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Pleading for a “Multiple Goal Approach” in European Competition Law

Outline of a Conciliatory Path Between the “Freedom to Compete Approach” and the “More Economic Approach”

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New Developments in Competition Law and Economics

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 7))

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Abstract

This paper will show why European competition scholars should break up the dichotomy of the two predominant approaches in competition law—“Freedom to Compete Approach” and “More Economic Approach”—and turn towards a promising third way: the so-called “Multiple Goal Approach”. This conciliatory approach combines the positive aspects of the two predominant approaches and will finally lead to a more realistic, inclusive, and transparent competition law. In doing so, the “Multiple Goal Approach” may also initiate a new debate about the old question of the goals of competition law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Zimmer (2010), pp. 321 et seqq.; Maier-Rigaud (2012), pp. 150 et seqq.; Künzler (2012), pp. 208 et seqq.

  2. 2.

    Especially in the German literature: Kerber (2008); Budzinski (2007); Hellwig (2006).

  3. 3.

    Monti (2004), p. 177.

  4. 4.

    Künzler (2012) and Zäch and Künzler (2009).

  5. 5.

    Waelbroek (2006), p. 85.

  6. 6.

    Further insights: Witt (2016), pp. 7 et seqq.

  7. 7.

    Behrens (2011), p. 126.

  8. 8.

    For further insights: Posner (1979) and Piraino (2007).

  9. 9.

    Further insights: Posner (1979).

  10. 10.

    See: Schmidt (2012), pp. 23 et seqq.

  11. 11.

    For further insights to the FTCA, see: 3.1 “Freedom to Compete Approach”.

  12. 12.

    Künzler (2008), pp. 40 et seqq. and 53 et seqq.

  13. 13.

    See for instance: Bork (1965), Posner (1977) and Stucke (2009).

  14. 14.

    Budzinski (2007), pp. 7 et seqq.

  15. 15.

    Stucke (2009), p. 132.

  16. 16.

    Schmidtchen (2007), p. 1.

  17. 17.

    See: Wurmnest (2010), pp. 223 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    Heinemann (2015a), p. 39 (especially Fn. 73).

  19. 19.

    See: Schmidt (2006), pp. 5 et seqq.

  20. 20.

    Monti (2004), p. 177.

  21. 21.

    See for this the date of publications of the following essays: Hellwig (2006); Schmidt (2006); Schmidtchen (2007); Budzinski (2007) and Kerber (2008).

  22. 22.

    Behrens (2011); Künzler (2008), pp. 500 et seqq.

  23. 23.

    Heinemann (2015b) and Tor (2013).

  24. 24.

    Ezrachi and Stucke (2016).

  25. 25.

    Post Danmark/Konkurrencerådet, ECJ, C-209/10; Von Jeinsen (2013), p. 207.

  26. 26.

    Ryanair Holdings/European Commission, ECJ, T-342/07; Von Jeinsen (2013), pp. 260 et seqq.

  27. 27.

    GlaxoSmithKline Service/European Commission, ECJ, C-513/06, paragraph 63; Von Jeinsen (2013), pp. 152 et seqq.

  28. 28.

    T-Mobile Netherlands et al./Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, ECJ, C-8/08, paragraph 38; Von Jeinsen (2013), pp. 153 et seqq.

  29. 29.

    Von Hayek (1969), pp. 249 et seqq.

  30. 30.

    Schmidt (2012), p. 18.

  31. 31.

    Schmidt (2012), pp. 19 et seqq.

  32. 32.

    Hoppmann (1968), pp. 27 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Olten (1995), p. 97.

  34. 34.

    For further reading to the axiomatic character of competition law, see: Zäch and Künzler (2009).

  35. 35.

    Hoppmann (1977), p. 235.

  36. 36.

    Stucke (2012), p. 577.

  37. 37.

    Kerber (2008), p. 22.

  38. 38.

    Von Hayek (1969), p. 250.

  39. 39.

    Von Hayek (1989), pp. 3 et seqq.

  40. 40.

    Hoppmann (1968), pp. 36 et seqq.; Stucke (2009).

  41. 41.

    Schmidt (2006), p. 6.

  42. 42.

    See therefore: Schmidt (2006), pp. 21 et seqq.

  43. 43.

    Further insights: Schmidt (2012), pp. 42 et seqq.

  44. 44.

    Olten (1995), p. 99.

  45. 45.

    Stucke (2012), pp. 592 et seqq.

  46. 46.

    Stucke (2012), pp. 591 et seqq.

  47. 47.

    See for instance: Schwartz (1979); Schluep (1976), pp. 119 et seqq.

  48. 48.

    Stucke (2012), p. 611.

  49. 49.

    Article 94 (2) and Article 2 Swiss Constitution; Wohlmann (2018), paragraph 24.

  50. 50.

    Stucke (2012), p. 567.

  51. 51.

    Clark (1961), p. 63.

  52. 52.

    Stucke (2012), p. 624.

  53. 53.

    See for this: Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Stucke (2013).

  54. 54.

    See: Stucke (2012), p. 620.

  55. 55.

    See for instance: Article 5 (3) (Presumption) and Article 5 (2) Swiss Cartel Act (Exception); Stucke (2012), p. 622; Other exceptions may follow, see therefore: Wohlmann (2018), paragraph 26.

  56. 56.

    Stucke (2012), p. 623 (referenced: Fn. 448).

  57. 57.

    Fuchs (2012), pp. 56 et seqq.; Van den Bergh (2007).

  58. 58.

    See for instance: Parret (2012).

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Martin Meier

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. The School of Law, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Avishalom Tor

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Meier, M. (2019). Pleading for a “Multiple Goal Approach” in European Competition Law. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) New Developments in Competition Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_3

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