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Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Japan

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Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 39))

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Abstract

Discussion of judicial deference to the administration has focused primarily on the area of administrative discretion. Administrative discretionary actions were traditionally understood to be completely out of judicial reach and thus deemed exceptions to the fundamental principle of administration based on law. Even so, how to comprehend administrative discretion and manage to legally check its leeway has been explored in some depth. The conception of the distinction between legally controlled discretion and free discretion is one of the achievements of efforts to control comprehensive freedom of conduct on the part of administrative agencies. Now that the law has made administrative agencies liable for even their discretionary actions when they have been conducted ultra vires or abusively, the court may exercise the power to review discretionary actions with various degrees of intensity. The degree of intensity tends to depend on the nature of the action and the judiciary’s confidence in making its own judgment through the judicial process. Modes of judicial review may vary from lenient through intermediate to strict scrutiny. Recent developments have brought the frequent use of process-oriented review, which may be theoretically applicable to both restricted actions and discretionary actions. Proper reconciliation has had to be explored between actual demands of administrative discretionary judgments and the fundamental principle of the legal state in contemporary complicated settings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This Constitution superseded the Constitution of the Empire of Japan of 1889, which had provided the legal foundation for the modernization that was understood to be imperative to avoid the colonization of Japan, which had just reopened its borders to the world after an interval of over two hundred years. The old Constitution declared the Emperor’s sovereignty: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution” (art. 4). While the Imperial Diet (Parliament) gave only consent to the Emperor, who possessed the legislative power (art. 5), the courts embodied the judicature in the name of the Emperor (Art. 57). The old Constitution failed to stipulate a Prime Minister or even a Cabinet, for its founders deliberately denied parliamentarianism due to their preference for a transcendental cabinet that was supposed to be independent of the Imperial Diet and political parties. The constitutional principle was that the minsters of the state respectively gave advice to the Emperor and were responsible for it (art. 55 para. 1), although its constitutional operation later opened up to quasi-parliamentarian practices. Without appointment and removal power, which belonged to the Emperor alone as one of his prerogatives (art. 10), the prime minister was considered only primus inter pares. The Emperor also determined “the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers” (art. 10). For the old Constitution, see e.g., Ito (1906), and Minobe (1934), pp. 1–155.

  2. 2.

    The Japanese legal system itself is understood to belong to the civil law tradition. Legal codes, not judicial precedents, are considered the main source of law. However, legal codes are usually sufficiently abstract to allow judges to have a considerable degree of leeway when interpreting them. Japanese judges also tend to highly value relevant judicial precedents in their dealings with cases.

  3. 3.

    Judicial review was not expressed clearly under the old constitutional regime. Although it was agreed that the court might review the propriety of procedural aspects of statutes, it was unclear whether the court could review the substance of statutes. The court itself denied it had the power to substantially review legislation (Taishin-in, July 11, 1913, Keiroku 19: 790). See Miyasawa (1973), p. 36.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Ashibe (2015), pp. 338–341; Sato (2011), p. 581; Hasebe (2016), p. 407.

  5. 5.

    For a general view of the relation between administration and the judiciary, see, e.g., Sowa (2011).

  6. 6.

    For the issues and discussions of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, see, e.g., Shiono (2013), pp. 64–285; Uga (2018), pp. 92–404.

  7. 7.

    For the issues and discussions of the State Redress Act, see, e.g., Shiono (2013), pp. 286–355; Uga (2018), pp. 405–498.

  8. 8.

    For the discussions of administrative discretion and its judicial control, see, e.g., Tanaka (1974), pp. 116–120; Shiono (2015), pp. 137–154; Harada (2012), pp. 146–155; Fujita (2013), pp. 96–125, on which Part II of this report mainly relies; Uga (2017), pp. 324–337; Ohashi (2016), pp. 200–216; Watari (2002), pp. 32–46, 292–323; Yamamoto (2006), Yamamoto (2012), pp. 218–310; Fukazawa (2013), pp. 353–369; Hashimoto (2008); Sakakibara (2013); Murakami (2013); Takahashi (2013); Yamashita (2013); Toyoshima (2013); Shimoyama (2013); Watanabe (2013a).

  9. 9.

    Minobe (1929), pp. 152–153.

  10. 10.

    See Shiono (2015), pp. 138–139.

  11. 11.

    See Fujita (2013), pp. 115–116.

  12. 12.

    See Sakakibara (2013), pp. 4–5.

  13. 13.

    See Sakakibara (2013), p. 5; Uga (2017), p. 333.

  14. 14.

    See Sakakibara (2013), and Takagi (2014).

  15. 15.

    See Murakami (2013), pp. 10–13.

  16. 16.

    Since this judgment, the Supreme Court has often utilized the review mode combining a review from socially accepted views with a review of the decision-making process of administrative discretionary power. See Yamamoto (2016), p. 2.

  17. 17.

    See, e.g., Shiono (2015), pp. 147–149; Uga (2017), pp. 330–332; Ohashi (2016), pp. 210–214; Hitomi (2018), pp. 114–116.

  18. 18.

    There is serious doubt about the appropriateness of the current national flag and anthem under the post-World War II constitutional regime, as they have not changed since the old constitutional regime, in which the Emperor was sovereign. The National Flag and National Anthem Act was established without much national debate in 1999.

  19. 19.

    See Murakami (2013), pp. 10–12.

  20. 20.

    See Murakami (2013), p. 13.

  21. 21.

    See Yamamoto (2016), pp. 15–23.

  22. 22.

    See Murakami (2013), pp. 13–14.

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Kawakami (2006), pp. 11–13; Miura (2008), Tsuneoka (2008), Sakakibara (2013), pp. 6–8; Murakami (2013), pp. 14–15; Yamamoto (2016), pp. 10–11; Uga (2017), p. 333.

  24. 24.

    See Kawakami (2006), pp. 15–16; Yamamoto (2016), p. 12.

  25. 25.

    See Yamamoto (2006), p. 15; Takagi (2010), p. 2077; Takahashi (2013), and Yamamoto (2016), p. 11.

  26. 26.

    See Yamamoto (2016), pp. 22–23.

  27. 27.

    See, e.g., Shishido (2009), Nagata (2013), Watanabe (2013b), Yamamoto (2016), pp. 11–13; Sakakibara (2018).

  28. 28.

    See, e.g., Kawagishi (2015).

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Correspondence to Norikazu Kawagishi .

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Kawagishi, N. (2019). Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Japan. In: Zhu, G. (eds) Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 39. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31539-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31539-9_13

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