Abstract
This essay develops a notion of meaning—what I shall term organic meaning--that may serve as a bridge between Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning. It is a bridge in the sense that like non-natural meaning and unlike natural meaning, it includes cases of communication; yet like natural meaning and unlike non-natural meaning, it is not cognitively demanding, in that a creature can exhibit organic meaning without intending to do so and without intending to produce any effects on the cognitive states of others. As a result, organic meaning may be of interest as part of an evolutionarily plausible account of the phylogeny of communication and of a psychologically credible account of the ontogeny of communication. It will also shed light on aspects of adult human communication that do not meet the cognitive demands of speaker meaning. The approach uses tools from evolutionary game theory, including that of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and is inspired and informed by findings in the evolutionary biology of communication.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Pragmasophia conference (Palermo 2016), the Münster Graduate School of Evolution, Sheffield University (2013), the University of Glasgow (2013), and the University of Connecticut (2012). I am grateful to audiences on those occasions for their comments.
- 2.
For further discussion see Green 2017.
- 3.
See for instance Andrews and Beck 2017.
- 4.
For a more detailed discussion of the issues here, see Bar-On 2013. Also, in Green 2007, I defend a conception of non- natural (a.k.a. speaker) meaning that does not appeal to intentions to produce effects on others. Instead, it analyzes speaker meaning in terms of overtness, where that notion requires that one do something with the intention that one’s intention to do so itself be available to view by appropriate others. Although this analysis has advantages over better- known accounts of speaker meaning, it does not neutralize all concerns having to do with issues of cognitive load.
- 5.
Citing Hasson 1994, Maynard Smith and Harper (2003) define a cue in a way that is most naturally read as being applicable primarily to animals, writing, “Cue: a feature of the world, animate or inanimate, that can be used by an animal as a guide to future action.” (2004, p. 15). Even replacing ‘animal’ with ‘organism’, the phrase ‘guide to future action’ seems more appropriate to animals than to, say, plants. However, it appears arbitrary to limit our discussion in this way, particularly in light of recent advances in our understanding of communication among plants. As a result, the definition of cue given in the text seems superior to that offered by Maynard Smith and Harper.
- 6.
Such a generalization would permit not just natural selection, but also artificial selection, cultural evolution, and even conscious intention to produce signals; indeed, the definition should be generalized to allow inanimate objects such as computers to signal one another as well as animate objects. The special case of signaling that we find among animate objects may then produce what I will below call organic meaning.
- 7.
Green 1999 offers a fuller explication and defense of this attitude toward indeterminacy. Also, just as we defined a cue as relative to an organism that makes use of it, so too a more precise definition of a signal would reflect this fact. Our definiens would then be: S is a signal of M for organism O. Such a definition would make clear that a single trait or behavior might be a signal for one species but not a signal for another.
- 8.
- 9.
See Green 2007 for further discussion of the Duchenne smile.
- 10.
In Green 2013 and 2016 I defend a conception of assertion on which one who asserts must also present herself as asserting. If correct, this account characterizes assertion as a type of act that advertises the fact that it is a signal. By contrast, a micro-expression such as occurs in the activation of the human corrugator muscle may be a case of a cryptic signal that, if it is in fact a signal, will have been designed by natural selection. So-called subliminal seduction may be a case of cryptic signaling that is designed not by natural selection but by human intention.
- 11.
Denkel (1983, 1992) offered an early exploration of an area between natural and non-natural meaning, arguing that these two notions are not jointly exhaustive of the phenomenon of meaning. Denkel terms cases between natural and non-natural meaning, ‘quasi-natural meaning’, and uses ‘broadly natural meaning,’ to refer to the class comprising both natural and quasi-natural meaning. Denkel suggests that quasi-natural meaning may be a useful category for the understanding of the phylogeny of language, but does not pursue the suggestion. Reboul (2007) also defends the claim that natural and non-natural meaning are not jointly exhaustive categories, couching her discussion in terms of levels of intentional systems. Thus in Dennett’s parlance, first-order intentional systems possess intentional states but are not capable of ascribing such states to others; second-order intentional systems are so capable, but cannot ascribe intentional states in which such states are ascribed to others, and so on. Natural meaning thus counts as a 0th-order intentional system, while non-natural meaning counts as fourth-order intentional system. Reboul cites aposematism as an example of a signal that is non-factive, and thus not a case of natural meaning. She regards this as a case falling, “…completely outside the range of the Gricean account,” (2007, p. 262), and then moves on to discuss first-order intentional systems as the most important examples falling between natural and non-natural meaning. In so doing, Reboul is appealing to concepts that are more intentionalistic than is required by the notion of organic meaning per se. Organic meaning occurs among 0th- order intentional systems, since the notion of design built into the definition does not require intentions. Our aim is to conceptualize the most primitive possible forms of communication in order to discern the explanatory reach of that conceptualization.
- 12.
We may easily imagine artifactualizing grains of sand in such a way as to find ourselves tempted to think that some outcomes are better for one of them than are others, just as we might cheer for a cumulous cloud overhead as it appears to “eat” what looks like a storm cloud. This is pleasant imaginative play that does not purport to represent genuine properties in the clouds or grains of sand. So too, while we can make literal sense of things like avatars in computer games doing better or worse in light of various possible courses of play, such intentionality as they have will always be derivative from that of the intentionality of the animate objects who created them.
- 13.
I argue for this in more detail in Green 2017.
References
Andrews, K. and J. Beck eds. (2017) Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds (Routledge).
—(2014) ‘Signaling without cooperation,’ Biology & Philosophy29: 357–78.
Artiga, M. (2016) ‘Teleosemantic modeling of cognitive representations,’ Biology & Philosophy 31 : 483–505.
Avramides, A. (1989) Meaning in Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language (MIT).
Bar-On, D. (2013) ‘Origins of meaning: must we ‘go Gricean’?’ Mind and Language28: 342–75.
Breheny, R. (2006) ‘Communication and folk psychology,’ Mind and Language21: 74–107.
Cook, P., Rowe, M., Van Devender, R. (1994) ‘Allometric scaling and interspecific differences in the rattling sounds of rattlesnakes,’ Herpetologica, 50: 358–368.
David, P., Hingle, A., Greig, D., Rutherford, A., Pomiankowski, A., and Fowler, K. (1998) ‘Male sexual ornament size but not asymmetry reflects condition in stalk-eyed flies,’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 265, 2211–6.
Denkel, A. (1992) ‘Natural meaning,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy70: 296–306.
—(1983) ‘The fringes of natural meaning,’ Philosophia12: 337–43.
Gillies, M. (1980) ‘The role of carbon dioxide in host-finding by mosquitos (Diptera: Culicidae): a review,’ aBulletin of Entomological Research70: 525–32.
Godfrey-Smith P (2008) ‘Information in biology,’ in Hull D., Ruse M. (eds) The Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge University Press) pp 103–119.
Goris, R. (2011) ‘Infrared organs of snakes: an integral part of vision,’ Journal of Herpetology45: 2–14.
Glüer, K., and P. Pagin (2003) ‘Meaning theory and autistic speakers,’ Mind and Language18: 23–51.
Green, M. (2017) ‘How much mentality is needed for meaning?’, in Andrews and Beck (eds.) Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds (Routledge).
—(2016) ‘Assertion,’ Oxford Handbooks Online, ed. D. Pritchard (New York: Oxford University Press) 2016.
—(2016b) ‘Expressing, showing, and representing,’ in C. Abell and J. Smith (eds.) The Expression of Emotion: Philosophical, Psychological, and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge), pp. 25–45.
—(2013) ‘Assertions,’ in M. Sbisà and K. Turner (eds.) Handbook of Pragmatics, Vol. II: Pragmatics of Speech Actions (de Gruyter-Mouton): 387–410.
—(2010) ‘Perceiving emotions,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Volume, 84: 45–61.
—(2009) ‘Speech acts, the handicap principle, and the expression of psychological states,’ Mind & Language24: 139–163.
—(2007) Self-Expression (Oxford: Clarendon).
—(2003) ‘Grice’s frown: on meaning and expression,’ in G. Meggle and C. Plunze, eds., Saying, Meaning, Implicating (U. of Leipzig Press): 200–219.
—(1999) ‘Attitude ascription’s affinity to measurement,’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies,7 : 323–48.
Grice, H.P. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard).
—(1957) ‘Meaning’ repr. in Grice (1989), pp. 213–23.
Hafernik J, Saul-Gershenz L (2000) ‘Beetle larvae cooperate to mimic bees,’ Nature205(6782): 35–36.
Hagman, M., and R. Shine (2008) ‘Deceptive digits: The functional significance of toe-waving in cannibalistic cane toads, Chaunus marinus’ Animal Behaviour75: 123–31.
Harms, W. (2004a) Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes (Cambridge).
—(2004b) ‘Primitive content, translation and the emergence of meaning in animal communication ,’ in Oller and Griebel (eds.) Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach (MIT): 31–48.
Hasson, O. (1994) ‘Cheating signals,’ Journal of Theoretical Biology167: 223–38.
Horisk, C. and Cocroft, R. (2013) ‘Animal signals: always influence, sometimes information,’ in Stegman, U. (ed.) Animal Communication Theory: Information and Influence (Cambridge): 259–78.
Hutteger, S. (2007) ‘Evolution and the explanation of meaning,’ Philosophy of Science74: 1–27.
Legendre, F., Marting, P., and Cocroft, R. (2012) ‘Competitive masking of vibrational signals during mate searching in a treehopper,’ Animal Behaviour83: 361–68.
Mann, M., and M. Cummings (2012) ‘Poison frog colors are honest signals of toxicity, particularly for bird predators,’ American Naturalist179: E1–E14.
Manser, M., Seyfarth, R., and D. Cheney (2002) ‘Suricate alarm calls signal predator class and urgency,’ Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 55–7.
Mathevon, N, Koralek, A., Weldele, M., Glickman, S., and F. Theunissen (2010) ‘What the hyena’s laugh tells: sex, age, dominance and individual signature in the giggling call of Crocuta crocuata,’ BMC Ecology10: 1–16.
Maynard Smith, J. and D. Harper (2003) Animal Signals (Oxford).
Nelson, X. (2014) ‘The spider’s charade,’ Scientific American311: 86–89.
Otte, D. (1974) ‘Effects and functions in the evolution of signaling systems,’ Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 5: 385–417.
Owren, M., D. Rendall, and M. Ryan (2010) ‘Redefining animal signaling: influence versus information in communication,’ fBiology and Philosophy.
Rendall, D., M. Owren, and M. Ryan (2009) ‘What do animal signals mean?’ Animal Behaviour78: 233–40.
Reboul, A. (2007) ‘Does the Gricean distinction between natural and non-natural meaning exhaustively account for all instances of communication,’ Pragmatics and Cognition15: 253–76.
Reichert, S. (1978) ‘Games spiders play: behavioral variability in territorial disputes,’ Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 3: 135–62.
—(1984) ‘Games spiders play III: cues underlying context-associated changes in agonistic behaviour.’ Animal Behaviour, 32: 1–15.
Ruxton, G., Sherratt, T., and M. Speed (2005) Avoiding Attack: The Evolutionary Ecology of Crypsis, Warning Signals, and Mimicry (Oxford).
Scarantino, A. (2013) ‘Animal communication as information-mediated influence,’ in U. Stegmann (ed.) Animal Communication Theory: Information and Influence (Cambridge): 63–81.
Schaefer, H., Schaefer, V., and D. Levey (2004) ‘How plant-animal interactions signal new insights in communication,’ Trends in Ecology and Evolution19: 577–84.
Schiffer, S. (1982) ‘Intention-based semantics,’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic23: 119–56.
Searcy, W., and S. Nowicki. (2005) The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems (Princeton).
Skyrms, B. (2010) Signals: Evolution, Learning and Information (Oxford).
—(2009), contribution to a forum on Tomasello’s Why We Cooperate (MIT), pp. 137–46.
Stegmann, U. (2009) ‘A consumer-based teleosemantics for animal signals,’ Philosophy of Science76: 864–75.
Thompson, J.R. (2008) ‘Grades of meaning,’ Synthese161: 283–308.
Tibbetts, E., and J. Dale (2004) ‘A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp,’ Nature432: 218–222.
Warren, P. (2016) Uptalk: The Phenomenon of Rising Intonation (Cambridge).
Wharton, T. (2003) ‘Natural pragmatics and natural codes,’ Mind and Language18: 447–77.
Wilkinson, G. and Reillo, P. (1994) ‘Female choice response to artificial selection on an exaggerated male trait in a stalk-eyed fly,’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 255, 1–6.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Green, M. (2019). Organic Meaning: An Approach to Communication with Minimal Appeal to Minds. In: Capone, A., Carapezza, M., Lo Piparo, F. (eds) Further Advances in Pragmatics and Philosophy: Part 2 Theories and Applications. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00973-1_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00973-1_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00972-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-00973-1
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)