Abstract
This essay reconsiders the philosophical merits of Ayer’s verificationism. It concentrates on the first and second editions of Language, Truth and Logic (LTL), while also taking account of other writings by Ayer, as well as pertinent contributions to the continuing debate about verificationism. It starts out by identifying the importance of verificationism to Ayer’s attack on metaphysics, through elucidating its place in what I call his ‘anti-metaphysical argument’. Next it explains what verificationism is, emphasizing the difference between a semantic doctrine about the nature of meaning—‘the principle of verification’ (PV)—and an anti-metaphysical standard for meaningfulness—‘the criterion of verifiability’ (CV). It then concentrates on CV, considering the idea of ‘verifiability in principle’ and the distinction between strong and weak verifiability. With hindsight, CV fails to furnish the kind of knock-down argument against metaphysics Ayer sought. Nevertheless, it is a valuable dialectic tool for clarifying philosophical problems and theories and for challenging metaphysical pronouncements. But even in that dialectic capacity, CV presupposes that linguistic meaning is indeed linked to verification, that is, a variant of PV. I therefore engage in a brief semantic discussion of the role verification plays in meaning. At the end, I register a brief and ambivalent verdict on the legacy of Ayer’s verificationism.
ayer, v. (from Spanish, ayer, meaning yesterday) To oversimplify elegantly in the direction of a past generation. “Russell, in the Analysis of Mind, ayers a behaviorist account of belief”.
—The Philosophical Lexicon, Daniel Dennett and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
About these issues see Nicole Rathgeb’s chapter in this volume.
- 3.
About Ayer’s phenomenalism see the chapters of Thomas Uebel and Gergely Ambrus; on ethics see the contributions of Aaron Preston and Krisztián Pete.
- 4.
On the various influences on Ayer’s thought see Quinton (1991), on the extent to which he was indebted to logical positivism in particular pp. 35–40. See also Andreas Vrahimis chapter in this volume on the non-analytic European influences on LTL.
- 5.
As some commentators have pointed out (e.g. Ellenbogen 2003, 122n), Dummett (e.g. 1978) wavers between characterizing semantic anti-realism as a position about truth, which insists on confining truth to warranted assertibility, and characterizing it as a position about meaning, which insists that the latter is to be spelled out in terms of assertibility—rather than truth-conditions. The second option is promoted by Crispin Wright (1992, 4–7, 37–38; 2001, 201, 367–373). The first option is favored by Rundle (1972, Ch. 1). But he draws the conclusion that absence of verifiability makes only for lack of truth-value, not for lack of meaning (see 1972, 16–17). For this reason, even if the alethic anti-realism of his verificationism were tenable, the latter could not serve as a rationale for Ayer’s anti-metaphysical argument.
- 6.
For Ayer’s theory of truth, see Laszlo Kocsis’ chapter in the volume.
- 7.
Whereas Carnap went for nomological possibility, Schlick opted for logical possibility. For an up-to-date and illuminating account of debates about verification among the logical empiricists see Uebel (2019).
- 8.
- 9.
I am grateful to the participants of the 2018 conference at Pecs, and in particular to its organizer Ádám Tuboly. The paper has also benefitted substantially from comments on a first draft by Ádam and by Nicole Rathgeb.
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Glock, HJ. (2021). Ayer’s Verificationism: Dead as a Dodo?. In: Tuboly, A.T. (eds) The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50884-5_8
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