Synonyms
Definition
Constitutional political economy analyzes the choice of constitutional rules as well as their effects by drawing on rational choice.
Introduction
Economists used to be interested in analyzing political decisions assuming the underlying rules to be given. Scholars of constitutional political economy (CPE) or constitutional economics have broadened the scope of economic research by analyzing both the choice of basic rule systems (constitutions) as well as their effects using the standard method of economics, i.e., rational choice.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962, vii) define a constitution as “… a set of rules that is agreed upon in advance and within which subsequent action will be conducted.” Although quite a few rule systems could be analyzed as constitutions under this definition, the most frequently analyzed rule system remains the constitution of the nation-state. Two broad avenues in the economic analysis of constitutions can be...
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Further Reading
Voigt S (2020) Constitutional economics: a primer. Cambridge University Press
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Voigt, S. (2021). Constitutional Political Economy. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_1-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_1-2
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Chapter history
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Latest
Constitutional Political Economy- Published:
- 18 May 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_1-2
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Original
Constitutional Political Economy- Published:
- 21 June 2014
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_1-1