Abstract
We study competition of firms for technology adoption in an incomplete information network of markets. Due to the high cost of adoption technology, firms need to use the same decision on technology adoption in all markets of the network. The market uncertainty about the new technology actually induces firms to have an incentive to delay the adoption until they receive more information about it, however a new technology often serves a new market segment. We use a two-stage game to model the strategic behavior of firms, competing in a network of markets, which have to adopt a long-term strategy. In the first stage, firms make decisions to adopt a new technology. In the second stage, a competitive advantage in the products of markets is captured. We apply the results of equilibria in the second stage to analyze the technology adoption decisions in the first stage. Furthermore, equilibrium analysis in the second stage needs to compute equilibrium quantities of Cournot competition and Stackelberg game in a network of markets with incomplete information. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm to find equilibrium in Cournot-competition in the incomplete information network.
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Hossein Ghorban, S. (2019). Strategic Technology Adoption in Networked Markets. In: Arai, K., Bhatia, R., Kapoor, S. (eds) Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2018. FTC 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 881. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02683-7_85
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02683-7_85
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