170 ff.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
After the strong attacks by Hobbes and Bentham, respectively in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [see Postema (1987), p. 9], the nineteenth century saw a restoration of stare decisis [see. Extensively, Evans (1987), p. 35 ff.] and, about the half of twentieth century, Goodhart could argue that the principle of stare decisis had never been so rigid in England [Goodhart (1934), p. 41].
- 44.
Cross and Harris (1991), p. 6.
- 45.
On the one hand, a list of grounds for limiting such right is provided by Art. 6§1 itself: public policy, national security, privacy, the interests of justice are expressly listed as grounds for limitation. On the other hand, the Court jurisprudence also clarified that the presence of the public is not necessarily considered fundamental at all stages of the proceeding, especially in the appeals, when legal issues are (often) discussed. See Rainey et al. (2017), p. 301.
- 46.
This jurisprudence dates back to the famous case of Pretto and others v. Italy, 8.12.1983, in which the Court discharged the applicants’ arguments, finding that no violation of the Convention had occurred, since the decision was accessible to anyone. See Rainey et al. (2017), p. 302.
- 47.
Serverin (2018), p. 24.
- 48.
Van Bossuyt and De Groote (2009), p. 371.
- 49.
MacCormick and Summers (1997), p. 2.
- 50.
Taruffo (1997), p. 451.
- 51.
Blackstone (1765), p. 73, concluding the section dedicated to the precedent: “and thus much for the first ground and chief corner stone of the laws of England, which is, general immemorial custom, or common law, from time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice”.
- 52.
It would be interesting to assess whether if the need for access to judicial decisions could be read in connection with the Kant’s principle of publicity and his claim for the ‘public use of reason’ stated, in particular, in Kant (1795), p. 1995.
- 53.
Mattei (1996), p. 178.
- 54.
Schauer (2009), p. 105.
- 55.
Schauer (2009), p. 107.
- 56.
Blackstone (1765), p. 70: “the doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to suppose they acted wholly without consideration”.
- 57.
Schauer (2009), p. 104.
- 58.
- 59.
In this sense, it must be noted that the concept of ‘leading case’ is a bare doctrinal evolution, as such case has no special authority: Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 341.
- 60.
- 61.
And before it, by ‘prothonotaries’, based on a long-lasting tradition, dating back to the days of King Edward the Second: at the expenses of the Crown, the reports were published annually and thus became known under the name of year books. Blackstone (1765), p. 71, recalls that, “upon the influence of Lord Francis Bacon, king James the first had appointed two reporters “with a handsome stipend for this purpose”… However, the appointment was soon forgotten and since the period of Henry the Eight to the time of Blackstone’s writing, the reports had been compiled by many private and cotemporary hands”, some of which more experienced, some others much more fallible.
- 62.
And also reporting the outlines of the arguments presented by the parties: Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 320.
- 63.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 322.
- 64.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 322.
- 65.
Cross and Harris (1991), p. 206.
- 66.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 337.
- 67.
- 68.
Cross and Harris (1991), p. 72 ff.
- 69.
Interestingly enough, it has been noted that it is almost up to the parties to cite all the relevant precedents, even those adverse to their client, pleading that it they must be distinguished: Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 342.
- 70.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 348.
- 71.
Blackstone (1765), p. 70.
- 72.
Ibidem: “the rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason: much more if it be contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law but to vindicate the old one from misinterpretation”.
- 73.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 350.
- 74.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 334.
- 75.
Practice Statement 1966 3 All ER 77.
- 76.
Blackstone (1765), p. 73.
- 77.
It is interesting to underling a peculiar feature of the Swiss legal system. In art. 1 of the Civil code, the legislator recognised to judge the specific duty to ‘act as legislator’ in case there are no written rules or customary rules to apply to the pending case. This allowed, in the recent decades, the development of a more pragmatic legal reasoning by the judges of the Swiss federal tribunal, based on the unusual recognition of incompleteness of the statutory legal system: see Werro (2018), p. 136 ff.
- 78.
It has been theorized that there are three different approaches from which the culture of judiciary can be studied: the personal, the institutional and the external one, the latter being related to impacts that judiciaries have on the society: Bell (2006), p. 2. There is no room in this inquiry to linger over this aspect. However, it is important to recall that the framework in which judiciaries must be appreciated is complex and multifaceted.
- 79.
For a general overview see Tunc (1978a), p. 8 ff.
- 80.
Although a comprehensive comparative study between France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and England demonstrated that the distinctions common law/civil law and Romano-Germanic/Latin are not really helpful in classifying the features and characters of judiciary in these countries: Bell (2006), p. 382.
- 81.
Cappelletti (1981), p. 383. On the contrary, the Italian constitution provides that any judgment and decision about liberty can be appealed to the Supreme Court (art. 111.7).
- 82.
In this sense, Cappelletti (1981), p. 383. Such distrust in judicial discretion is particularly relevant in the history of criminal procedure. In fact, it is always mentioned in the list of the main differences between inquisitorial and adversarial legal models, being the main reason why inquisitorial models provide for a plurality of means of appeal, allowing for a general and complete review of the first instance decision by one or more higher courts.
- 83.
However, many Supreme Courts, like e.g. the French and the Italian one, although deprived of the writ of certiorari, introduced filters to the admission of the cases, based on the requirements established by the law.
- 84.
- 85.
There are, of course, admissibility requirements, but they imply just a minimum deree of diligence by the parties.
- 86.
Tunc (1978b), p. 440 f.
- 87.
Taruffo (1997), p. 448.
- 88.
Cappelletti (1981), p. 383.
- 89.
Bobek (2013), p. 99.
- 90.
Bankowski et al. (1997), p. 337.
- 91.
- 92.
Zweigert Kötz (1971), p. 316.
- 93.
See, e.g., art. 65 of the Italian Judiciary Act (Ordinamento giudiziario), establishing that the Supreme Court of Cassation must provide for the exact application of law, the uniformity of the interpretation of it, and the substantive unity of the legal order.
- 94.
Cappelletti (1981), p. 389.
- 95.
For a comprehensive comparative approach to judiciary recruitment in seven democracies (England, US, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy), see Guarnieri and Pederzoli (2002), p. 46.
- 96.
Oberto (2003), p. 14.
- 97.
See, however, Switzerland: judges are elected by the Federal Assembly on a political basis. Such system has long been in the radar of GRECO, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, that released its last report earlier 2019: https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/168094e860. Unfortunately, the report on the implementation of the measures suggested about judicial recruitment is negative: the committee of the Council of Europe found out that there is no domestic discussion about the possibility to amend the current system.
- 98.
For a worldwide overview, see Bellet et al. (1978), passim: each national report covers the recruiting policies for judiciary. For more recent European perspective, Delmas Marty and Spencer (2002), passim. For a comparison between France and England, see Cross and Harris (1991), p. 13. For a complete overview on the Italian system see Oberto (2013).
- 99.
Salas (2002), p. 491 ff.
- 100.
Cappelletti (1981), p. 387.
- 101.
Edlin (2016), p. 8. In some continental jurisdictions, judges are not supposed to sign their decision because it “should in principle be the same decision that any other judge in that tradition would reach in the same case”.
- 102.
Salas (2002), p. 493.
- 103.
See Posner (2010), p. 129.
- 104.
Violante (2009), passim.
- 105.
Bell (2006), p. 19 underlines that the research about this topic is very rare, and data are patchy. The social context of each European country is particular and any general approach will prove inappropriate. The mix of diverse components in each national society is unique and depends on geography, ethnography, history and colonialism… Thus, a comprehensive discourse about diversity in judiciary should be based on a diversified approach for each country. On the basis of high educational qualifications, the prerequisite for recruitment, the average European member of judiciary has middle-class backgrounds.
- 106.
Access to legal profession is the requisite for a further access to the highest level of judiciary: see Webley et al. (2016), p. 198 ff. See The Guardian editorial, 12.5.2017, The Guardian view on judicial diversity: time, gentlemen, please.
- 107.
In December 2015 the Italian media informed that the number of women in judiciary was higher than men, although acknowledging that women in the highest seats were less than one third. In France, in April 2018, 66% of judiciary were women, with a stunning relationship, within the youngest group of judges (30–34 years), of 29 men against 100 women (figures from by the French Ministry of Justice).
- 108.
Salas (2002), p. 494.
- 109.
Paradoxically, it has been noted that in France, the Cour de Cassation is not used to cite its own precedents. It does not mean, of course, that the Court feels totally free to disregards its own precedent, but the typical style of the decision does not encompass citations from previous case-law: Taruffo (1997), p. 454.
- 110.
MacCormick and Summers (1997), p. 12.
- 111.
Taruffo (1997), p. 458, highlighting that in every system the declaratory or constitutive nature of the courts is crucial. However, a critical approach to English common law, denies that neither the declaratory theory, nor the positivist one can justify the absolute authority of the precedent: Wesley Smith (1987), p. 87: “stare decisis cannot be law, precedents cannot be absolutely authoritative. Judges owe their fidelity, not to the pronouncements of predecessors, but to the law”.
- 112.
As to Italy, see Canzio (2014), p. 231: every judge of the court writes average 400 decisions per year. And the number of the judges at the Supreme court is very high, higher than in any other Supreme Court: Lupo (2014), p. 11. A comprehensive study on the organization and functioning of the Court, based on empirical research, was published by Di Federico (1969), passim: unfortunately, the empirical research has not been updated.
- 113.
The term judiciary may encompass different roles: in some countries, prosecutors are member of judiciary, although they do not exercise any formal judging power, while in other countries (England and Wales Crown Prosecution Service) middle rank civil servants. On the complexity of translating the term, Bell cit., 2ff.
- 114.
On the legalistic theory, see Posner (2010), p. 41.
- 115.
Dupré (2018), p. 106.
- 116.
Bobek (2013), p. 98.
- 117.
von der Lieth Gardner (1987), p. 3.
- 118.
European Ethical Charter, Appendix I, p. 27.
- 119.
Interestingly enough, the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure never mentions the word ‘truth’. Due to the large doctrinal discussion about the existence of different concepts of truth, a judicial and an historical one, the rulers decided not to use the term.
- 120.
Turner and Weigend (2019), p. 257.
- 121.
Turner and Weigend (2019), p. 256: “Every legal system recognizes exclusionary rules as a reaction to particularly serious violations”.
- 122.
Thaman (2013), p. 410.
- 123.
Thaman (2013), p. 408.
- 124.
Rationales of exclusionary rules are multiple: first, finding the truth, but also upholding judicial integrity, deterring police misconduct and, of course, promoting respect of fundamental rights: see Turner and Weigend (2019), p. 257.
- 125.
Thaman (2013), p. 426.
- 126.
Serverin (2018), p. 45: local courts would benefit of ‘predictive justice’ in the sense of recognizing the public opinion expectation for equal treatment at a local level.
- 127.
Serverin (2018), p. 44.
- 128.
See European Ethical Charter, Appendix I, cit., p. 29.
- 129.
Ibidem.
- 130.
Benesty (2017), p. 4, observes that it is not relevant for the purposes of the instrument to determine the individual role of each judge.
- 131.
There has been a serious debate in France on the matter of publishing the name of the judges who delivered the decision. Art. 33 loi n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice, not only provides that the publication of elements identifying the individuals involved in the proceeding is prevented whether hampering their right to security and privacy. Such guarantee is extended to their families and the professionals. It also expressly prohibits the re-use the names of judges and registrars for the purposes of predictive quantitative legal analysis.
- 132.
See European Ethical Charter, Appendix I, cit., p. 19.
- 133.
Usually, decisions in civil law countries are considered final when no ordinary means of appeal is available any longer. However, a first instance decision, totally departing from the supreme court case law, could become final, if none of the parties appellate it. Nevertheless, its value as a precedent is irrelevant, because, if appealed, it would have been likely reversed.
- 134.
Brigan (2018), p. 244.
- 135.
Deumier (2018), p. 54.
- 136.
Deumier (2018), p. 55.
- 137.
Larret-Chahine (2018), p. 292.
- 138.
Larret-Chahine (2018), p. 293.
- 139.
Deumier (2018), p. 61.
- 140.
Buat-Menard and Giambiasi (2017), p. 1483.
- 141.
Brigan (2018), p. 250.
- 142.
See e.g. Italy.
- 143.
Deumier (2018), p. 61.
- 144.
Mouriesse (2018), p. 135.
- 145.
Brigan (2018), p. 248.
- 146.
Ferrié (2018), p. 498.
- 147.
Rainey et al. (2017), p. 297: “the subjective element involves an enquiry into whether the personal conviction of a judge in a particular case raises doubts about his or her independence or impartiality […] The objective element involves determination of whether, in terms of structure and appearance, a party’s doubts about the tribunal’s independence and impartiality may be legitimate”.
- 148.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Tourancheau et July c. France, 24.11.2005, spec. § 78: in the case about the alleged violation of art. 10, based on the applicants’ conviction for opinions expressed in a press article, the court recognized that the conviction was necessary in a democratic society to guarantee impartiality of the judicial function. The decision has been recalled in many further cases about art. 10 ECHR.
- 149.
In a case dealing with a military court, the European Court stated the importance of avoiding internal influences based on the rank of the judges: ECtHR, Findlay v. UK, 25.2.1997.
- 150.
Which was apparently used first by an English barrister…
- 151.
Larret-Chahine (2018), p. 293.
- 152.
Benesty (2017), p. 7.
- 153.
- 154.
Brigan (2018), p. 245.
- 155.
- 156.
Fossas Espalder (2018), p. 4.
- 157.
See what one of the most influential twentieth century Italian scholars said about certainty of law: “[l’uomo], per fare un passo, ha bisogno di vedere dove va. La previsione precede l’azione come la luce dei fari precede la marcia d’un veicolo nella notte. E quanto più la marcia è veloce, tanto maggiore ha da essere lo spazio illuminato dai fari. Perciò, se oltre ad essere giustizia il diritto non fosse certezza, non offrirebbe la garanzia dell’azione”, Carnelutti (1953), p. 178.
- 158.
Villaverede Menéndez (2018), p. 36.
- 159.
It is worth remembering that art. 7 ECHR cannot be derogated based on art. 15, in any case, even not in case of war.
- 160.
RCtHR 21,10.2003, Del Rio Prada v. Spain, §§ 78, 79.
- 161.
Zagrebelsky (2018), passim.
- 162.
- 163.
See, e.g., Mayer (1915), p. 302 ff.
- 164.
- 165.
Garcia Amado (2018), p. 178.
- 166.
Viganò (2016), p. 213 ff.
- 167.
Garcia Amado (2018), p. 179: based on the fact that in many European legal systems, the same behavior may amount to both a criminal and a civil violation, the global conditions applied to the offender may be harsher as to the penalty, but can be harsher from the private law point of view.
- 168.
Manes (2012), p. 278 ss.
- 169.
Santangelo (2019), p. 344.
- 170.
At the end of 1989 in C.R. v. UK and at the beginning of 1990, in S.W. v. U.K.
- 171.
Osborne (1996), p. 406 ff.
- 172.
ECHR, 10.10.2006, Pessino v. France, § 36 f.
- 173.
Del Rio Prada. cit., § 117.
- 174.
Ibidem.
- 175.
ECHR, 6.10.2011, Soros c. France, in which the Court stated that although neither the French supreme court, nor a court of appeal had ever ruled on the new offence, with which the applicant was charged, lower courts had delivered decisions on the merit of similar cases, excluding a violation of art. 7 ECHR. Moreover, the Court applied the ‘subjective test’, considering that (§59) the applicant quality of international entrepreneur, urged him to be aware of the criminal risk implied in the investment he was planning.
- 176.
The Court completely overlooked this criterion in the case of Pessino v. France, who was an entrepreneur in the real estate field, having been convicted for urban planning offences, and in the case of Dragotoniu e Militaru-Pidhorni v. Rumania, 24.5.2007, § 35.
- 177.
ECHR, 28.3.1990, Groppera Radio AG and others v. Switzerland.
- 178.
However, with regard to Dallas, it has been noted that the Court completely failed to apply the ‘subjective test’. The applicant had no specific legal competences, helping her to understand the criminal consequences of her act (while serving as juror, she browsed the internet for information about the defendant). Such decision was criticized (A. Santangelo, cit., 340), especially because it was followed by a statutory reform (Criminal Justice and Court Act 2015) of the offence, due to the concern of the Law Commission about the uncertainty of the common law ‘jurors content of court’. Before the European Court decision, the Law Commission had already expressed its concern about the situation (Law Commission, Report 304, 9th December 2004).
- 179.
ECHR 25.5.1993, Kokkinakis v. Greece, § 40.
- 180.
Manes (2018), p. 125 ff.
- 181.
ECHR, Dec. 14.6.2011, Jobe v. UK.
- 182.
Jobe v. UK, § A.
- 183.
Be Blasis (2017), p. 141.
- 184.
See Del Rio Prada, cit., § 79.
- 185.
See, among others, Kokkinakis, cit., § 40; Del Rio Prada, cit., 92.
- 186.
In civil matters, the consequence would be that of shifting the legal system towards a model based on actions, on writs, like in the ancient common law tradition. Actually, there is trend in legal doctrine suggesting to found the litigation not on the claim for the respect of a substantive right, but on the existence of a corresponding action…
- 187.
Serverin (2018), p. 42.
- 188.
Garcia Amado (2018), p. 181.
- 189.
ECtHR, 23.2.2017, De Tommaso v. Italy, § 107: “a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Such consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances”.
- 190.
Usually, procedural law is ruled by the principle tempus regit actum…
- 191.
Garcia Amado (2018), p. 181.
- 192.
Art. 33 loi n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice.
- 193.
Weizenbaum (1972), p. 614.
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Quattrocolo, S. (2020). Predictability and the Criminal Justice Decision-Making Process. In: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Modelling and Criminal Proceedings. Legal Studies in International, European and Comparative Criminal Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52470-8_7
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