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How a Statement Has Meaning by Expressing a Judgement—Brentano Versus Marty on Utterance Meaning

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Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy

Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

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Abstract

Brentano’s work contains the seeds of an account of (non-natural) meaning of assertoric utterances according to which the correctness commitment of judgement enables these acts to mean states of affairs. In this point, Brentano’s work contrasts with Marty’s and Grice’s approaches to (non-natural) meaning in which communicative intentions are central. In my contribution, I will develop Brentano’s suggestion in order to make plausible that it is a viable alternative to Grice’s work.

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Textor, M. (2019). How a Statement Has Meaning by Expressing a Judgement—Brentano Versus Marty on Utterance Meaning . In: Bacigalupo, G., Leblanc, H. (eds) Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05581-3_3

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