Powering Forces and History

Abstract

Interwoven in turnaround are issues of democracy, constituent influence and control over organizational decisions, ownership of public institutions, trust, and organizational accountability. Proponents believe that turnarounds increase knowledge, about, access to, and participation in governance; make organizations easier to change; and prevent undue consolidation of power at geographically distant locations and hierarchically remote organizational levels. Lurking slightly in the background is the belief that increased responsiveness and accountability will result in more effective and efficient internal operations and the development of a better product or the delivery of a better service.

1 Powering Forces

1.1 Political Understandings

Interwoven in turnaround are issues of democracy, constituent influence and control over organizational decisions, ownership of public institutions, trust, and organizational accountability. Proponents believe that turnarounds increase knowledge, about, access to, and participation in governance; make organizations easier to change; and prevent undue consolidation of power at geographically distant locations and hierarchically remote organizational levels. Lurking slightly in the background is the belief that increased responsiveness and accountability will result in more effective and efficient internal operations and the development of a better product or the delivery of a better service.

Turnaround analysts portray a growing discontent with activist government (Kunzman, 2009a, 2009b) and the rise and spread of an antigovernment philosophy (Apple, 2007). They describe a “fundamental concern that government simply ‘doesn’t work.’ Planning is seen as inadequate, bureaucracy as inefficient and outcomes highly problematic” (Hula, 1990, p. xiii). They go on to argue that the consent of the governed is being withdrawn to a significant degree. In its softest incarnation, this cynicism leads citizens to argue that government is no longer a reasonable solution to all problems and to question the usefulness of much government-initiated activity. At worst, it has nurtured the belief that government is fated to fail at whatever it undertakes. In many cases, it has nurtured the development of a variety of antigovernment political and social movements. There is little question that this widespread “disillusionment with government has extended to all sectors, including schooling” (Gaither, 2008, p. 93).

1.2 Economic Understandings

It is almost a fundamental law that the economy is undergoing a significant metamorphosis. There is widespread agreement that we have been and continue to be moving from an industrial to a postindustrial economy. What is becoming clearer to many analysts is that with the arrival of the postindustrial society, “we are seeing the dissolution of the social structure associated with traditional industrialism” (Hood, 1994, p. 12) and an environment that is less hospitable to government intervention. With the ascent of the global economy, there is an emphasis on new markets—conditions that provide many of the seeds for the debate about appropriate governance structures for society and its schools. At the same time that the economic policy habitat is evolving, the current foundations of the economy—especially the public sector—appear to be crumbling. In particular, the economic principles that have provided the grounding for government actions for most of the twentieth century have been called into question.

The important question here is: What accounts for this discontent and skepticism about the public sector of the economy that is helping fuel school turnaround? Given the cyclical nature of policy development and other value expressions in American society, it should surprise no one to learn that some of this rising tide of dissatisfaction with public sector initiatives can be characterized as a response to the nearly unbroken growth of government over the last three quarters of the twentieth century—a counter reaction to the progressive philosophy that has dominated the policy agenda for so long (Apple, 2007).

Another piece of the discontent puzzle focuses on the widespread perception that the state is overinvolved in the life of the citizenry. Critics note that more and more citizens are chafing under the weight and scope of government activity. They characterize a government that has gone too far. They argue that the state has become involved in the production of goods and services that do not meet the market failure test. The results are predictable: The state, it is claimed, occupies an increasingly large space on the economic landscape, welfare loss due to collective consumption increases, and citizens experience an increasing need for more nongovernmental space. Calls for a recalibration of the economic equation are increasingly heard.

Expanding numbers of citizens begin to experience “some public sector institutions as controlling rather than enabling, as limiting options rather than expanding them, as wasting rather than making the best use of resources” (Martin, 1993, p. 8). Of particular concern here is the issue of values. An increasing number of individuals and groups have come to believe that state intrusiveness includes efforts to establish value preferences—values that they believe often undermine their ways of life (Cooper & Sureau, 2007). Others argue that, at least in some cases, through interest group and bureaucratic capture, some public sector institutions have actually destroyed the values that they were established to develop and promote.

The wearing out of the economic foundations of the liberal democratic state can also be traced to recent critical analyses of the model of public sector activity developed to support expanded state control. The critique here is of three types. First, when examined as they are put into practice, the assumptions anchoring public sector activity over the last century look much less appealing than they do when viewed in the abstract (i.e., conceptually). The attack on extensive state control rests on the way in which its limitations have become visible. At the same time, much of the critique of the market economy upon which public sector growth has been justified, especially market failure, has been weakened with the advent of socio-technical changes associated with a shift from an industrial to a postindustrial society.

Second, “structural weaknesses inherent in the nature of public-sector supply itself … which undermine the whole basis on which it is established” (Petrie, 1990, p. 20) have become more visible—visible to the point that some analysts claim that state ownership and management are inherently flawed. Concomitantly, both the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activities have begun to be questioned seriously.

Third, it is suggested that the reforms that created the large public sector are themselves much in need of change. Reform is increasingly seen in terms of alternative to, rather than the repair of the existing public sector.

The recasting of public sector economic policy can also be attributed to stories of gross government incompetence or scandal and a mounting body of evidence that government enterprises are often inefficient, that it costs more to accomplish tasks in the government than in the primary sector.

While widespread concern over the growing costs of government is an important variable in the algorithm of the discontent—especially perceived waste and inefficiency, an even more significant factor is the expanding disillusionment about the overall effectiveness of government action, particularly perceived inability of government to meet its goals. Perhaps nowhere is this perception more vivid than in the arena of the large-scale egalitarian programs initiated in the 1960s and 1970s. A number of critics of government control argue that the conditions that led to the development of these policies have not been ameliorated. In fact, they maintain that such transfers often worsen the situation and create even more problems. They go so far as to suggest that many of our social problems are in reality cratogenic—that is, created by the state.

1.3 Social Understandings

These data have implications for educators, Ms. Weitz said, noting that ‘if we’re serious about education reform, we have to also deal with other risks children experience, because in the end it will affect the performance of students’. (Cohen, 1992, p. 14)

The fabric of U.S. society is being rewoven in some places and is unraveling in others, resulting in changes that promise to have a significant impact on schooling. At the macro level, schools operate in an environment where social capital for increasing numbers of students and their families is limited.

One thread of these environmental phenomena is comprised of demographic shifts that threaten to overwhelm schools as they are now constituted. Minority enrollment in U.S. schools is rising, as is the proportion of less advantaged youngsters. There is a rapid increase in the number of students whose primary language is other than English. The traditional two-parent family, with one parent employed and the other at home to care for the children, has become an anomaly, constituting only one quarter of U.S. families.

At the same time that these new threads are being woven into the tapestry of U.S. society, a serious unraveling of other parts of that fabric is occurring. The number of youngsters affected by the ills of the world in which they live—for example, poverty, unemployment, crime, drug addiction, malnutrition—is increasing, as is the need for a variety of more intensive and extended services from societal organizations, especially schools.

A particularly troublesome aspect of this situation is the fact that, by and large, these are the students—low-income, minority, and disadvantaged youngsters—with whom schools have historically been the least successful.

The changing demographics of the United States are placing tremendous strains on the country’s educational system. More and more of the types of students whom educators have failed to help in the past are entering our schools. Not only are educators being asked to educate them successfully, but the definition of success has been dramatically expanded and higher levels of achievement are expected. Most critics see little hope that the ever-widening goals of education can be reached in the current system of schools. Reformers are attempting to accommodate to these demographic shifts by turning around failing schools.

2 History of Turnaround

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was passed into law by Congress in 1965 and utilized a student-based theory of change. ESEA focused on providing aid to students who were disadvantaged (e.g., racial minorities and the poor) when compared with their peers. ESEA aimed to provide additional resources to communities where disadvantaged students were clustered in high concentrations. But, this approach was found to be ineffective. Researchers including James Coleman and his contemporaries found that school resources like funding were weak predictors of student achievement after controls were added for race or socio-economic status (Marsh, Strunk, & Bush, 2013). At the same time, other studies identified school characteristics that were positively associated with student outcomes including: a safe learning environment, academic press, instructional leadership, assessment of students, community relations, and a clear mission (Trujillo & Renee, 2015). This research served as the basis for a new approach that focused on school-wide improvement strategies (Potter, Reynolds, & Chapman, 2002). The focus on education policies shifted from students to schools.

Title I –the primary funding mechanism in ESEA—provided funding based on the number of students in a school eligible for free and reduced priced meals under federal guidelines. Schools used this funding to support specific students by pulling them out of their regular classrooms for targeted instruction (Sunderman, 2001). An important step in the move towards school-based interventions was the creation of “School-Wide Programs” (SWP). Beginning in 1978, districts were able to use their Title I dollars for school level programs rather than interventions targeting funding-eligible students (Dee, 2012; Herman, 2012; Marsh et al., 2013). SWPs included reducing class size, professional development, and whole-school reform models with the support of outside organizations. They shared much in common with modern turnaround approaches (Sunderman, 2001; Wong & Meyer, 1998). Research during this time period repeatedly showed that student-focused programs were less effective than hoped which built momentum for the shift to school-level approaches. In 1988, the Hawkins-Stafford Amendments to ESEA shifted policy further towards a school-based approach. Schools with at least 75% of students from low-income backgrounds were permitted to adopt SWPs (Sunderman, 2001). These changes created a strong incentive for more schools to implement SWPs.

In 1994, Congress passed the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), which made important changes to Title I of ESEA relating to school accountability changes, that would foreshadow future reforms in NCLB. The legislation required the development of content and curriculum standards. IASA mandated the administration of rigorous annual student assessments that were aligned with state standards (Wang, Wong, & Kim, 1999). In addition, states had to develop measurable goals, although without any accountability mechanisms that were enforced by the federal government (Picucci, Brownson, Kahlert, & Sobel, 2002; Sunderman, 2001). IASA also changed the criteria for SWP eligibility. Schools with at least 50% of students from low-income families were permitted to use Title I funds for SWPs for the first time (Gross, Booker, & Goldhaber, 2009; Picucci et al., 2002). This change was particularly impactful for secondary schools because poverty levels of secondary schools were typically underreported (Rubenstein & Wodatch, 2000). In response to all of these changes, states started to adopt stricter accountability policies and develop their capacity to intervene in failing schools (Borman et al., 2000). This continued the shift of federal education policy from a student-focused to a school-focused approach.

In 1997, Congress created the Comprehensive School Reform (CSR) demonstration program. CSR models included, “a prominent emphasis on the use of ‘scientifically based’ teaching and management methods and the school-wide integration of instruction, assessment, professional development, and school management” (Dee, 2012, p. 10). Schools were given 3-year grants that were used to hire whole-school turnaround specialists (e.g. Success for All, Direct Instruction, School Development Program, New American Schools) (Bifulco, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2005). The partnership with a school turnaround specialist represented a policy innovation that would influence future changes to ESEA and school turnaround efforts (Gross et al., 2009). The program was also innovative because CSR models were designed as the name implies to influence every aspect of a school (e.g., curriculum, instruction, professional development, community relationships) (Orland, 2011). CSR invigorated previously existing school-level reform efforts including the New American Schools project (Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby, 2002). Many schools and districts chose to adopt CSR models. The program provided just under $2 billion in funding that was allocated to approximately 6700 schools (Dee, 2012; Zimmer, Henry, & Kho, 2016). This averages out to about $300,000 per school over the life of the program. Schools could choose from over 500 different reform models (Rhim & Redding, 2014). Some of the most popular were Accelerated Schools (1300 schools), Coalition of Essential Schools (1000 schools), Comer School Development Program (400 schools), Core Knowledge Schools (700 schools), and Success for All (1600 schools) (Datnow, 2000).

Table 2.1 includes a description of the funding for CSR. The funding reaches its zenith in the 3 years from FY 2002 to FY 2005 at just over $300 million a year. Funding for the program declines drastically starting in FY 2006. Congress ended funding for the program in FY 2008 and shifted appropriations to other turnaround reform efforts.

Table 2.1 Comprehensive school reform program funding

Research on the influence of CSR on student outcomes is mixed. A meta-analytic study found that a few of the CSR models (Success for All, Direct Instruction, School Development Program) yielded positive results for students (Borman, Hewes, Overman, & Brown, 2003). But, studies that examined a larger range of CSR model found effects that ranged from small and negative to small and positive (Gross et al., 2009; Murphy & Datnow, 2003).

2.1 No Child Left Behind and National School Turnaround

The watershed NCLB legislation brought school accountability to the entire country. The omnibus legislation had numerous components, but the crux of the law related to the new requirements for schools to meet performance benchmarks and the accompanying sanctions if there were not met (Hamilton, Heilig, & Pazey, 2014). NCLB sanctions escalated over time and culminated with a form of school turnaround called restructuring (Murphy, 1991; Scott, 2009). From this perspective, it is accurate to frame NCLB as the first mandatory national school turnaround law.

NCLB was crafted with the view that learning opportunities were far from equal for all students. Improving achievement overall was not enough, it was necessary to also hold schools accountable for achievement gaps, “between ethnic groups, between children with disabilities and those without, and between English language natives and English language learners” (Redding & Rhim, 2013, p. 3). The law’s authors assumed that no child would be left behind because, “education can overcome the effects of impacted poverty and deprivation without further broad-based support or social interventions. The implicit theory is that if greater pressure is placed on schools through increasingly severe sanctions, then positive changes and greater efficiencies will be forced onto the schools” (Mathis, 2009, p. 16). Accountability policies like NCLB are thought to realign incentives for teachers and principals in schools. Creating a set of punishments and rewards based on overall and sub-group student achievement was thought to strongly motivate teachers to change their behavior in a way that would benefit all students (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Murphy, 2010b). NCLB goes further even than this goal with logic that is parallel to that of school turnaround. Some schools are so dysfunctional as to be incapable of ever closing achievement gaps in their current form. As a result, the only way to help students in those schools is to close them and either send students to schools with more capable educators or to re-open the school with new staff (Rice & Malen, 2010).

NCLB required states to set performance standards for the percentage of students that would score at least proficient on standardized tests (Brady, 2003). The law required that every Title I school must reach 100% proficiency by the conclusion of the 2013–2014 school year (Perlman & Redding, 2011). Title I schools were those with high concentrations of disadvantaged students. NCLB did not require states to apply sanctions to non-Title I schools, but many states chose to do so voluntarily (Scott, 2008). The law gave states the flexibility to choose performance standards in a given school year (known as Annual Yearly Progress or AYP) for English/Language Arts and Mathematics (Reyes & Garcia, 2014). NCLB required states to choose an assessment to identify schools that did not meet AYP (i.e., “failing” schools). The law also required states to assess students once a year in grades 3–8 starting in 2005–2006 and once in high school (Scott, 2008).

NCLB applies sanctions based on the number of consecutive years a school has been failing. For example, in 2002–2003 school performance was compared to the previous year to identify schools that were failing to meet AYP (Perlman & Redding, 2011). The subsequent year (2003–2004) was the first in which a school could fail for consecutive years. The first and second consecutive years of failure were labeled the “School Improvement” phase. After two consecutive years of failure, schools were required to provide supplementary education services or tutoring (Reyes & Garcia, 2014). Schools had considerable flexibility in developing these plans, but federal guidelines provided suggestions about permissible approaches. These approaches included the implementation of a comprehensive school reform model or “a thorough program designed to change multiple curricular, planning, communications, and other processes in schools in coordinated fashion around a coherent school design or philosophy” (Brady, 2003, pp. 4–5). Districts also needed to ensure that schools receive technical assistance, which may come from the district itself, the state, or a turnaround specialist. In the third year of consecutive failure, students in schools that have not met AYP are permitted to transfer to another school in the district that had met performance standards (Hamilton et al., 2014). Under NCLB, if at any time a school met AYP it exited this process and would begin again if found to be failing.

Schools that failed for three consecutive years entered the “Corrective Action” phase. In this phase schools implement a policy that was created during the school improvement phase. Overall, the steps for schools in corrective action are similar to school turnaround. Once the school has entered corrective action, NCLB mandates more prescriptive policies. Schools may “institute a new curriculum, significantly decrease management authority at the school, appoint an outside expert to advise the school, extend the school day or year, or restructure the school’s internal organization” (Brady, 2003, p. 5).

If a school is still failing after four consecutive years then the school enters the restructuring phase (Brinson & Rhim, 2009; Huberman, Parrish, Hannan, Arellanes, & Shambaugh, 2011; Mathis, 2009). In the fourth consecutive year of failure, schools developed their restructuring plan. NCLB allowed them to choose among five options: (1) close and reopen as a charter school, (2) replace relevant school staff (i.e., reconstitution), (3) turn the school’s governance over to the state, (4) contract with a private management company to operate the school, and (5) any other major restructuring designed to produce reform. If the school fails to meet AYP for a fifth consecutive year (6 total years of failure) then the district must implement its chosen restructuring plan. To exit restructuring a school must meet AYP for two consecutive years (Scott, 2008, 2009). Very few schools that entered the restructuring phase were ever able to exit (Smarick, 2010) (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Sanctions for a hypothetical persistently failing school

The first district option was to close the school and re-open as a charter school. Students in the enrollment zone of the now closed public school could then choose to attend the charter school (Hassel, Hassel, Arkin, Kowal, & Steiner, 2006). Typically, a conversion charter still receives support from the school district (e.g., maintenance, busing, managing pensions) (Loveless, 2010). By the 2010–2011 school year, the majority of states had policies the promoted the expansion of charter schools (Webber et al., 2014). But, few districts chose this option for their restructuring plans. Available estimates suggest that between 1% (Mathis, 2009) and 2% (Scott, 2008) of schools in the restructuring phase were converted to charter schools.

Reconstitution is the most drastic NCLB strategy for school turnaround. It involves, “vacating staff and administrative positions; appointing a new principal; and establishing a new school team, with some rehired teachers and some new teachers” (Meyers & Murphy, 2007, p. 647). The reconstitution approach bears much in common with the turnaround and transformation models later utilized in the SIG program (Hassel et al., 2006; Perlman & Redding, 2011). This approach was the second most common of the restructuring options; about 10% of schools used this model (Scott, 2008).

Another option was for the state to take over control of a school from a district. Typically, the state would replace the superintendent and often the school board (Ziebarth, 2002). Historically, this approach was used more often for schools in financial rather than academic distress (Mathis, 2009). This was the least utilized reconstitution method. In a survey of states the number of schools that reported using this approach in the sample was zero (Scott, 2008). A GAO study found the percentage of schools that were taken over was less than 1% (Mathis, 2009). States were likely reticent to use this approach because of the capacity demands it would place on the SEA (Mathis, 2009).

The fourth approach to restructuring involved the district entering into a contract with a private organization to take over the failing school, which includes both for-profit and non-profit options. For example, some districts gave control of schools to private Education Management Organizations (EMOs) (e.g., Edison, Victory, Chancellor Beacon Academies) (Peterson & Chingos, 2009). But, others used this provision of the law to contract with foundations or universities. Very few schools entered into a contract with either a non-profit or for-profit organization (about 2% of schools in restructuring) (Scott, 2008).

The fifth permissible approach to restructuring under NCLB—colloquially known as the “other option”—was by far the most common school restructuring strategy. This was in part because of the flexibility it provided districts and states. The federal government approved a wide variety of reforms to qualify as restructuring under the “other option”. These included:

An astonishing array of improvement strategies, including different types of school-level needs assessments, surveys of school staff, conferences, professional development, turnaround specialists, school improvement committees, training sessions, principal mentors, teacher coaches, leadership facilitators, instructional trainers, subject-matter experts, audits, summer residential academies, student tutoring, research-based reform models, reconfigured grade spans, alternative governance models, new curricula, improved use of data, and turning over operation of some schools to outside organizations. (Smarick, 2010, p. 23)

In the 2006–2007 school year, 90% or more of schools in restructuring used the “other strategy” (Scott, 2008). The vagueness of the NCLB’s “other approach” makes it difficult for researchers to understand exactly what school turnaround efforts were taken as a part of restructuring. An additional complication is that districts need only report their restructuring strategies, but NCLB did not require states to ensure these strategies are actually implemented (Scott, 2008).

Despite this complication, there were differences in state approaches to restructuring schools. This is likely attributable to differences in the accountability systems of states prior to NCLB (Hamilton et al., 2014) and the variation in funding available for school improvement (Scott, 2008). In addition, state education officials likely interpreted the vague language to have different meanings that aligned with their own policy preferences (Scott, 2008). Individual states pursued different strategies under the “other option.” Sixty-four percent of restructured schools in Maryland and 87% of restructured schools in Michigan appointed a school turnaround specialist (Scott, 2008). Restructured schools in Ohio reported pursuing a variety of changes including bringing in an outside expert (11%) and redesigning the curriculum (9%) (Scott, 2008). Another study found that 62% of schools reported hiring an outside expert and 61% changed the internal structure of the school (Mathis, 2009).

In 2007, almost 3000 schools were in the corrective action or restructuring phase (Duke, 2012). In the 2008–2009 school year 1598 schools were in the planning phase of restructuring and 3419 schools were implementing their restructuring plans (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). The number of schools in restructuring rose for the next few years until the ESEA waivers went into effect (Aladjem et al., 2010; Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahmatullah, & Tallant, 2010).

The percentage of schools in restructuring varied from state to state (Scott, 2009). Some states received less Title I funding than was originally envisioned by NCLB to support school improvements and restructuring activities, which resulted in “flat or declining” appropriations. The differences in funding were a driver of the varied state approaches to supporting schools in the improvement and restructuring phases. NCLB required SEAs to develop “statewide systems of support” to aid school improvement efforts, but practically speaking many states lacked the institutional capacity to do so. Some states utilized offices that provided technical assistance, hired school turnaround specialists, or sent teams of coaches and administrators. The common theme was to provide schools with additional sources of school turnaround expertise (Le Floch, Boyle, & Therriault, 2008). The most commonly reported supports that school districts received from states were training about school turnaround (e.g., seminars, professional development), supplementary funding, and school based experts (e.g., content experts and mentors).

The primary mechanism for funding school improvement was Title I. But, NCLB also authorized a separate category of funding in section 1003(g) of the omnibus law (Council of the Great City Schools, 2015; Scott, 2011). At the time, section 1003(g) was known as the School Improvement Fund (SIF). The first year that Congress appropriated funding for the program was FY 2007. In 2009, the ARRA infused considerably more money into the program and it was renamed School Improvement Grants (Trujillo & Renee, 2015).

There are few differences between SIF and SIG besides the name and the influx of money appropriated under ARRA. SIF grants were provided to states and in turn school districts would then apply for the additional funding. States were supposed to give priority to the “lowest achieving schools that demonstrate … the greatest need for the funds” (U.S. Department of Education, 2008, p. 5) and the strongest commitment to providing them to struggling schools. The school improvement strategies that schools were required to use under SIF shared much in common with SIG program strategies. Districts that received SIF grants were supposed to provide customized technical assistance and/or professional development based on measurable outcomes. They could also choose to establish partnerships with turnaround specialists to promote their own work.

The funding history of CRS, NCLB, SIF, and SIG is relevant for understanding federal school turnaround efforts. Table 2.1 shows that Congress invested considerable funding into school turnaround in the form of CSR until FY 2006. One year later in FY 2007, Congress appropriated $125 million for the SIF program (Council of the Great City Schools, 2015). This was 1 year prior to the first year that a school (SY 2007–2008) could have entered restructuring under NCLB. The federal government was heavily invested (at least $100 million) in funding school turnaround prior to SIG for every year from 1998 to 2009 (except for FY 2006). When also considering the slow expansion of SWPs this historical view elucidates the decades long involvement of the federal government in school turnaround efforts.

2.2 School Improvement Grants: ARRA Supercharges Section 1003(g)

ARRA gave the School Improvement Fund a new moniker (School Improvement Grants) and made three main changes to section 1003(g) of ESEA. First, SIG specifically targeted the worst performing schools or those in the bottom 5% of test scores (Hurlburt, Therriault, & Le Floch, 2012). Second, schools were required to implement one of the 4 SIG models: turnaround, transformation, restart, or school closure. These models were thought to be more “aggressive and comprehensive” than previous approaches to turnaround (Hurlburt et al., 2012). Finally, ARRA infused a massive amount of funding into SIG, doubling down on what Congress had already appropriated for the SIF (Floch et al., 2016).

The goal of SIG was to turn around persistently low performance schools (Kober & Rentner, 2011; Peck & Reitzug, 2014). The policy focused on so called drop-out factories (Jambulapati, 2011; Redding & Rhim, 2013). Although they were relatively few in number, drop-out factories accounted for a disproportionately high number of failing secondary schools (Balfanz & Legters, 2004). In a speech not long after the passage of ARRA, President Obama commented, “Because we know that about 12% of America’s school’s produce 50% of America’s dropouts, we’re going to focus on helping states and school districts turn around their 5000 lowest performing schools in the next five years” (Education Resource Strategies, 2012, p. 1). In addition, grant size was no longer determined by a formula based on the characteristics of students attending a school. Rather, school districts had to apply to the state for the grants demonstrating their capacity to successfully deploy the four SIG interventions (Yatsko, Lake, Bowen, & Cooley Nelson, 2015).

Researchers and analysts have described the SIG interventions as innovative, i.e., departing from previous reform efforts. In their guide on school turnaround best practices, Redding and Rhim (2013) describe SIG as, “largely driven by the shortcomings of prior efforts” (p. 19). Dee (2012) characterizes SIG as a “novel amalgam” of the “no excuses” accountability of NCLB with the broader approach emphasized in school leadership culture. SIG does allow state’s additional flexibility with how to evaluate the performance of schools. Whereas NCLB only permitted states to use proficiency-based measures of success, under SIG, states where permitted to use other measures of growth over time to identify struggling schools (Jambulapati, 2011). Despite the framing of the SIG interventions as innovative in the literature, caution is warranted because previous school turnaround efforts including CSR and NCLB received similar praise. In addition, resources on SIG make few references to these past reform efforts, suggesting the framing of SIG as innovative is ahistorical (Peck & Reitzug, 2014).

NCLB and SIG have much in common. SIG’s focus on the bottom 5% of schools builds on NCLB’s approach of identifying schools that failed to meet AYP (Perlman & Redding, 2011). The persistently low-performing schools that SIG was trying to turnaround were likely also schools that were placed into restructuring under NCLB. SIG advocates highlight the competitive nature of the grants. But the SIF and CSR grants had a similar structure. Finally, the actual school improvement strategies including changes to teachers and leadership; rigorous curriculum; and improved community relations are found in NCLB, CSR, and other turnaround programs. Providing technical assistance and outside expertise from the state or turnaround specialists are not new education reforms.

School Improvement Grants assume that the impoverished communities in which turnaround schools are often located are the cause of chronic low levels of performance. High levels of poverty cause overlapping and self-perpetuating issues related to leadership, teacher quality, and available resources (Dee, 2012). The inherent difficulty in turning around “drop-out factories” necessitates dramatic action to improve these schools (Jambulapati, 2011). To improve the odds of success, SIG models were intended to have multiple complementary features. The SIG models from this perspective are an attempt to marshal external resources to improve instructional and leadership practices (Dee, 2012). The theoretical assumptions underlying SIG are driven by a market-based approach to education policy. Similar to accountability policies like NCLB, “[SIG] assumes that strong external threats motivate teachers and principals to improve, that standardized test scores are a reliable measures of student performance, that meaningful sustainable changes can be spurred by competition, and that outcome-oriented accountability reforms can effectively interrupt historical patterns of low performance” (Trujillo & Renee, 2012, p. 5).

Despite past struggles with improving persistently low-performing schools, advocates pointed to “lighthouse schools” (Mathis, 2009). The theory was that if it was possible for these exemplar schools to succeed in communities with endemic poverty then it would be possible for others schools to succeed as well (Murphy, 2010a). A benefit of this strategy is that the concentration of dropouts in a fraction of SIG schools meant that successful turnaround would only need to happen in a small subset of schools for the program to have large benefits overall (Anrig, 2015).

2.2.1 SIG Program Organization

SIG schools were required to implement one of 4 models discussed earlier: turnaround, restart, closure, or transformation (Hurlburt et al., 2012; Kober & Rentner, 2011). School districts with more than nine eligible schools were prevented by regulation from using the same models for all schools (Scott, 2011). When explaining how SIG differed from past turnaround efforts, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Judith Wertzel commented that previous reform efforts, “(a) did not ‘embrace flexibility’ when it came to certain aspects of school operations such as the allocation of instructional time and (b) failed to focus squarely on school staffing and the quality of teachers in low-performing schools” (Duke, 2012, p. 18). Each SIG model has slight differences, but they also have much in common (Peurach & Neumerski, 2015). In each state, districts pursue changes to the governance, administration, and finances of the targeted schools. Both the state and the district are also responsible for providing technical support to improve educational processes.

The turnaround model has four main components (McMurrer, 2012a). First, the school must replace the principal. Second the new school leader must receive additional operational flexibility relating to staffing, school calendars, and budgeting to improve student outcomes. Third, all teachers are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and at least half are fired. Fourth, the school institutes “comprehensive instructional reforms.” This could include using data to differentiate instruction or formative assessments to provide staff with high quality professional development.

The transformation model has much in common with the turnaround model except there is no requirement to replace at least half of the school’s staff (U.S. Department of Education, 2014b). Because the transformation model does not require teachers to be replaced, it assumes that “the core instructional staff members at a failing school are competent but need new leadership, programs, training, and support” (Huberman et al., 2011, p. 1). The principal is replaced and strategies are utilized to improve teacher effectiveness (e.g. evaluation based on data, data-driven instruction) (Mass Insight, 2010). Policies to retain high quality teachers and recruit new ones are put into place (Lachlan-Hache, Naik, & Casserly, 2012). Learning time is extended and efforts are taken to promote a community-oriented school. School leaders are also provided operational flexibility and additional support from the state.

The restart model converts a traditional public school into one run by a management organization (Perlman & Redding, 2011). The success of this model rests on the assumption that non-district schools will use innovative approaches that will benefit students (Huberman et al., 2011). Charter school operators, Charter Management Organizations (CMOs), and Education Management Organizations (EMOs) may oversee a restart school. But, the typical case for a school utilizing the restart model was charter conversion (Huberman et al., 2011). In addition, the converted school is required to accept students that previously attended the pre-conversion school (Tanenbaum et al., 2015). In theory, because of the dramatic change involved with a school restart, this approach has the greatest potential to produce large effects (Kutash et al., 2010). At the time that SIG was passed into law, the research on converting traditional public schools into charters (i.e., the restart model) suggested the intervention was ineffective. So called conversion charters had uneven results when compared to either typical charter schools or traditional public schools (Mintrop & Trujillo, 2005).

School closure is perhaps the most straight forward SIG model. The school is closed and its students are enrolled in other schools that have higher achievement. Students may attend new traditional public schools or charters schools (Tanenbaum et al., 2015). Embedded in the theory of action for the closure model is that it is both possible and practical for students to attend a higher achieving school. If no such school exists, then the closure model is not viable. As we report in Chap. 5, communities will often attempt to resist actions that close local schools and result in additional travel for students. SIG schools that used the closure model received 1-year awards as opposed to the 3-year awards given for the other models. Closure model recipients were permitted to use these funds for: “notifying parents and the community of closure; transferring students, teachers, and other school staff to new schools; and supporting schools receiving transfer students” (Hurlburt et al., 2012, p. 29) (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 School improvement grant tiers

Federal guidelines require that SIG grants target the persistently lowest performing schools. SIG divides these schools into three tiers, of which Tiers I and II have top priority (Hurlburt et al., 2012). Schools that do not meet these criteria were not eligible for SIG grants. States submitted applications to the federal government describing how they would identify schools that fell into these three tiers. They also had to provide information about how they planned to prioritize funding, the criteria they would use to evaluate district applications, and how they would monitor implementation and outcomes (Hurlburt et al., 2012). The SIG federal guidelines are fairly prescriptive. But, they do provide states some flexibility by allowing the use of optional measures for eligibility (Scott, 2011). States were also permitted to make changes to their eligibility criteria after Cohort I received their grants. For example, 25 states changed their criteria for tier eligibility and renewal after the first cohort and 22 made changes to the capacity requirements (Hurlburt et al., 2012). Districts were also permitted to continue previous turnaround efforts if those efforts matched one of the 4 SIG models “in whole or in part” and they intended to transition completely to a SIG model (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012).

Schools that met these criteria were eligible to receive a SIG. However, districts were still required to “compete” with other districts based upon their application to the state (Herrmann, Dragoset, & James-Burdumy, 2014). To demonstrate the strength of their application, school districts had to make three commitments (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012). First, school districts and states were required to demonstrate the capacity to turn around the school. Second, districts were required to submit a detailed plan and budget materials. Finally, states were required to discontinue the grant if districts were not able to show annual improvement.

2.2.2 SIG Funding

All 1003(g) grants provided 3 years of funding. In some years the appropriations covered all 3 years of implementation and in others just a single year. Funding for FYs 2007 and 2008 covered pre-ARRA guarantees for SIF grants. In FY 2009, $3 billion in ARRA funding supplemented the money already appropriated for 1003(g) programs to cover 3 years (2010–2011 to 2012–2013) of the SIG grants for Cohort I (schools that first received a SIG grant in SY 2010–2011). Regular appropriations for SIG covered funding for subsequent cohorts on a rolling basis (Dragoset et al., 2017) (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4 Section 1003(g) funding by Cohort

Perhaps the biggest difference between SIG and previous turnaround efforts is the amount of the money that was invested (Jambulapati, 2011). ARRA appropriated $3 billion on top of the $546 million that Congress was already scheduled to spend on SIGs (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). However, when considering the fiscal crisis that states and districts were experiencing (that necessitated the passage of the ARRA) this difference also becomes less salient. During this time, overall expenditures on education practically froze. The dramatic increase in federal education spending from ARRA that included SIG spending essentially replaced the drastic cuts at the state and local levels. Real education expenditures for SIG recipients likely changed very little for schools in the first two cohorts, which constituted the vast majority of SIG recipients (Hurlburt et al., 2012). Paradoxically, SIG is the largest federal turnaround program ever, but still provided relatively meager funding given the baseline for SIG eligible schools.

2.2.3 State Supports for SIG Schools

Critical to the success of SIG grant recipients is the investment of state resources. Embedded in the theory of change for school turnaround is the belief that a failing school (and implicitly the school district) will be unable to improve itself without externally induced dramatic change. In the SIG program the responsibility for providing additional technical and human resources falls to the state.

Every state provided guidance to schools and districts about choosing the appropriate SIG intervention model (Webber et al., 2014). A majority of states reported providing a variety of supports for the first SIG cohorts, including: technical support, monitoring and data review, and professional development (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). States also aided the development of partnerships between schools and turnaround specialists including non-profits, universities, and consultants. In addition, to “matchmaking” districts and turnaround specialists, many states also created a list of authorized external providers (McMurrer, Dietz, & Rentner, 2011). The majority of states reported that turnaround specialists participated in school turnaround activities “to a great extent” or “to some extent” (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). Schools and districts also reported receiving help with the development of school improvement plans and effective improvement strategies (Herrmann et al., 2014). Many states hired dedicated school improvement specialists to supplement these services along with regional technical assistance providers. Seventy-four percent of states provided SIG schools support from at least two organizations (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). States also pursued other strategies including the development of improvement tools to help diagnose the needs of SIG schools. Others supported the creation of turnaround networks to improve communication and share useful strategies (Hurlburt et al., 2012). Nearly every state reported that staff from the SEA provided oversight and monitoring. State’s also made ancillary policy changes to support the improvement of struggling schools that received SIG grants. For example, nine SEAs took steps to expand the number of charter schools and a few made changes to teacher evaluation systems (Webber et al., 2014).

The state supports that were given to schools that received SIG grants were often also given to schools that did not receive SIG grants. Overall, schools that received SIG reported receiving more supports on average than non-SIG schools (Kober & Rentner, 2011; McMurrer et al., 2011). The supports that schools implementing SIG interventions reported receiving more frequently than non-SIG schools were identifying turnaround strategies, identifying effective instructional leaders, and supporting data use (Herrmann et al., 2014). States were split overall on whether the types of assistance that were given to states as a part of the SIG grants differed from previous turnaround and improvement efforts. About half felt that supports to SIG schools were “different” or “very different” and the remaining half reported they were “similar” or “very similar” (McMurrer et al., 2011).

States were permitted to change the supports they gave to SIG schools after the first year of implementation and the vast majority availed themselves of this option (Hurlburt et al., 2012). States reported adding several supports to SIG districts including assigning a SEA staff member to monitor implementation and to arrange for targeted professional development (Hurlburt et al., 2012). In the second SIG cohort, a majority of states reported they were providing additional supports such as: online tools to support instruction, mental health services, and liaising with school boards (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012).

Despite these efforts to support school turnaround at the local level, SEAs faced a number of challenges related to capacity. Eighty-four percent reported that they faced at least one major challenge in providing support for low performing schools. Chief among these were concerns from educators about the SIG interventions. About half of states cited opposition from teachers about closing or restructuring schools (Webber et al., 2014). About half of states reported they had adequate SEA staff expertise and/or fiscal resources to support SIG models in Cohort I. But, lack of state capacity to support turnaround was more apparent in other areas. Only one-third of states reported having an adequate number of staff members and staff time to support school turnaround (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). The vast majority of states also reported that teacher hiring practices and budgeting autonomy for schools and districts was a challenge. About half of states found that extended school time (a popular SIG intervention) was also a barrier encountered when implementing SIG (Webber et al., 2014). Even though every state was providing information to districts about partnerships with school turnaround specialists, more than half of states expressed a concern about a lack of expertise in this area (Webber et al., 2014). States also remained unconvinced that the 3-year length of the grant was sufficient. More than two thirds reported that 3 years was either not enough time or were unsure if it was enough time to improve the lowest achieving schools (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012).

Overall states had generally positive views about the SIG program components (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). The vast majority agreed that the criteria for identifying struggling schools was appropriate (Kober & Rentner, 2011; McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). Conversely, due to some of the challenges discussed above, there was disagreement about the usefulness of some program elements. The vast majority of states reported they either disagreed or were unsure about whether concentrating large federal grants on a small number of struggling schools was an effective strategy (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012). Among school districts eligible for SIGs, 58 percent, “agreed or strongly agreed that concentrating large amounts of federal funds on a small number of low-achieving schools is an effective means of improving these schools” (Kober & Rentner, 2011, p. 6). Conversely, schools that were ineligible for SIG grants thought this approach was weak. State officials were more confident in the size of the SIG grants. Eighty-five percent of officials thought the size of the grants were very adequate or somewhat adequate in terms of their ability to improve struggling schools (McMurrer & McIntosh, 2012).

There was a lack of consensus about whether the features of the SIG grants were adequate for districts and schools. A majority of urban districts with SIG grants reported they did not have enough time to create professional development programs, to recruit high quality teachers and principals, and to provide curriculum and materials (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012). School responses varied in part depending on their eligibility for SIG funds. Schools that were eligible for SIG grants did not think that 3 years was a suitable amount of time to turnaround persistently low performing schools. Fifty percent agreed this was not enough time compared to the 33% who that it was sufficient (Kober & Rentner, 2011). About half of school districts disagreed that the competitive application process was an effective way of distributing the grants. Similarly, among SIG eligible districts, half thought that partnering with external providers was an effective school improvement strategy and half did not (Kober & Rentner, 2011).

2.2.4 Characteristics of SIG Schools

Unsurprisingly, schools that received SIG grants were significantly different from schools that did not receive SIG grants. SIG schools in the first two cohorts had student bodies with about 20% more students who received free and reduced-price lunch than the average school. The racial makeup of SIG schools differed considerably from the average school as well. SIG schools had significantly more African American and Hispanic students and about 20% fewer white students than the average school (Hurlburt et al., 2012). SIG schools had about 10% more Hispanic students and about 30% more black students (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012).

About half of SIG recipient schools were in urban areas, about two times higher than the national average. More than half of SIG recipient schools were located in cities (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012). Although only 20% of rural schools received SIG interventions, this was a relatively large figure given previous federal education efforts (Hurlburt et al., 2012). For example, rural schools receive proportionately fewer Title I dollars than urban schools (Jambulapati, 2011).

A disproportionately large number of SIG grants went to high schools compared to elementary and middle schools. This is a product of SIG’s focus on turning around high school dropout factories. SIG regulations prioritized funding for secondary schools that had not previously received Title I funding (McMurrer et al., 2011). About half of the schools that received SIG grants in Tier I and Tier II were high schools and the remaining half were elementary, middle, and other (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012). Compared to the assistance that schools received under Section 1003(g) from the SIF, the majority of states have provided disproportionately more support to high schools (McMurrer et al., 2011) (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5 Characteristics of American schools and SIG awarded schools

The vast majority of schools selected the transformation model, which was the least demanding intervention (American Institutes for Research, 2011). In Cohort I, 94% of schools chose either the turnaround or transformation models. This was partially driven by the high usage of the transformation model in rural schools. In these communities, closure and charter conversion were not viable options (Jambulapati, 2011). Rural districts in which there was a short supply of teachers and relatively few schools meant that replacing a large number of teachers or closing a school was not possible (Rosenberg, Christianson, Angus, Rosenthal, & Wei, 2014). The number of schools that chose the restart model increases slightly across cohorts. SIG guidelines capped the number of schools that could implement the turnaround and transformation interventions at 9. This policy compelled increased usage of the restart model. Unsurprisingly given the political and administrative barriers to its implementation, only 21 schools out of 1399 chose the closure model (1.5%) (U.S. Department of Education, 2014a) (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Proportion of SIG awards, by cohort, by model

2.2.5 Improvement Practices Adopted in SIG Schools

SIG regulations required grant recipients to implement a variety of education reforms. For the transformation and turnaround models the practices fit into 5 categories: adopting comprehensive instructional reform strategies; developing and increasing teacher effectiveness; developing and increasing principal effectiveness; increasing learning time and creating community-oriented schools; and having operational flexibility and receiving support (Herrmann et al., 2014). The transformation model requires the adoption of 24 practices and the turnaround model requires the adoption of 19 practices. Many schools had implemented the reforms required by transformation/turnaround as a school improvement activity under NCLB (Council of the Great City Schools, 2015). SIG intervention schools reported implementing more practices than schools that did not receive a SIG grant. However, this effect was substantively small. SIG schools reported implementing two more practices on average than non-SIG schools. No schools reported adopting all of the required practices for their intervention (transformation or turnaround). In addition, despite the differences in the required practices for the turnaround and transformation models there were no significant differences between the mean number of practices adopted (Herrmann et al., 2014). Almost every school reported implementing a different combination of required practices. But, there were some patterns in the use of required activities. About half of schools reported adopting the ten most common practices (e.g., using data and technology to improve instruction and providing professional development for various purposes). The least frequently adopted practice was using financial incentives to attract and retain principals and teachers Herrmann et al., 2014).

2.2.6 Non-SIG Programs in ARRA that Promoted School Turnaround

The ARRA also included a variety of other reforms beyond the expansion of SIG that influenced school turnaround. ARRA provided schools with large one-time grants through the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund ($70.6 billion) and Education State Grants ($39 billion) (Webber et al., 2014). The primary purpose of these grants was to prevent massive education spending cuts. But, the states that received them were also required to commit themselves to 4 specific educational reforms, which included “turning around the lowest performing schools” (Webber et al., 2014). The Race to the Top (RTTT) competitive grant program, which was also a part of ARRA promoted the adoption of school turnaround policies. RTTT provided large grants to states in return for adopting the preferred education policies of the federal government. States were awarded grants based on a number of selection criteria. Among these was state commitment to “turning around the lowest performing schools” (Kutash et al., 2010). This strategy effectively empowered and provided additional resources to states that were already pursuing these reforms (McGuinn, 2012). ARRA also included the Investing in Innovation Fund (I3). This was another competitive grant program that awarded $650 million to non-profit/school district partnerships. Of the 49 grant recipients, 13 focused their efforts on turning around schools with historically low performance (Kutash et al., 2010). Around the same time that ARRA was reforming the SIG program, the U.S. Department of Education created the Office of School Turnaround (Redding & Rhim, 2013). Primarily, this office oversaw the administration of the SIG program and also provided support services to states and districts. The creation of the office indicated the commitment of the Obama administration to pursue school turnaround as a reform strategy (Reyes & Garcia, 2014).

Soon after the passage of ARRA, leaders in Washington were deadlocked about future changes to NCLB. In response, the Obama administration started issuing waivers to provide states with flexibility on meeting the requirements of NCLB. The waivers were granted on a competitive basis. Preference for flexibility was given to states that were willing to intervene in the state’s lowest performing schools (Dougherty & Weiner, 2015a). Some state waivers expanded the proportion of schools that were eligible to receive state and federal turnaround resources to include the lowest 15% rather than the bottom 5% of performers (Peurach & Neumerski, 2015).

In 2015, Congress passed the Every Students Succeeds Act, which returned control of school accountability policies to states. Although, it’s too early to know for sure, it is held that this change will decrease the federal role in school turnaround (Dougherty & Weiner, 2015b). The creation of the Office of School Turnaround, State Fiscal Stabilization Funds, Education State Grants, I3, Race to the Top, and ESEA Waivers each promoted state commitment to school turnaround. Finally, the SIG program required specific changes for schools, districts, and states. The overlapping and complementary influence of each of these education reforms that were packed tightly into a short period of time created a synergistic effect that promoted school turnaround as a policy above and beyond the effect of the SIG program (Webber et al., 2014).

2.2.7 State and District Turnaround Efforts

States have pursued a variety of educational reforms that bear much in common with school turnaround. One reform that has seen increased popularity in recent years is state takeover of failing schools. About two thirds of states have laws that allow either a district or state to takeover a failing school (Kowal & Hassel, 2005). The majority of the state turnarounds occurred in the decade prior to NCLB and were often district led (Ziebarth, 2002). This included high profile takeovers of Chicago, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Newark (Mintrop & Trujillo, 2005; Wong & Shen, 2003). In this approach, the state assumes control from local school leaders (superintendent and school board). The state then goes about the work of school turnaround but at a district-wide scale. Prior to NCLB, Nevada required a flexible form of school takeover, where low performing schools were required to implement approved instructional strategies (Meyers & Murphy, 2007). Since the reform of their state takeover law in 2010, Massachusetts has assumed a more active role, taking over Lawrence Public Schools in addition to other districts (Schueler, Goodman, & Deming, 2016). A special form of state takeover is the creation of a so called “Achievement School District” (ASD) (Henry, Campbell, Thompson, & Townsend, 2014). Tennessee pursued this strategy using its RTTT grant to assume control of schools from districts across the state. The individual schools in the ASD where then administered by the state or handed over to a CMO. Other states including Michigan and Maryland have also experimented with special turnaround zones (Peurach & Neumerski, 2015).

Some states have taken even more innovative approaches to fostering school turnaround by forging partnerships and creating new offices in their departments of education. In 2004, Virginia created the UVA Darden/Curry Partnership for Leaders in Education (PLE), which was a partnership between the SEA and the University of Virginia. The PLE provides executive education and training to principals and central office workers pursuing school turnaround (Redding & Rhim, 2013). Other states like North Carolina, Maryland, and Ohio have created a division or an office specifically dedicated to turnaround schools (Peck & Reitzug, 2014; Scott, 2009). States with such offices often pursue ambitious turnaround projects. For example, in North Carolina the District and School Transformation division oversees Turning Around North Carolina’s Lowest-Achieving Schools (TALAS), an effort that focuses on turning around low performing middle and high schools (Heissel & Ladd, 2016).

Many school turnaround efforts were independent of federal policies like NCLB and SIG (Lachlan-Hache et al., 2012; Peurach & Neumerski, 2015). Prior to 2001, several school districts including New York and Washington, DC were intimately involved in turning around low-performing schools (Meyers & Murphy, 2007). Many school districts have experimented with a “portfolio model”, which falls within the broad category of school turnaround. The district seeks to bring in a diverse set of providers (traditional public schools, charters schools, academies, and magnets). The district shepherds the portfolio of schools by closing low performers and encouraging the expansion of best practices in other schools (Marsh et al., 2013). In New Orleans, the state created the Louisiana Recovery School District (RSD) after Hurricane Katrina. The RSD made some radical changes including eliminating attendance zones, firing all teachers, and allowing the teachers union contract to expire (Harris & Larsen, 2016). Chicago Public Schools experimented with a school turnaround model called Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) that started only a few years after the passage of NCLB. Pre-dating the SIG intervention models, in the AUSL model the district takes over a school and replace administrators and teachers (Peck & Reitzug, 2014). The AUSL turnaround model—which in Chicago is referred to as reconstitution—was popular with then CEO of Chicago Schools, Arne Duncan, who would later become U.S. Secretary of Education and oversee the implementation of SIG (Duke, 2012).

The operationalization of the four SIG models also presents some unique challenges. An avowed benefit of SIG when compared with previous turnaround efforts is the flexibility that schools and districts have to choose the model that best fits their needs (Duke, 2012). However, political and practical factors effectively constrained the choices available to school and district leaders. The SIG models differ in the degree to which each will encounter political opposition (Kutash et al., 2010). The closure of a school can generate significant political opposition from the community. Closing a local public institution can be seen as anti-democratic. In addition, administrators are wary of pursuing a strategy that will alienate parents.

The restart model presents a variety of challenges. Restart hands control of a school to a charter operator that is less accountable to the public (Kutash et al., 2010). Charter schools themselves are a popular education model and were a favored reform of the Obama administration (Stuit, 2012). However, not every state allows charters to operate and some have caps on the number of permitted schools. As a result, the viability of the restart intervention will depend heavily on a particular state’s charter policies (Webber et al., 2014).

Charter school operators also lack interest in restarting schools. CMOs were strongly encouraged by the Education Department to engage in turnaround activities, but prominent networks like KIPP and Green Dot Public Schools balked (Zehr, 2011). The rationale was that, “it’s easier to be successful when parents and students have chosen their schools” (Zehr, 2011, p. 3). Turning around a school represents a risk for a charter organization that may suffer from the political blowback associated with converting a traditional public school. Many CMOs prefer to open new schools from scratch for this reason.

For these reasons, the closure and turnaround models were chosen by school and district leaders for very few schools (about 5%). The remaining two SIG models (transformation and turnaround) had much in common with each other. Seventy-three percent of the practices that were required by the Education Department for schools implementing either the transformation or turnaround models were the same. School and district leaders can in theory choose from a menu of options, but realistically the transformation/turnaround model is the only broadly viable SIG model. As a rresult, turnaround in its current form is highly inflexible (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Federal school turnaround funding by fiscal year

2.3 Chapter Synthesis

In Chap. 2, we began with an exploration of the political, economic, and social forces that have driven interest in school turnaround interventions. Embedded in the support for school turnaround is an anti-statist understanding of public policy. This reflects a belief in the merits of privatizing certain schooling functions, but also a lack of confidence in public organizations. The social fabric of the country more broadly is under duress due to escalating poverty and other challenges.

In the next section of this chapter we explored the history of federal school turnaround. The pre-cursor to contemporary federal school turnaround efforts were SWPs. The federal government provided grants for schools to implement policies such as reductions to class size, professional development, and whole-school reform models with the support of outside organizations. Over time support for these programs was expanded. The passage of NCLB introduced the first national school turnaround effort. The law allowed states to reconstitute schools that had persistently low test scores. These school turnaround programs were supercharged with the creation of SIGs. This ambitious effort provided billions of dollars in grants to schools in return for implementing one of four models (transformation, turnaround, restart, and closure). We then end this section with a discussion of state and local school turnaround efforts. Here we examine how states have overseen and districts have implemented school turnaround.