Abstract
Planetary defense scientists frequently consider nuclear explosive devices (NED) among the suitable tools for deflection of near-Earth objects. Despite the convenient physical characteristics of nuclear explosions, this chapter sketches the negative implications of developing any options in this direction for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order as such. Moreover, the author critically unpacks the seemingly objective scientific rationality of these proposals and discusses how support for the NED development de-stigmatizes technology that, similarly to the impact of large asteroids, also carries the risk of destroying human civilization with a non-zero probability. The chapter concludes with a pragmatic attempt to find the middle ground between the NED advocates and critics.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
See Chap. 7 for a comprehensive discussion of NEO-deflection methods.
- 2.
For most relevant countries, the employment of such nuclear explosions would be prohibited under the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which was signed by 183 countries but has not yet entered into force). In addition, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (usually referred to as ‘Nuclear Ban Treaty’) explicitly prohibits those looking to ‘develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ (UNGA 2017). However, all the current nuclear-armed countries refused to sign the document and expressed their unwillingness to abide by its terms.
- 3.
See Chap. 14.
- 4.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that many US–Russian R&D initiatives have been suspended after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (see Stone 2016).
- 5.
- 6.
Besides the economic argumentation, some scholars and experts (Rislove 2006) also highlight the importance of the global diffusion of nuclear industry in the context of global climate change.
- 7.
The NPT established two categories of states with different rights and obligations according to the treaty: nuclear weapon states, defined as the ones that tested nuclear weapons before 1967, i.e. the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China; and non-nuclear weapon states, i.e. all the other signatories.
- 8.
The two superpowers also adopted a 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty that would specify the rules of appropriate conduct of PNEs on both sides.
- 9.
Indian behavior was widely interpreted as a breach of the non-proliferation norm among the NPT members, particularly on the side of the United States and Canada, who supplied India with heavy water and a research reactor, respectively, and saw the test as ‘cheating on the basic bargain of the nuclear regime’ (Epstein 1975, 1976; Nye 1981). On the consequences of India’s 1974 nuclear explosion, see Wan (2014).
- 10.
The meaning of this article has been subject to numerous interpretations over the course of the last few decades. There were also many attempts to make the normative prescriptions and proscriptions more specific, most prominently in the ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the ‘Thirteen Steps’ in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the 2010 NPT Review Conference ‘Action Plan.’ Nuclear disarmament, as the fundamental norm of the global nuclear order, was also formally validated in the 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice and in numerous resolutions of the UNGA and other international bodies. On July 7th, 2017, the UNGA adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as the first international agreement banning nuclear weapons and providing framework for their elimination.
- 11.
Admittedly, this US practice of restraint may now be reevaluated in the light of the President Trump’s forthcoming 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
E-mail conversation with David Morrison and Nikola Schmidt, December 2017.
References
Abraham, I. (1998). The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb : Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. London: Zed Books.
Abraham, I. (2006). The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories. Osiris, 21(1), 49–65. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/507135
Abraham, I. (2010). ‘Who’s Next?’ Nuclear Ambivalence and the Contradictions of Non-Proliferation Policy. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(43), 18–20.
Acton, J. M. (2009). The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading. Survival, 51(1), 119–142.
Artemieva, N., & Morgan, J. (2017). Quantifying the Release of Climate-Active Gases by Large Meteorite Impacts With a Case Study of Chicxulub. Geophysical Research Letters, 44(20), 10,180-10,188. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/2017GL074879
Barbee, B. W., Syal, M. B., Dearborn, D., Gisler, G., Greenaugh, K., Howley, K. M., et al. (2018). Options and uncertainties in planetary defense: Mission planning and vehicle design for flexible response. Acta Astronautica, 143(August 2017), 37–61. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2017.10.021
Birch, D. (2013a). Hunting Rogue Asteroids Could Be A New Use For Nuclear Weapons| HuffPost.
Birch, D. (2013b). The Plans to Use Nuclear Weapons to Blow Up Incoming Asteroids, 1–16.
Biswas, S. (2014). Nuclear desire : power and the postcolonial nuclear order. University of Minnesota Press.
Bolton, D. (2016). Russian scientists discover best way to destroy asteroids with nuclear weapons|The Independent.
Booth, K. (1999a). Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 1). The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(2), 1–24.
Booth, K. (1999b). Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 2). The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(3), 44–61.
Borrie, J. (2014). Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban. International Affairs, 90(3), 625–646.
Bourantonis, D. (1997). The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968: A Note. The International History Review, 19(2), 347–357. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1997.964078
Bucknam, M., & Gold, R. (2008). Asteroid Threat? The Problem of Planetary Defence. Survival, 50(5), 141–156. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330802456502
Bunn, G., & Rhinelander, J. B. (2008). Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now. Arms Control Today, (July/August 2008), 1–7.
Burns, E. L. M. (1969). The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects. International Organization, 23(4), 788–807.
Dearborn, D. S., Patenaude, S., & Managan, R. A. (2007). The Use of Nuclear Explosives To Disrupt or Divert Asteroids. In Planetary Defense Conference. Washington, D.C.
Demeritt, D. (2001). The construction of global warming and the politics of science. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91(2), 307–337. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/0004-5608.00245
Department of Energy. (2013). United States, Russia Sign Agreement to Further Research and Development Collaboration in Nuclear Energy and Security|Department of Energy.
Dhanapala, J., & Rydell, R. (2005). Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An insider’s Account. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
DoD. (2010). Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010).
Epstein, W. (1975). Nuclear proliferation: The failure of the review conference. Survival, 17(6), 262–269. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396337508441575
Epstein, W. (1976). The last chance : nuclear proliferation and arms control. Free Press.
Fields, J., & Enia, J. S. (2009). The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. The Nonproliferation Review, 16(2), 173–196.
Gerber, L. G. (1982). The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War. Diplomatic History, 6(1), 69–96. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1982.tb00364.x
Grzelczyk, V. (2012). Failure to relaunch? the United States, nuclear North Korea, and the future of the six-party talks. North Korean Review, 8(1), 8–21. doi:https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.8
Hanson, M. (2002). Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security. International Relations, 16(3), 361–379.
Harris, A. W. (2015). A Global Approach to Near-Earth Object Impact Threat Mitigation – Final Report.
Huntley, W. L. (2006). Rebels without a cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT. International Affairs, 82(4), 723–742.
Interfax. (2013, March). Megaton bomb may destroy large asteroid - Rosatom.
Jaipal, R. (1977). The Indian Nuclear Explosion. International Security, 1(4), 44–51.
Jasper, U. (2016). Dysfunctional, but stable – a Bourdieuian reading of the global nuclear order. Critical Studies on Security, 4(1), 42–56. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1106426
Johnson, R. (2014). The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons: an Imperative for Achieving Disarmament. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 25(1), 59–72.
Kaplinger, B., Wie, B., & Dearborn, D. (2012). Earth-Impact Modeling and Analysis of a Near-Earth Object Fragmented and Dispersed by Nuclear Subsurface Explosions. The Journal of the Astronautical Sciences, 59(1–2), 101–119. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s40295-013-0008-3
Kienzle, B. (2014). The Exception to the Rule? The EU and India’s Challenge to the Non-proliferation Norm. European Security, 24(1), 36–55. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2014.948863
Krause, J. (2007). Enlightenment and nuclear order. International Affairs, 83(3), 483–499.
Lantis, J. S. (2018). Nuclear Cooperation with Non-NPT Member States? An Elite-driven Model of Norm Contestation. Contemporary Security Policy advance online publication 30 January, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367
Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press.
McDonough, D. S. (2006). Nuclear Superiority: The „New Triad‟ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Mellor, F. (2007). Colliding Worlds. Social Studies of Science (Vol. 37). doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312706075336
Mellor, F. (2010). Negotiating uncertainty: asteroids, risk and the media. Public Understanding of Science, 19(1), 16–33.
Morgan, J., Artemieva, N., & Goldin, T. (2013). Revisiting wildfires at the K-Pg boundary. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 118(4), 1508–1520. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/2013JG002428
Morrison, D., & Teller, E. (1994). The Impact Hazard: Issues for the Future. In T. Gehrels (Ed.), Hazards due to Comets and Asteroids (pp. 1135–1143). Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Mueller, J. E. (2010). Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Müller, H. (2010). Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime. Strategic Analysis, 34(2), 189–201. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160903542740
Müller, H., Becker-Jakob, U., & Seidler-Diekmann, T. (2013). Regime Conflicts and Norm Dynamics: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. In H. Muller & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Müller, H., Fischer, D., & Kötter, W. (1994). Nuclear non-proliferation and global order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
NASA. (2007). Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives. Report to congress. Washington D.C. http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf
National Research Council. (2010). Defending Planet Earth : Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies. National Academies Press.
Nordyke, M. D. (1998). The soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Science & Global Security, 7(1), 1–117. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/08929889808426448
Nye, J. S. (1981). Maintaining a nonproliferation regime. International Organization, 35(01), 15–38. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004069
Ogilvie-White, T. (2010). The Defiant States: the Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(1), 115–138.
Onderco, M. (2017). Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise. Global Affairs, 0(0), 1–14. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082
Paul, T. V. (2003). Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(1), 135. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757032000075753
Paul, T. V. (2009). The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Paul, T. V. (2010). Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics. Review of International Studies, 36(04), 853–863. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001336
Pollack, J. D. (2011). No exit : North Korea, nuclear weapons, and international security. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Popp, R., Horovitz, L., & Wenger, A. (2016). Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty : Origins of the Nuclear Order. Oxon: Routledge.
Potter, W. C. (2017). Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty. Survival, 59(4), 75–108.
Press, D. G., Sagan, S. D., & Valentino, B. A. (2013). Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. American Political Science Review, 107(1), 188–206.
Rauf, T., & Johnson, R. (1995). After the NPT’s indefinite extension: The Future of the global nonproliferation regime. The Nonproliferation Review, 3, 28–42. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436604
Rislove, D. C. (2006). Global Warming v. Non-Proliferation: The Time Has Come for Nations to Reassert Their Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 24, 1069–1098.
Ritchie, N. (2009). US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War: Russians,’Rogues’ and Domestic Division. Oxon: Routledge.
Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security, 21(3), 54–86. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273
Sagan, S. D., & Valentino, B. A. (2017a). Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants. International Security, 42(1), 41–79.
Sagan, S., & Valentino, B. A. (2017b). The nuclear weapons ban treaty: Opportunities lost. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Schelling, T. C. (2005). An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima (Nobel Prize Lecture). The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 365–375.
Shaker, M. I. (1980). The nuclear non-proliferation treaty : origin and implementation 1959-1979. Oceana.
Smetana, M. (2015). Nuclear infrastructure, strategic hedging, and the implications for disarmament. In N. Hynek & M. Smetana (Eds.), Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives (pp. 44–60). Oxon: Routledge. doi:https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315735856
Smetana, M. (2016). Stuck on disarmament: The European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference. International Affairs, 92(1), 137–152.
Stone, R. (2016, October). Russia suspends nuclear R&D pact with United States. Science.
Tannenwald, N. (2005). Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. International Security, 29(4), 5–49.
Tannenwald, N. (2007). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tannenwald, N. (2013). Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. Ethics & International Affairs, 27(3), 299–317.
Tannenwald, N. (2015). Delegitimizing the Bomb: The Normative Strategy for Disarmament. In N. Hynek & M. Smetana (Eds.), Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political and Regional Perspectives. Oxon: Routledge.
Tannenwald, N. (2018). The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order. Daedalus, (forthcoming).
Teller, E. (1995). The Need for Experiments on Comets and Asteroids. In Proceedings of the Planetary Defense Workshop (pp. 5–6). Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Thakur, R. (2000). Envisioning Nuclear Futures. Security Dialogue, 31(1), 25–40.
UNGA. (2017). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. New York.
Unger, B. (1976). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Stem the Tide. World Affairs, 139(2), 87–111.
Walker, W. (2000). Nuclear Order and Disorder. International Affairs, 76(4), 703–724.
Walker, W. (2004). Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order. The Adelphi Papers, 44(370), 9–19.
Walker, W. (2007a). Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment. International Affairs, 83(3), 431–453.
Walker, W. (2007b). International nuclear order: A rejoinder. International Affairs, 83(4), 747–756. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00650.x
Walker, W. (2012). A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order. Oxon: Routledge.
Wan, W. (2014). Firewalling nuclear diffusion. International Studies Review, 16(2), 217–228. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12133
Welsh, S. B. (1995). Delegate perspectives on the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. The Nonproliferation Review, 2(3), 1–24. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436589
Wie, B. (2013). Hypervelocity nuclear interceptors for asteroid disruption. Acta Astronautica, 90(1), 146–155. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2012.04.028
Wie, B., Barbee, B., Pitz, A., Kaplinger, B., Hawkins, M., Winkler, T., et al. (2014). Final Technical Report of a NIAC Phase 2 Study. Graduate Research Assistants: Alan Pitz (M.S.
Wunderlich, C. (2017). Delegitimisation à la Carte: The ‘Rogue State’ Label as a Means of Stabilising Order in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Carmen. In S. Gertheiss, S. Herr, K. D. Wolf, & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Resistance and Change in World Politics: International Dissidence (pp. 143–186). Springer.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Nikola Schmidt, David Morrison, and Daniel Porras for useful comments and ideas. I acknowledge funding by the Charles University Research Centre program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague/Faculty of Social Sciences).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Smetana, M. (2019). Weapons of Mass Protection? Rogue Asteroids, Nuclear Explosions in Space, and the Norms of Global Nuclear Order. In: Schmidt, N. (eds) Planetary Defense. Space and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01000-3_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01000-3_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00999-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01000-3
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)