Abstract
Last December the U. S. Congress finished the first year’s trial run of new budgetary procedures required by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee reported that the new process “... has so far succeeded beyond our most optimistic expectations.”1
What has led to this strange impairment of the power of the purse? Why has Congress, inheritor of the right wrested from the king to control national expenditure, become seemingly unable to control it, not as against King or President, but as against itself’?
(Rollo Ogden, “The Rationale of Congressional Extravagance,” Yale Review, May 1897, p. 39).
For comments and conversations the authors are indebted to Allen Schick, Charles Mohan, Richard Fenno, Jerry Miner, George Schaefer, Anthony Carnevale, Calude Seguin, Roy Bahl, William Schuerch, Charles Schultz, James Sundquist, Sam Cohn, Robert Reischauer, Charles Leonard and Thomas Lynch.
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© 1978 H. E. Stenfert Kroese B.V., Leiden
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Burkhead, J., Knerr, C., Harriss, C.L., Samuels, W.J. (1978). Congressional Budget Reform: New Decision Structures. In: Fiscal responsibility in constitutional democracy. Studies in Public Choice, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-7125-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-7125-0_6
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