Abstract
For many old and new mechanists, Mechanism is both a metaphysical position and a thesis about scientific methodology. In this paper we discuss the relation between the metaphysics of mechanisms and the role of mechanical explanation in the practice of science, by presenting and comparing the key tenets of Old and New Mechanism. First, by focusing on the case of gravity, we show how the metaphysics of Old Mechanism constrained scientific explanation, and discuss Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism. Second, we examine the current mechanistic metaphysics, arguing that it is not warranted by the use of the concept of mechanism in scientific practice, and motivate a thin conception of mechanism (the truly minimal view), according to which mechanisms are causal pathways for a certain effect or phenomenon. Finally, we draw analogies between Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism and our thesis that the metaphysical commitments of New Mechanism are not necessary in order to illuminate scientific practice.
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Notes
- 1.
For the purposes of this paper, we ignore issues of mind-body causation and we focus on body-body causation. We also ignore divisions among mechanists concerning the nature of corpuscles, the existence of vacuum etc.
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- 3.
For more on the development of Old Mechanism, see Psillos (2011).
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- 5.
There are various other questions that can be raised concerning TMM: for example, do we take pathways to be types or tokens? Here again, we defer to practice. Causal pathways, qua things in the world that produce an effect, are concrete particulars. But what is described theoretically in the language of theory is a type of causal pathway.
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Acknowledgement
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the AIPS Conference on Mechanistic Explanations, in Dortmund, 27–30 October 2016. We would like to thank the audience for comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann for their invitation, encouragement and comments. Many thanks to Stuart Glennan for useful comments on an earlier draft.
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Psillos, S., Ioannidis, S. (2019). Mechanisms, Then and Now: From Metaphysics to Practice. In: Falkenburg, B., Schiemann, G. (eds) Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10707-9_2
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