Abstract
Ethics is a speculative discipline. We lose sight of this because of our current practices and due to our deep involvement with the contemporary literature. Explorations in Ethics has a distinctive speculative bent, although much that is addressed in it will be familiar to all ethicists. Ethics today is largely analytic in approach and is historically informed. A prominent part of contemporary ethics methodology is its piecemeal approach, formulating and arguing for definite smaller defensible claims. Central to the current ethics discussion are what I describe as safe claims. The problem with prioritizing safe claims is that it ensures the exclusion of unsafe claims that might be more explanatorily powerful and fruitful. This means that, currently, we choose theoretical safety over progress. The principal reason to speculate in ethics is to move ethics toward its ultimate aim: a comprehensive and correct ethical theory. Putting explanatory but unsafe claims back at the center of ethical inquiry is the key to progress in ethics. The proposal for putting ethics back on its natural footing of greater speculation is to encourage ethicists to identify a contemporary methodological constraint they wish to suspend, then, once it is lifted, to speculate about matters of ethics.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
The inclusion of Hume makes sense if we consider that he influenced both utilitarians and moral skeptics.
- 4.
Kant identifies this as a feature of the Categorical Imperative in Critique of Practical Reason (1993, 8).
- 5.
The Benacerraf problem is covered in Justin Clarke-Doane’s chapter in this volume.
- 6.
Hursthouse states that virtue ethics is a ‘fairly recent addition to contemporary moral theory’ (1999, 1).
References
Bales, R. Eugene. 1971. Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure? American Philosophical Quarterly 8: 257–265.
Becker, Lawrence. 1998. A New Stoicism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carlyle, Thomas. 1987. Sartor Resartus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glock, Hans-Johann. 2008. What Is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haybron, Daniel. 2008. The Pursuit of Unhappiness–The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holiday, Ryan. 2014. The Obstacle Is the Way: The Timeless Art of Turning Trials into Triumph. New York: Portfolio.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Irvine, William B. 2008. A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kagan, Shelly. 1998. Normative Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1993. Critique of Practical Reason. 3rd ed., Trans. Lewis White Beck. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Kaspar, David. 2016. Ross’s Place in the History of Analytic Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4): 657–674.
Miller, Christian. 2013. Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1993. Introduction. In Consequentialism, ed. Philip Pettit. London: Dartmouth Press.
Pigliucci, Massimo. 2017. How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a Modern Life. New York: Basic Books.
Ross, William David. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Russell, Bertrand. 1956. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. In Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh, 175–281. London: Routledge.
Schroeter, Laura, and François Schroeter. 2019. The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics. Nous 53 (1): 192–223.
Schwartz, Stephen P. 2012. A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Stout, Rowland. 2010. Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy. In The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Dermot Moran, 851–882. London: Routledge.
Stratton-Lake, Philip. 2000. Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. London: Routledge.
Wood, W. Jay. 2014. Prudence. In Virtues and Their Vices, ed. Kevin Timpe and Craig S. Boyd, 37–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for quite helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kaspar, D. (2020). Introduction. In: Kaspar, D. (eds) Explorations in Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48051-6_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48051-6_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-48050-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-48051-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)