Abstract
The chapter relates to the thought of the Lvov-Warsaw School in a very contemporary way, because it refers to computer science. In section 1, starting from the declarations of selected representatives of the School (including Kazimierz Twardowski and Władysław Tatarkiewicz), we will specify the relation between the worldview and philosophy as a feedback taking place in time. In sections 2 and 3, we will characterize the conceptual apparatus of computer science (it consists of such terms as information, computing, algorithm, computability and uncomputability), and then we will explain some preliminary assumptions of the informational worldview. These are the following assumptions: (i) each being has a certain information content, (ii) a human mind is an information processing system, and (iii) with the development of human civilization, the complexity of problems solved by the mind (through information processing) keeps increasing. In section 4, we will present for discussion the philosophical concept of Marciszewski (one of the contemporary continuators of the School), which refers to the assumption of (iii), and is one of the possible informational worldviews.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
It should be stressed that Twardowski treated the scientific worldview (or: the ultimately scientifically substantiated view of the world and life) as an ideal to be pursued, but never to be actually achieved.
- 3.
The term ‘world perspective’ was used by Ajdukiewicz in the context of the methodology of sciences, referring to a set of beliefs (or, more properly, statements) characteristic of a particular science at a particular stage in its development. These judgments make up the knowledge proper to a particular science about a particular fragment and aspect of the world. Thus, every science develops its special perspective on the world (rather than a comprehensive picture of the world), consistent with the findings it has made so far. Such perspective may be treated (as we do in this text) as a way of viewing the world offered by a particular science as a framework within which one can build a worldview going beyond science—i.e. a set of views which are not unequivocally ruled out by scientific findings. In this new context, a more adequate term is therefore ‘worldview perspective’ (rather than ‘world perspective’) (cf. Ajdukiewicz 1934: 409–416).
- 4.
The concept of information society was introduced by a Japanese, Tadao Umesao (in 1963), and then popularized by the American sociologist Daniel Bell (beginning in the 1980s). It describes a society in which: (a) the dominating sector of economy is services (including information services); (b) the economy is based on knowledge; (c) the occupational structure is dominated by specialists and scientists; (d) there is a strong development of new (information and communication) technologies of managing information and knowledge; and (e) there is an increasing tendency to computerize more and more areas (Ito 1991: 3–12).
- 5.
By way of a longer footnote, let us explain that the methodological status of computer science is not unequivocal. Depending on how its main concepts (such as algorithm or data) are interpreted and used, computer science is considered to be: (a) a formal science—akin to mathematics; (b) an engineering and technical science—akin to electronics; or even (c) a natural science—in some respects akin to traditional natural sciences (such as physics or biology; in this context, the term natural computing is used). It should be borne in mind that these descriptions are not mutually exclusive; rather, they suggest various aspects of research and applications, instead of defining computer science as such (Knuth 1974: 323–343; Denning 2005: 27–31; Murawski 2014).
Despite the multifaceted nature of studies mentioned above, the central feature of computer science—the one which enables both engineering applications and references to nature—is its formalism. This means that the objects of computer science are first of all formal objects, and only then, within the framework of particular implementations and applications, do they become physical objects (e.g. signals corresponding to particular types of data), or technical ones (e.g. specific, appropriately constructed computer systems). Or, in other words, in order for any products of applied computer science to take form, a theory is required which is developed in a formal (quasi-mathematical) way within such disciplines as algorithmics or computational theory.
- 6.
Another example of a cognitivist interpretation is that of the artificial neural network examined as part of research into artificial intelligence. While a particular network (e.g. multilayer perceptron) is examined independently from its various possible applications (e.g. in relation to the question about the best mathematically substantiated learning algorithm), it remains a formal object. If such a network is understood as a model of perception (explaining how the human mind recognizes and classifies objects in a particular field), it is endowed with a cognitivist meaning (Żurada 1992).
- 7.
A more detailed explanation of these and other concepts can be found in (Stacewicz 2016).
- 8.
Since elementary operations performed by a machine take a particular amount of time, computational complexity (in the sense defined above) is also called time complexity. Other types of computational complexity are identified as well: including that referring to memory (the amount of the machine’s memory units that need to be used), and structure (concerning the complexity of the algorithm/programme itself, i.e. the instructions which make it up).
- 9.
The term used hereinafter, ‘informational worldview’, first appeared in the book ‘Umysł—Komputer—Świat. O zagadce umysłu z informatycznego punktu widzenia’. Since its publications, various aspects of the informationally inspired worldview have been presented and discussed (in Polish) on an academic blog called Cafe Aleph (http://marciszewski.eu/).
Using a single synthetic formula, an informational worldview can be defined as a certain type of pre-philosophical views which are scientifically grounded and which derive from a strong belief that the key role in describing the world and the relationship between man and the world is played by information technology concepts (such as data, code, algorithm, or computability; cf. Stacewicz 2016: 36).
- 10.
The dynamic character of this phenomenon is illustrated, for instance, by the ever new discussions in the Cafe Aleph blog (http://blog.marciszewski.eu/) whose main purpose is to provide a platform for the exchange of information on various topics related to the IWV.
- 11.
The comments provided here could, naturally, be longer—they would then represent a broader discussion of some of the topics related to the IWV. Due to limited space, they need to be succinct, however. A more detailed discussion of this concept can be found in (Stacewicz 2016: 35–47).
- 12.
The concept of computational power is particularly emphasized by Marciszewski (Marciszewski and Stacewicz 2011: 148).
- 13.
A more extensive definition provided by Marciszewski is worded as follows: ‘realistic optimism about understanding and transforming the world’ (Marciszewski and Stacewicz 2011: 224).
- 14.
This thesis is an expression of the realism of the standpoint discussed further on: it must be accepted realistically, i.e. in accordance with the actual practice of various sciences, that the complexity of problems they examine keeps increasing.
- 15.
For example, using the Roman notation (without the zero symbol) it was not possible to develop universal algorithms for addition or multiplication (not to mention more complicated operations; cf. Ifrah 2000).
- 16.
The most thoroughly investigated and most closely related to information processing in practice is the model of discrete computing, precisely described with the formalism of universal Turing machine (describing data processing by digital computers in an idealized way). It is not the only model, however. Apart from this one, various models of continuous (analogue) computations are examined as well. We will refer to them further on in this paper (Burgin and Dodig-Crnkovic 2013).
- 17.
As a reminder, the halting problem is expressed in the following question: ‘Does a particular (but any) Turing machine determined by its programme and the sequence of input symbols halt after a finite number of steps, or must it run indefinitely?’ (cf. Harel 1987).
- 18.
This assumption does not need to be true, as we will discuss further on.
- 19.
References
Ajdukiewicz, K. (1934). Naukowa perspektywa świata. Przegląd Filozoficzny, XXXVII, 409–416.
Ajdukiewicz, K. (2003). Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii. Kęty and Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Antyk—Fundacja Aletheia.
Ajdukiewicz, K. (2006). Język i poznanie (Vol. 1). Warszawa: PWN.
Burgin, M., & Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2013). Typologies of computation and computational models. arXiv:1312.2447[cs].
Cafe Aleph (http://blog.marciszewski.eu/), an academic discussion blog of W. Marciszewski and P. Stacewicz.
Copeland, J. (2002). Hypercomputation. Mind and Machines, 12, 461–502.
Denning, P. J. (2005). Is computer science science? Communications of the ACM, 48(4), 27–31.
Harel, D. (1987). Algorithmics: The spirit of computing. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Ifrah, G. (2000). The universal history of numbers: From prehistory to the invention of the computer. New York: Wiley.
Ito, Y. (1991). Birth of Joho Shakai and Johoka concepts and their diffusion outside Japan. Keio Communication Review, 13, 3–12.
Kari, L., & Rozenberg, G. (2008). The many facets of natural computing. Communications of the ACM, 10(51), 72–83.
Knuth, D. E. (1974). Computer science and its relation to mathematics. American Mathematical Monthly, 4(81), 323–343.
Marciszewski, W. (1996). Sztuka Dyskutowania. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo „Aleph”.
Marciszewski, W. (2006). The Gödelian speed-up and other strategies to address decidability and tractability. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 22, 9–29.
Marciszewski, W. (2013). Racjonalistyczny optymizm poznawczy w Gödlowskiej wizji dynamiki wiedzy. In R. Ziemińska (Ed.), Przewodnik po epistemologii. WAM: Kraków.
Marciszewski, W. (2015). On accelerations in science driven by daring ideas: Good messages from fallibilistic rationalism. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 53, 19–41.
Marciszewski, W. (2019). The progress of science from a computational point of view: The drive towards ever higher solvability. Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences, 44, 11–26.
Marciszewski, W., & Stacewicz, P. (2011). Umysł – Komputer – Świat. O zagadce umysłu z informatycznego punktu widzenia. Warszawa: Akademicka Oficyna Wydawnicza EXIT.
Michalewicz, Z. (1992). Genetic algorithms + Data structures = Evolution programs. Berlin: Springer.
Murawski, R. (2014). Filozofia informatyki. Antologia. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM.
Mycka, J., & Costa, J. F. (2004). Real recursive functions and their hierarchy. Journal of Complexity, 20, 835–857.
Mycka, J., & Olszewski, A. (2015). Czy teza Churcha ma jeszcze jakieś znaczenie dla informatyki? In P. Stacewicz (Ed.), Informatyka a filozofia. Od informatyki i jej zastosowań do światopoglądu informatycznego (pp. 53–74), Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza PW.
Ord, T. (2006). The many forms of hypercomputation. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 178, 8–24.
Shannon, C. (1941). Mathematical theory of the differential analyzer. Journal of Mathematics and Physics MIT, 20, 337–354.
Stacewicz, P. (2016). Informational worldview: Scientific foundations and philosophical perspectives. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 47(60), 35–47.
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1990). Historia filozofii (Vols. 1–3). Warszawa: PWN.
Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42, 230–265.
Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 49, 433–460.
Twardowski, K. (1965). Wybrane pisma filozoficzne. Warszawa: PWN.
Wang, H. (1996). Logical journey: From Gödel to philosophy. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
Żurada, J. M. (1992). Introduction to artificial neural systems. St. Paul: West Publishing Company.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stacewicz, P. (2019). The Informational Worldview and Conceptual Apparatus. In: Drabarek, A., Woleński, J., Radzki, M. (eds) Interdisciplinary Investigations into the Lvov-Warsaw School. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24486-6_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24486-6_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-24485-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-24486-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)