Abstract
The structure of our discussion of the systematicity of cognitive representations argument will mirror the structure of our previous discussion of the systematicity of inference argument in Chapter 4. We will begin by describing, clarifying, and defending the putative explanandum, then review the Pure Atomist and Classical accounts of it indicating how neither Classicism nor Pure Atomism will explain the systematicity of cognitive representations up to the standard Fodor and Pylyshyn have in mind. The central problem for both theories will be their reliance upon hypotheses that are ad hoc in the sense we have seen in Chapters 2 and 4.
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Notes
Cf. Fodor & Pylyshyn, (1988), p. 37, p. 39, cf. Fodor, (1987), p. 149. Just for the record, we may note that, McLaughlin (1993b), p. 221, uses the notion of an intrinsic connection as part of the explanans for systematicity, rather than the explanandum.
Cf., e.g., Matthews, (1994), Niklasson and van Gelder, (1994), van Gelder and Niklasson, (1994), and Hadley, (1997).
Cf., McLaughlin, (1993a, 1993b).
McLaughlin, (1993a, 1993b), is quite explicit about this.
Recall our discussion in Chapter 4 of Rowlands’s observation that “The demand that connectionism postulate and account for logically or sententially structured representations is simply not a legitimate demand” (Rowlands, 1994, p. 495).
McLaughlin, however, does use some counterfactual language in his explication of systematicity. He writes, “two capacities are systematically related if and only if they have constitutive bases such that a typical possessor of the one capacity would possess the other” (McLaughlin, 1993a, p. 220).
McLaughlin, (1993a, 1993b), explicates systematicity in terms of pairs of thought capacities. Presumably, he does this merely for the sake of expository convenience, since, as we shall see, there is no need to limit the counterfactual dependence to pairs of cognitive capacities, rather than to clusters of cognitive capacities.
Cf., Cummins, (1996b), where it is urged that the very statement of another of some of the various systematicity explananda begs questions in favor of Classicism.
More precisely, in discussing the systematicity of sentences in natural language, Fodor and Pylyshyn write, “On the view that the sentences [of natural language] are atomic, the systematicity of linguistic capacities is a mystery” (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 38).
Fodor & Pylyshyn, (1988), p. 50.
It is common enough to suggest that the systematicity arguments involve some sort of trickery or sleight of hand (Matthews, 1994, Cummins, 1996b). While such analyses are largely erroneous, Fodor, et al., may have introduced some (unintended?) misdirection at this point in the arguments. While one’s attention is focused on how poorly the Pure Atomist account fares, the Classical account is not similarly scrutinized.
This is how Matthews, (1997), puts the point.
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Aizawa, K. (2003). The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations. In: The Systematicity Arguments. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0275-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0275-3_5
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