Policing in Russia

Abstract

The modern (since 1991) Russian government has inherited the police machine as it was and due to tremendous political, economic, and ethnic turmoil, have not had enough time and resources to change it. After a couple of decades of dynamic and unpredictable changes in Russian society, it became obvious that the old Soviet type law enforcement system does not match the new semi-democratic realities of modern Russian society.

Policing is one of the social institutions that, despite numerous reforms and innovations, largely retain the Soviet structure, traditions, and techniques of work. Four important mechanisms of the modern police which allow us to fully consider the legacy of Soviet experience are (a) the prevalence of punitive-repressive functions, (b) the political dependence from authorities, (c) legal nihilism, and (d) the “cane” reporting system. For the last 20 years police have endured budget deficits and low wages. Legal imperfection of the current police legislation and its constant change lead to unfounded difficulties in day-to-day operation of the police, poor working conditions, overtime assignments, mediocre recruitment, and selection and training (Sociology of yesterday, today and tomorrow: The second sociological readings in memory Valery Borisovich, pp. 151–174, 2008b). The police force is the core element in the Russian criminal justice system and changes launched in 2009 will inevitably affect the nature of the activities of other parts of the criminal justice system in Russia: prosecution, courts, prisons, and other agencies.

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The State

The Russian Federation (Russia) is a democratic presidential-parliamentary federal republic, located in Eastern Europe and Northern Asia geographically is the largest country in the world. The population is 138.7 (July 2011 estimation) million people. The Official language is Russian but in 23 subjects of the nation other languages are in use as official. For example, in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, in addition to Russian, other official languages include Abaza, Karachay, Nogai, and Circassian languages. Russians are the largest ethnic group with 70.9 % of the population along with Tatar 3.8 %, Ukrainian 2 %, Bashkir 1.2 %, and Chuvash 1.1 %; others are an unspecified 12.1 %. The capital city is Moscow. Russia shares borders with 18 countries is a member of the UN Security Council.

The executive branch includes the President of the Russian Federation is Vladimir Putin who (since 7 May 2012) (Russian: Prezident Rossijskoj Federatsii) is the head of state, supreme commander-in-chief, and holder of the highest office within the Russian Federation. The Government of the Russian Federation (Russian: Pravítel’stvo Rossíjskoj Federácii) exercises executive power in the Russian Federation. The members of the government are the Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev (Chairman of the Government), the deputy prime ministers, and the federal ministers. The Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD) is the Ministry of Internal Affairs which is part of the government of Russia. Its predecessor was founded in 1802 by Alexander I in Imperial Russia. The Ministry is headquartered in Moscow.

The legislative branch is comprised of a bicameral Federal Assembly or Federalnoye Sobraniye consisting of an upper house, the Federation Council, or Sovet Federatsii (166 seats; members appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the 83 federal administrative units—oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and the federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg; with members serving 4-year terms) and a lower house, the State Duma or Gosudarstvennaya Duma (450 seats; as of 2007, all members are elected by proportional representation from those party lists winning at least 7 % of the vote; members elected by popular vote to serve 4-year terms) elections: State Duma—last held on 4 December 2011 (next to be held in December 2015) election results: State Duma—United Russia—49.6 %, CPRF—19.2 %, Just Russia—13.2 %, LDPR—11.7 %, other 6.3 %; total seats by party—United Russia—238, CPRF—92, Just Russia—64, LDPR—56.

The judicial branch consists of a Constitutional Court; Supreme Court; and Supreme Arbitration Court. Judges for all courts are appointed for life by the Federation Council on the recommendation of the president (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). The legal system is based on civil law with judicial review of legislative acts.

Evolution of the Police

Two centuries of Russian police history have produced a definite image of an oppressive tsars’ or commissars’ style of rule in which the police have all the rights and powers and the people have none. The first police agency in Russia was established in Saint Petersburg as the Main Police with General-Police master on 7 June 1718 by decree of Peter the Great. On 19 January 1722 the Governing Senate established the Moscow Police. The first Investigative Department was founded in 1866 operating under the Police Department of the Ministry of Interior, and by 1907 similar departments were created in other major cities of the Russian Empire. The Police of the Russian Empire was dissolved on 10 March 1917, and on 17 April the Provisional Government established the People’s Militia (Militsiya) as a new law enforcement body. The current law enforcement system may be seen in its dramatic evolution through three stages (Sergevnin, 2010b).

1917–1953

Upon seizing power in 1917, the Bolsheviks (later Communists) imposed a violent, centrally planned and repressive police system in Russia and then in the Soviet Union. The so-called Workers’-Peasants’ Militia was established immediately after the October Revolution on 10 November (28 October old style) in 1917 for the protection of the new Soviet order. New standards for policemen were introduced: be at least 21 years of age, recognize Soviet authorities, literate, and have the right to vote (the so-called capitalist class was denied such a privilege). Initial contracts for militia officers were at least 6 months. There were established voluntary organizations of supporting militia such as the Voluntary Militia, the Friends of Public Order, etc. Only individuals from blue collar and peasant backgrounds were accepted to service. During the Civil War, militia officers actively participated in various battles on the front. Utilizing political commissars as a political monitoring tool in each and every militia division, affirmed political control and became a unique feature of the Soviet police until the demise of the Soviet Union. The initial design of Soviet style policing was based on serving the political class struggle with a centralized military style structure and the modus operandi of placing itself above the law or using the so-called “revolutionary conscious law.” From September 1918 the militia had participated in the Red Terror which resulted in millions of victims. As part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), police became one of the most powerful tools of the Communist party and the Soviet state. Once it became more sophisticated the Soviet state forced the MVD to embraced more and more of the nonpolice services, such as the Internal Troops (focused on internal uprisings, ethnic conflicts, riots, demonstrations, etc.), the department of corrections, the firefighting service, and passport and registration services, to mention a few. The MVD shared police functions with the Committee of State Security (KGB) in investigating serious crimes such as political offenses, large-scale economic crimes involving foreign currency, banditism, terrorism, sabotage, and mass riots.

1953–1991

Stalin’s death in 1953 brought about some cosmetic changes to Soviet policing such as the separation of the KGB from the MVD, and an attempt to move from political style policing to a professional model. Police recruitment training standards and curricula focused on legal, forensic studies, and criminal investigations. Soviet style community policing allowed police to enlist millions of volunteers (druzhinniki) to assist in street patrols. New uniforms, equipment, and technology were introduced. Gorbachev’s perestroika and general weakening of the social and political controls were marked with widespread corruption, inefficiency, brutality, and involvement with military type operations for which police had not been trained. An anticorruption campaign was introduced by Andropov and carried on by Gorbachev. Thousands of militiamen were fired or resigned (Sergevnin, 2010b).

Police Organization, Structure and Function

In 2010, the Interior Ministry (Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del [MVD]) employed about 1.2 million people, roughly five times greater than the Prosecutor’s Office and courts combined. According to the experts before the well-published reform of 2011 there were around 1.5–2 million people in the Russian police, and in 2007, the number of officers surpassed the number of law enforcement officers in the Soviet Union. Thus, today in Russia there is a police officer for every 75 people. Policing is one of the largest professions in Russia (Gladarev, 2008a). The police reform (2011) intended to reduce the force for 20 %. In January 2012 according to the MVD there were 1,106,000 personnel including 782,000 police officers (MVD, 2012).

Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government has been unsuccessfully attempting to reform the militia (police) by imitating change and implementing international police experience. The initial step in reforming the militia was made by adopting the 18 April 1991 Law No. 1026-I “On Militia.” The Ministry of Internal Affairs was separated from corrections and firefighting functions in the 1990s. After several serious incidents with high-ranking police officials and wide spread cases of corruption former President Medvedev made a new attempt at reforming the police by decree with new police regulations he signed on 24 December 2009. Generally this decree proposed to cut the number of policemen by 20 %, raise salaries, and reform police training and selection.

The Bill on Police, with the proposal of a name change from militia to police returning to the pre-1917 title, was introduced by former President Dmitry Medvedev to the State Duma on 27 October 2010 as a part of the reform process of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The bill was signed into law by the President on 7 February 2011, and took effect on 1 March.

The police are part of a centralized system of federal executive authority—the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD of Russia), exercising its powers within the government to protect the rights and freedoms of people. The composition and structure of the police are determined by the Constitution and the President of the Russian Federation. The 2011 police reform had changed the financing of police solely from federal budget to exclude cases of involvement of local administration in the law enforcement process. Police have several vertical levels of management and are highly centralized.

Level One

The Russian Interior Ministry reports to the President of the Russian Federation. The Minister has eight (as of 12 February 2012) deputies appointed by the President of the Russian Federation on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The number of Deputy Ministers is established by the President of the Russian Federation. Police activities are carried out in the following areas:

• Prevention of crimes and administrative offenses

• Identification, prevention, and detection of crime, the preliminary investigations in criminal cases

• Search for wanted persons and stolen property

• Prevention of offenses and administrative proceedings on administrative violations

• Protection of public order

• Traffic safety

• Control of arms trafficking

• Control over the private detective and security activity

• Protection of property and facilities under contracts

• State protection of participants in criminal proceedings, judges, law enforcement officials, and regulatory bodies

• Rendering assistance to the citizens, the federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, other state bodies, local authorities, public associations, and organizations regardless of ownership, the officials of these bodies and organizations to protect their legitimate rights and interests. Supervision over the legality of police actions is carried out by the Prosecutor General’s Office and subordinate prosecutors

The Russian Interior Minister directs all police. In the course of administrative reform, the Russian Interior Ministry established a new structure, and significantly reduced the number of central staff. Instead of 34 major departments and offices in the headquarters, 15 independent departments, centers, and management units were established (Krylov & Nalivaiko, 2008).

The structure of the Russian Interior Ministry, which includes the police, is:

• Main command of internal troops

• The investigation committee

• Department of Law Enforcement on transport

• Administrative Department

• Departments: Public protection of property, staffing, traffic safety, law enforcement in closed areas and sensitive sites, protection of public order, to combat extremism, internal affairs, logistics, criminal investigation, economic security, organizational and inspector, legal, financial, and Economics

• Main Information and Analytical Center

• Expert and forensic center

• State Institution “All-Russian Research Institute of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia”

• National Central Bureau of Interpol at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia

• Russia’s national contact point for cooperation with the European Police Office (Europol)

• Department “K,” to ensure the safety of persons who are subjects to state protection

Level Two

The Ministries of Interior of the subjects of the Russian Federation are the general management bodies of internal affairs within a given subject of the federation. Depending on the staffing structure, which is determined by population and other factors, Ministry of Interior of the subjects of the Russian Federation can be equated with the Main Department of the Interior (GUVD) or Department of Internal Affairs (UVD). Interior ministers of the republics, heads of main departments, departments of the interior are all appointed to office by the Minister of Internal Affairs with approval by the state authorities of the Russian Federation.

The Main Department of the Interior (GUVD) manages the internal affairs bodies, within their competence, limited either geographically (police departments in each state of the Federation) or functionally (responsible for a certain number of tasks of the Interior such as General Directorate for Combating Economic Crimes—a division of the central office of the Ministry). The Main departments of the Interior (GUVD) are above the Departments of Interior (UVD) or departments of the Interior in the districts. In the subjects (states) of the Russian Federation with a population of more than two million people, or with special status by virtue of certain circumstances, as a rule, there are Main Departments of Internal Affairs (GUVD or police departments in Moscow, Moscow regional police department, police department of Krasnodar region, etc.). The District of internal troops is equal to the Main departments of the Interior (GUVD) according to the power structure. The head of the Main department of the Interior, as a rule, has a paramilitary (special) rank of Lieutenant General—Colonel-General. All the appointments on this level are highly political and require loyalty rather than professionalism and competence. Any attempts to criticize upper level police bureaucrats are discouraged and immediately reprimanded. In February 2012 the head of the Saint-Petersburg Main Department of the Interior (GUVD) Colonel-General Michail Suhodolsky was fired due to his criticism of the Ministry of Interior and was forced to leave his office with a help of the special police squad “Bastion” (Desyatnichenko, 2012).

Department of Internal Affairs (UVD) as a governing body of the system of Internal Affairs has a lower status than the Main departments of the Interior (GUVD), but higher than the Division of the Interior (OVD). There are territorial UVDs (in federal subjects, such as UVD in the Tula region), and functional ones as an intrinsic part of the Ministry or the police department. Their bureaucratic structures and power potential are equal, as a rule, to the division of internal troops, led by a Major-General or Lieutenant General. In the case where the UVD is part of a superior police department, then its bureaucratic structure is equal to a brigade of internal troops with a commander who will hold the rank of Colonel.

Level Three

The Division of Internal Affairs (OVD) is the main governing body in the internal affairs of Russia and reports to the Department of Internal Affairs (UVD). There are territorial Divisions of Internal Affairs (OVD) (for example, OVD of a district or of the city with regional subordination) and functional Divisions of Internal Affairs (OVD) which direct all activities of law enforcement within the jurisdiction of the administrative area (for example, the Department of Criminal Investigations). The Departments of Internal Affairs (UVD) and Divisions of Internal Affairs (OVD) also include special police purpose squads and special rapid-response teams. In Moscow, there are also environmental police.

Level Four

The branches of militia or the police branches (OP) in most of the cases are the lowest agencies in police structure and designed as territorial (very few are functional) branches within the Division of Internal Affairs (OVD).

Law and order in rural areas is enforced by District inspectors (or precinct commissioners). Precinct police service is one of the central departments of the Interior, which is due not only to its multiplicity, but also the daily proximity to the vital interests of the population. About 40 % of the police district inspectors (23,000) work in the countryside, and are often the only representatives of the Ministry of Interior. The district police inspector as a representative of the government has executive and administrative functions aimed at solving the complex task of ensuring the protection of public order and public security in the area served by this administration. The status of the police district inspector serving the rural administrative area in the sphere of public order is different from the status of the district inspector serving the administrative area in the municipality. In rural areas, the district inspector is the main representative of the Interior Ministry and fully administers functions of the public authorities in general, as well as local authorities in the protection of public order, which defines its role as the main subject of the system of crime prevention and public order. In the precinct, the district inspector serves as an organizer and direct executor of action to implement the state policy in law enforcement. Each district inspector is assigned to service an administrative area with from 3 to 3.5 thousand of the population both in urban and rural areas. The district inspector reports to the branches of the militia or the police branches (OP), or to the Division of Internal Affairs (OVD) in the district, the head of which approves the number and lengths of the shift(s). Usually there are two shifts but working hours can be set based on the state of the operational situation at the site. District inspectors interact with other services of the agency concerning: the exchange of information, including through information networks, training, joint planning; implementation of specific actions (raids, operations); and they perform certain tasks with the approval of superiors.

District inspectors solve from 70 to 80 % of all registered crimes in rural areas. However, the conditions of their work are generally very poor: one-third of the precincts do not have office space and grounded telephone lines. Most police vehicles are outdated and in poor condition. More than half of the precinct police inspectors do not own their homes and apartments. There are serious shortcomings in crime control in rural areas, including, but not limited to, poor registration of crime, limited crime prevention programs, and inadequate staffing and resources. Emerging issues are not adequately reflected in departmental regulations, modification of forms, and methods of preventing crime. The process of identification, disclosure, and exposure of the perpetrators of crimes in the villages is fraught with challenges. For example, it is more difficult for rural cops to obtain confidential information. Rural residents are disinterested in testifying against perpetrators if the potential to damage neighborly relations or ethnic or religious unity exists. Of great importance is the issue of limited resources and staffing for rural law enforcement, especially of precinct police inspectors. Precinct police inspectors have a high level of turnover; almost 70 % have less than 5 years of work experience, and only 9 % have more than 10 years of work experience (Cheprasov, 2007). Operating procedures (instructions for organizing the activities of the precinct of authorized police officers, approved by the Order of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia Number 900-2002) for organizing the activities of authorized police officers (precinct police inspector) do not contain a section of special guidelines for precinct police inspectors serving rural administrative areas, despite the specificity of policing in such areas (Sergevnin, 2010a).

Voluntary associations of citizens for the protection of law and order and public safety, or voluntary people’s guards (VPG), play an important role in police efforts to prevent and combat crime in rural areas. The activities of the VPG are based on the principles of voluntariness, justice, humanity, respect and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

In 2009 there were more than 34,000 units of VPG with more than 363,000 people. Despite modest logistical and financial support for VPG from regular police, they are able to assist in clearing 40,000 crimes and to detect more than 400,000 administrative offenses annually.

Law “On Police,” law “On Operational-Investigative Activities” and other legislative acts of the Russian Federation establish the body of police responsibilities. Police are called to regulate order in the relations between people; to prevent life-threatening events, provide security to the health and property of citizens and legal. In accordance with law police has to protect all individuals, regardless of nationality, place of residence, social status, property and official status, race, national origin, sex, age, education, language, religion, political, or other beliefs. Police are prohibited from resorting to degrading treatment. Any restriction of citizens in their rights and freedoms by the police is permissible only on legal grounds. A police officer in all cases in which restrictions on rights and freedoms should apply is obliged to explain to individuals the grounds and cause of such limitations, as well as individual’s rights and obligations. The police provide an opportunity to detainees for statutorily established rights to legal assistance; reports upon request (in the case of detained minors it is mandatory) on the detention to individual’s relatives, or to the employer or to school administration, if necessary, take measures to provide them with first aid, as well as to eliminate the danger of someone’s life, health or property resulting from the detention. The police have no right to disclose information relating to the personal life of a citizen, discrediting his honor and dignity, or likely to damage the legitimate interests, if the execution of justice otherwise requires.

The police in the Russian Federation are divided into Criminal Police and Public Safety Police. The mission of the criminal police requires the identification, prevention, suppression, and disclosure of criminal acts when a preliminary investigation is required; organization and implementation of the search of persons hiding from the inquiry, investigation or from trial, or avoiding the execution of penal Code, missing persons, and other persons in cases envisaged by legislation. Criminal police have operational-investigative, scientific and technical divisions: criminal investigation; to combat economic crime; scientific, technical, and other divisions.

The activity of criminal police aimed mainly at ensuring the interests of the federal law and state and, therefore, requires a certain independence from the influence of local authorities. Therefore, it is derived from the authority of local administrations and is subordinate only to the federal police agency.

The primary tasks undertaken by the police regarding public safety include ensuring the personal safety of citizens; protection of public order and public safety; prevention and suppression of crimes and administrative offenses; disclosure of the crimes for which the preliminary investigation is not required, and the investigation of crimes in the form of inquiry; assisting within its competence to citizens, officials, businesses, institutions, organizations, and associations.

The powers of a police officer by law “On Police” are broad: to prevent and suppress crimes and administrative offenses, identify, and within its rights to take measures to address the circumstances that contribute to crime; to record statements, reports of crimes, and administrative offenses; to identify and solve crimes; initiate criminal proceedings, to make inquiries and investigations; to search for the perpetrators of the crime, hiding from the inquiry, investigation and trial, avoiding the criminal penalties or missing persons; to carry out the investigations of the administrative offenses; to ensure law and order in the streets and other public places, regulate traffic, to register vehicles; to authorize the acquisition, carrying and storage of weapons; and to protect on the basis of agreements with the owners their property.

Police officers in the performance of their duties are entitled: to demand from citizens and officials the termination of criminal behavior or administrative offenses; to check with the officials and citizens their ID documents if they have reasonable grounds to believe that these individuals are committing a crime or administrative offense; to request citizens and officials to be present for inquiry; to receive from the citizens and officials the necessary explanation, information, statements, documents, and their copies; to draw up protocols on administrative offenses, and to carry out administrative detention; to proceed with criminal proceedings; to arrest and detain, in accordance with the law of persons suspected of committing a crime, as well as persons against whom there is a custody warrant; to deliver individuals to health facilities for sobering; to initiate proposals to the state bodies, to enterprises, institutions, organizations, and public association and require them to review and to eliminate the circumstances that contribute to crime; to carry the operational-investigative measures; to enter freely into residential and other premises of citizens, to the territory and premises occupied by businesses, institutions, organizations, and examine them in the pursuit of those suspected of committing crimes, or if there sufficient evidence to believe that they committed or is being committed crime, accident, and also to protect the personal safety of citizens and public safety during natural disasters, accidents, epidemics, epizootics, and mass riots.

A police officer should notify the prosecutor within 24 h about cases of penetration into a dwelling against the will of an individual. Also law enforcement personnel can carry out voluntary and mandatory state fingerprint registration and mandatory state registration of genome; to establish the cordon area when plots, natural disasters, accidents, conducting quarantine measures in case of epidemics or epizootic diseases, suppression of riots, as well as in the search for escaped convicts and criminals, to carry out inspection of vehicles; to screen carry-on baggage and luggage of passengers of civil aircraft and, if necessary, personal inspection of passengers; to prohibit operation of vehicles the technical condition which does not meet the requirements, to stop vehicles and check the documents; to inspect the storage and use of firearms, ammunition, and explosive materials; to withdraw from the citizens and officials documents with signs of forgery; to receive information from the companies, organizations, institutions; to engage citizens with their agreement to cooperate, etc.

It is important that police have the right, in cases stipulated by the Law “On Police,” to apply in the prescribed manner of physical force, special tools, and firearms. Due to intensified measures to control crime in 2011 there was a 64 % increase in the number of unlawful acts against members of the Ministry of Interior and internal troops: and more than 20,000 crimes committed against police officers. Of the officers assaulted, 3,602 were injured and 322 policemen and interior troopers were killed. In the same year, 926 staff members received state awards, five officers were posthumously awarded the title Hero of Russia (Bulavin, 2012).

Crime and Disorder Trends in the Last 20 Years

During the last 20 years, the Russian Federation has increasingly recognized crime as a critical social problem. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, however, awareness of crime was extremely limited, particularly during Stalin’s reign when the ideological pursuit of “a perfect society” made most of the information on the criminal justice system a taboo. Most criminal justice information was classified by the state and was only available to police officials or political leadership.

The transition from a totalitarian society to the early stages of democracy has had a significant impact on the crime situation. The resulting radical political and economic change, financial and regulatory chaos, privatization and extreme deterioration of the economy have been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in lawlessness, corruption, and crime. The overall crime rate (per 100,000) in Russia has increased considerably during the past 20 years (Table 1).

Table 1 Crime rate (per 100,000 people) in Russia

The controversial transition to a market economy has increased the scope of property and violent crimes and moved the crime issue into the focus of public concern. A survey conducted in December 2005 rated crime as the second most worrisome phenomenon for Russian citizens. Recent polls 2009–2012 indicate that 38 % (57 % in 2012) of residents have strong concerns about the rapid rise of crime and comparative analysis of different types of criminal activity shows no significant dynamics between 2009 and 2011 (±2 %). Exception of fear of suffering from car thieves and extortionists, blackmailers, who feared more in 2011 to 5 % and 9 %, respectively, compared with 2009 (WCIOM, 2012). The serious tendency in crime situation has been a significant growth in virtually all types of crimes. Increased crime rates follow the process of criminalization of new types of socially dangerous behavior. Four Criminal Codes of Russia (1922, 1926, 1960, and 1996) have criminalized more than 300 new types of behavior, and approximately 100 have been decriminalized (Luneev, 2011).

For a couple of decades Russia has had high levels of serious violent crime, especially in rural areas. The predominantly agricultural Russian empire in 1913 had registered 34,400 murders, and after more than 80 years, in 1996–1997, the number of murders was approximately 30,000. The murder index per 100,000 inhabitants was 20.3 in 1913 and 19.9 in 1996–1997. From 1950 to 1980, under the Soviet power, this ratio was significantly lower (i.e., 4.9 in 1956, 6.1 in 1966, 7.0 in 1976, and 6.8 in 1985) (Luneev, 2003). In 1990, this index exceeded 10, and in 1994, 1996, 1997, and 2006, it was at approximately 20. From 1994 to 1995 and again from 1998 to 2005, the index exceeded 20. In 2009, there were 21,400 murders and in 2011, as result of criminal attacks, there were 40,100 killed (a 4.5 % increase), 49,400 suffered serious bodily harm (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2012). Police statistics on violent crime traditionally are not reliable. Even former President Medvedev indicated that police statistics are “nonsense” and could not be trusted (Medvedev, 2010a). According to MVD advisor Vladimir Ovchinsky in 2011 there were 24.5 million citizen’s reports about crime but law enforcement agencies initiated only two million of criminal cases (Ovchinsky, 2012). According to medical statistics, the mortality rate from murder in Russia is even higher (i.e., 22.9 in 1992 [in contrast with law enforcement statistics, which indicated 15.5]; 30.4 in 1993 [in contrast with law enforcement statistics, which indicated 19.6]; 32.3 in 1994 [in contrast with law enforcement statistics, which indicated 21.8]; 30.8 in 2002 [in contrast with law enforcement statistics, which indicated 22.4]; and 29.5 in 2003 [in contrast with law enforcement statistics, which indicated 22.1]). According to Gilinsky (2008), the differences in numbers between medical and law enforcement statistics are due to the fact that law enforcement statistics are derived from relevant articles of the Criminal Code (introduced in 1997), whereas medical statistics record the actual number of killings (Table 2).

Table 2 Homicides in Russia

From 2001 to 2010, there have been 263,889 murders officially recorded. From 100 % of homicides, there were only 86.3 % registered suspects, only—67.5 % were convicted. During the same decade there registered 1.2 million missing and 38.2 % of them have not been found, but almost a million (974,672) unidentified corpses were found, many of whom were killed (Luneev, 2011). The Research Institute of the Academy of General Prosecutor’s Office revealed the different level of murder of around 46, with 2,000 murders in 2009. The murder rate when calculated based on the multivariate model increased steadily, the number of statements about murders admitted by police amounted to 45.1 thousand and the number of unidentified bodies in the same year 77.9 thousands (Inshakov, 2011).

In addition, Russian women are at higher risk to become victims of violent crime and homicide than males, and homicide is currently the leading cause of external mortality for Russian women (Gavrilova, Semyonova, Evdokushkina, Ivanova, & Gavrilov, 2004). The criminological characteristic of homicide in Russia has changed considerably in two decades, with more cases in which murder is committed to conceal another crime, in association with robbery or rape, or by a group of people. Offender characteristics are also changing: they are younger, less likely to have previous convictions, and more likely to have a more diverse range of educational levels (Chervyakov, Shkolnikov, Pridemore, & McKee, 2002).

A growing number of deaths are attributed to guns: every eighth murder, every seventh robbery, and every tenth case of hooliganism is committed with firearms. The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have strong gun control measures. In the Soviet Union, the percentage of crimes committed with the use of firearms accounted for 0.03 % of all crimes committed; today, the proportion is 1.6 %, or an increase of more than 50 times. In 2000, the number of crimes committed with firearms, explosives, and explosive devices was 25,500 followed by 30,400 in 2001, 31,800 in 2002, 9,600 in 2004, 5,500 in 2007, and 4,400 in 2008 (MVD, 2009). The most common channels and sources for obtaining and illegal trafficking in weapons, explosives, and explosive devices are theft from (1) military and paramilitary agencies, especially the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and internal troops, and the customs authorities; (2) mining enterprises; (3) weapons manufacturers, including the conversion of gas weapons and smuggling of arms from abroad; (4) citizens who have permits for possession and carrying; and (5) the illegal acquisition of arms of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. The internal conflicts in the rural Caucasus region are strong magnets for illegal firearms trafficking (Sergevnin, 2010a).

In addition, sexual violence has become more prevalent. Such crimes are prosecuted according to two articles of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (2003): (1) rape (Article 131) and (2) sexual assault (Article 132). Law enforcement statistics indicated more cases (i.e., 35.7 % in 1997, 37.4 % in 1998, 37.2 % in 1999, 37.9 % in 2000, 35.9 % in 2001, and 34.6 % in 2002) than sexual assault (27.2 % in 1997, 28.8 % in 1998, 29.5 % in 1999, 29.3 % in 2000, 30.7 % in 2001, and 27.8 % in 2002). A significant number of violent sexual crimes are committed under the influence of alcohol. The average percentage of convicts who committed a crime under the influence of alcohol is 35–9 %; 64–67 % were convicted of sexual assault; and 83–84 % were convicted of rape. In addition to sexual violence, acts of domestic or family violence are more prevalent in rural areas than urban areas (Roshin, 2003).

Alcohol has played a significant role in the evolution of crime in Russia. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, the consumption of alcohol rose 2.3 times or from 4.6 to 10.6 L of pure alcohol annually per capita from 1960 to 1984. Today, per capita consumption of pure alcohol in Russia is 18 L (in comparison to 8 L in the United States) (Efimov, 2009). By some estimates, approximately seven million out of roughly 120 million persons over 15 years of age, or roughly 6 % of Russia’s adult population, are classified as heavy drinkers, with 20 % of deaths attributed to alcohol intoxication (Eberstadt, 2009). Russia has experienced large wave of moonshine (samogon) production in the last two decades. A 2003–2004 survey of residents of the city of Izhevsk reported that 7.3 % of men aged 25–54 had drunk surrogates in the past year, with 4.7 % drinking them weekly or more often (Stickley et al., 2007). From 2000 to 2005, the consumption of alcoholic drinks increased 1.3 times, the number of crimes committed under the influence of alcohol rose almost 1.6 times, and the number of administrative law violations has increased 1.9 times (among juveniles, 2.3 times). Mortality directly linked with the consumption of alcohol has risen 2.5 times. During the same period, 250,000 people died from chronic alcoholism; liver cirrhosis; psychosis; and alcohol poisoning, which accounted for the most deaths at 105,000. Currently, Russia has approximately 2.5 million chronic alcoholics. According to crime statistics and expert opinion, from 27 to 30 % of all crimes are committed under the influence of alcohol. For some types of crime, especially serious violent crimes against individuals, the numbers are much higher (60–65 %). The majority of domestic violence crimes involve alcohol consumption (70–75 %) (Zaigraeev, 2002). Accidental alcohol poisoning is pervasive in Russia and accounted for more than 41,000 deaths in 2001, equating to a rate of 28.5 per 100,000 of the population, or more than 120 times the European average (Stickley et al., 2007).

Another dangerous crime trend in Russia is significant radical nationalist, religious, and hate crime activity. Modest efforts of state and non-state institutions to counteract it have failed in most cases. Acute separatist and nationalist crimes are especially widespread in the Northern Caucasus region. Racism and racial profiling by local police is rampant and even indirectly approved by MVD.

One of the first precursors of skinheads in Russia were groups of stylyagi or mod’s and hipster’s groups. Mod (from modernist) is a subculture that originated in London, England, in the late 1950s and peaked in the early-to mid-1960s. Hipsters and mods were the majority among the Natsiks (nazi) and included mostly students and young people, which had been attracted by the aesthetics of Nazism, with its parades, the cult of beautiful bodies and neoclassical architecture. For most of them Nazism was a game (Charny, 2004). “Game” type organizations were among the first Nazi organizations in the former USSR. Kiev group of schoolchildren, led by J.P. Yurchenko first just played in the Nazis. Then they decided to create the youth of Nazi (formally fascist because fascism and Nazism in the USSR, then very few people make out) the organization of “SS Viking” in order to build national communism in the Soviet Union and forced construction of socialism in the world. The band members considered Hitler’s genius. Filed against them, the case was in December 1957 discontinued because it was proved that the participants of this Viking group did not go further than a game. Particularly rapidly these groups had blossomed 1970–1980s in the form of covert “fascist organizations” of students. And the catalyst for this process was the movie Seventeen Moments of Spring, one of the first Soviet movies that demonstrated the “grand style” of Nazism and simultaneously “humanized” it. The authorities quickly realized this relatively harmless hobby, and because most of the punishment for “mods” were limited to the formal conversations in the KGB and the District Committee/Regional Committee of the party. Perhaps one of the last of these “mods” was arrested in 1985 in Krasnodar, S.L. Serban, who had listened to hard rock, and considered “fascism as a hostile union of free people” as opposed to “friendly alliance of slaves,” as he called the Soviet system (Charny).

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century hate crimes have continued to be a serious problem in Russia, including instances of intimidation, threats, vandalism, arson, assault, and murder. The Interior Ministry reported that in 2008, the total number of crimes committed by foreigners rose by 29 % (MVD, 2009). Although a share of foreigners among criminals in Russia constitute only around 3.1–3.5 % (2008–2009) (Gilinsky, 2011), recent statistical analysis found that throughout the past 5 years, there was a steady increase in hate crimes, mostly related to neo-Nazi and skinhead activity. From 2000 to 2005 the number of identified and disclosed xenophobic crimes increased from 35,100 to 51,200. The number of crimes against foreign citizens for the same period increased from 7,200–13,300, or to 83.9 %. The number of crimes against foreign students: in 2001—160, in 2002—214, in 2003—311, 2004—449, 2005—437. Of the total number of foreign students studying in Russia (more than 67.3 thousand) 0.6 % have been attacked (Brod, 2006) (Table 3).

Table 3 Number of racist attacks victims according to SOVA Center (2012)

According to the U.S. State Department annual 2009 Human Rights Report the number of race-hate crimes, committed in Russia declined in 2009, but ethnic discrimination still causes concern. According to the SOVA Center (NGO), 84 people were killed and 434 wounded in racially motivated attacks in 2009, down from 109 killed and 486 wounded in 2008. The SOVA Center reported a slight rise in hate crimes in 2008 after a 13 % rise in hate crimes in 2007 (LeGendre, 2006; SOVA, 2012) (Table 4).

Table 4 Sentences for hate crimes (SOVA, 2012)

Despite hundreds and thousands of cases in 2010 there were only 63 guilty verdicts on hatred-based violent crimes, 215 people were accused, and 75 of them were conditionally sentenced or released. In 2010, there were 43 guilty verdicts for propaganda of hatred, 52 people were accused and 22 of them were conditionally sentenced or released. Ten verdicts were produced for propaganda of the extremist activity, 13 people were accused, and 9 of them were sentenced conditionally (or released). In 2009 there were 117 verdicts for hate crimes including hate crime related to murder (Article 105 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003)—17 cases; serious bodily harm resulted in death (Article 111 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003; Zyukov, 2010). Numbers of incarcerated foreigner are steadily climbing up: in 2000, there were 14,000 foreigners and 1,500 illegal immigrants, in January 2010 there were 29,000 foreigners and 3,500 illegal immigrants.

Police and courts are frequently criticized for not responding to the increase in violence, and many hate crimes were only prosecuted as incidents of hooliganism, which would carry a lighter sentence than hate crimes (Bottorff, 2010). Despite a recent decline, many hate crimes remain unsolved, including murders, assaults, bombings, arsons, and vandalism, and most instances of public hate speech, which is illegal in Russia, continues to go unpunished. A total of 12,900 racially or religiously motivated crimes were registered during 2009 (UCSJ, 2010). High-ranking federal officials have condemned anti-Semitic hate crimes, but law enforcement bodies have not always effectively prosecuted those responsible (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2011).

Some of the incidents include interethnic riots, as in the case of the rural Karelian city of Kondopoga where the local prosecutor’s office has opened 17 criminal cases on the violence that erupted after a brawl on 31 August 2006 between ethnic Chechens and Slavs. This incident led to the deaths of two ethnic Russians. Thousands took to the street, targeting businesses owned by people from the Caucasus. Chechen families were evacuated as the violence continued, and demands were made for the removal of all residents from the Caucasus. Massive hate crimes with significant rural community involvement are not isolated from any area of Russia. Prior to Kondopoga-style violence, there were riots in the Siberian village of Haragun (May 2006) when anti-Azeri unrest resulted in one death, several wounded, and 16 arrested. Local villagers demanded to expel ethnic Azeri, and their property became a target of destruction and arson. In another Siberian village of Targis (June 2006), residents initiated violence with the silent assistance of local police, clashing with Chinese migrant workers, injuring 6 of them, and deporting 75 (Yasmann, 2006). In 2004, the racist attacks on minorities were registered in 26 regions, and by 2005, they had spread to 36 regions (Rossiyskaya Federatziya, 2006). The response of the Russian criminal justice system to the problem of hate crime is simply inadequate. In particular, police and prosecutors have refused to recognize the racist nature of these attacks and killings, despite the existence of the Russian Criminal Code article that imposes criminal penalties for racial crimes. In many cases, these violent attacks were identified as hooliganism. According to Gilinsky (2008), in most cases, a hate crime would be qualified as disorderly conduct, murder, etc. For this reason, Article 105, Part 2, paragraph L of the Russian Criminal Code (murder motivated by ethnic, racial, or religious hatred or enmity or blood feud) documents only 9 cases in 2001, 10 in 2002, 11 in 2003, and 10 in 2004, whereas the media and criminal justice literature describe hundreds of hate crimes committed in the country each year (Gilinsky). The failure of law enforcement to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish crimes motivated by racial hatred strengthens the extreme manifestations of xenophobia, Nazism, and neo-Fascism in Russia (Sergevnin, 2011).

A considerable gap in the count of extremist groups can be found between information from NGOs and the media and official numbers. According to one of the information agencies there were 453 extremist groups with 10,000 members (in 2004) and around 302 extremist groups with 11,000 members (in 2008) in Russia (SOVA, 2012). The Federal List of Hate Organizations now includes only 28 organizations (not including a separate 19 groups considered terrorist) whose activities have been prohibited in a court of law, and whose continued actions are punishable under Article 282-2 of The Criminal Code of the Russian federation (2003)—organization of an extremist organization. As of February 2010, there were up to 70,000 skinhead and radical nationalist organizations operating in the country. There are over 150 radical neo-Nazi groups registered in Russia. This was announced by Sergey Girko, the head of the Russian institute for scientific research under the Russian Interior Ministry. The Interior Ministry anti-extremism department admitted that the number of skinhead groups and crimes, committed on the basis of ethnic, race or religious hatred is increasing every year (There are over 150 radical neo-Nazi groups in Russia, 2010). Skinhead groups have been identified by Russian police in 85 major cities of the country. Today skinhead membership is growing steadily: 2002—40,000; 2005—50,000; 2006—60,000; 2008—70,000; 2011—150,000 members nationwide (Zyukov, 2010). Currently there are over 500 internet sites that encourage incitement to ethnic hatred. These sites posted specific information on the preparation and perpetration of crimes motivated by ethnic and sectarian strife. Websites describe in detail not only how to make explosives, but also methods of bombing. Police are concerned that existing legislation provides virtually no criminal responsibility for the financing of extremist manifestations, and no effective mechanisms to deal with extremism on the Internet (Sergevnin, 2011).

Current Russian legislation provides criminal liability for acts connected with the commission of violent crimes motivated by political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, or motivated by hatred or hostility toward a particular social or ethnic group. Such crimes are recognized by Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as an aggravating circumstance. Such circumstances include membership in any associations or groups (53 % convicted of extremist crimes were members of informal groups), which should indicate the stability of certain personal prejudices, distinguishing them from “situational,” “spontaneous” decision (Kuzmina, 2010).

The Russian Criminal Code, adopted in 1996 and amended in 2003 (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003: Article 63), provides a legal framework for the prosecution of hate crimes, with a general provision for enhanced penalties when crimes are committed with a motive of national, racial, religious hate, or enmity… The article punishing incitement extends further, to bias founded upon “sex, race, nationality, language, origin, and relationship to religion as well as the affiliation to any social group” (LeGendre, 2006).

The trafficking and smuggling of human beings is also a problem for Russia; women are trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation and slavery. Men are trafficked internally and from central Asia for forced labor in the construction and agricultural industries (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). The Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed 118 human trafficking investigations and 62 prosecutions for trafficking in 2010 (compared with 99 prosecutions in 2009). At least 15 investigations involved slave labor. Police indicated that prosecutions in 2010 reportedly involved larger and more transnational trafficking rings. Russian courts convicted 42 trafficking offenders and issued 31 sentences in 2010, a decrease from 76 trafficking offenders convicted in 2009. Sentences for the reported trafficking convictions ranged from several months to 12 years’ imprisonment (U.S. Department of State, 2011).

Theft is currently the most prevalent crime in Russia and counted for between 40 and 50 % of all crimes. Robbery increased nearly 50 % from 1992 (30,400) to 2007 (45,300), and theft increased nearly 15 % from 1992 (1,368,000) to 2007 (1,567,000), to 1,038,600 in 2011 (Federal State Statistic Service, 2012). In 2009, almost every third theft (32.1 %) involved illegal entry into homes, premises, or other dwellings (MVD, 2009). Most of the theft targets are valued at less than 1,000 rubles (56.9 %) or approximately $30 (US) (Criminologicheskaya […], 2005).

Another unique trend in rural crime is the spread and increase of poaching and the illegal use of bio resources in general. Despite the overall decline in the production of bio resources by state and legitimate private companies, the number of detected crimes in the fishing industry from 1996 to 2003 increased 4.2 times. In one of the rural states (Astrakhan oblast), the number of registered illegal fishing crimes grew from 188 in 1985 to 2,263 in 2002. One survey of this region discovered that 53 % of the rural population engaged in poaching (Goncharova, 2003). Annual losses from illegal fishing and uncontrolled exports of aquatic resources to foreign countries are estimated at billions of dollars. In 2006, law enforcement agencies registered more than 12,000 crimes with a total loss of about five billion rubles (approximately 166 million dollars). The Russian Ministry of Economic Development estimates that the average annual profit from the smuggling of fish and other biological resources overseas is up to seven billion dollars. Due to the high profitability of such crimes, they have a tendency to transform individual poachers into highly equipped organized criminal enterprises with corrupt ties to governmental and law enforcement agencies (Sergevnin, 2011).

According to the General Prosecutor’s office, organized crime in Russia for the last couple of decades became not only evident, but a threat to national security. Concerned legislators have made some additions to law and have criminalized certain organized criminal activities: Article 241 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has been modified by federal law (162-FZ from 8 December 2003) and now includes “organized prostitution” provisions; Article 322.1 has been modified by federal law (187-FZ from 28 December 2004) to include a provision on organized illegal migration, etc. (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003). Because of economic chaos and organized criminal groups activities during 1993–1999, registered economic crimes almost tripled, growing from 110,000 to 303,822 incidents (Gurov, 2000: 63). By the year 2001, there were already 382,400 registered economic crimes. The majority of those (50.7 %) were crimes against property, 47.0 % of which was illegal appropriation and misallocation of funds (Kidanov, 2002). The scale and risk of organized crime has been recognized by the Russian Government. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov indicated in 2003 that 40 % of the consumer goods industry refers to the shadow economy (Skoblikov, 2007).

While in the past few years the number of registered economic crimes has decreased (partly due to decriminalization and abandonment in 2003 of Article 200, “Consumer Fraud,” of the Criminal Code), law enforcement is convinced that this is not a result of their success but simply of corruption cases going unrecorded. Often, corruption networks coordinate the activity of the organized criminal groups or even merge with them (Cheloukhine & King, 2007). Organized criminal groups are infiltrating all segments of the society including state and political (Kulikov, 2008).

According to the Ministry of Interior (MVD) in 1996, there were 3,000 individually operating criminal groups in Russia, 70 of them were formed ethnically and 365 were organized inter-regionally, with the remainder organized on a regional level. The total number of members in the Russian criminal world was about 600,000, which does not include about 40 % of entrepreneurs and nearly 70 % of commercial structures, which were also involved in criminal activity. Ten years later in 2007, according to the MVD Department for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, there were only 450 groups and in 2010—around 249 organized criminal groups with 11,622 members (Kuznetsova, 2007). These numbers include only those involved in violent crime, drugs, and human trafficking. The same source indicates that the number of semi-legal operating organized crime groups, which provide “roofs” or protection services to businesses, is about 10,000, with 300,000 rank and file members. Some these individuals are employed as security officers protecting business and financial operations owned by organized crime and illegal economic leaders. Currently, the size of the shadow economy operations in Russia is about 20–25 % of the GDP. In 2011 the number of identified offenders as part of an organized group or criminal community (criminal organization), was 5,200, which is 18.6 % lower than the previous 2010 year (Federal State Statistic Service, 2011).

Police Training and Police Educational Systems

To be a police officer in Russia an individual should be no younger than 18 and no older than 35 years (40 years old to be an employee of the MVD), regardless of nationality, gender, social origin, property and official status, religion, convictions, membership of public associations, personal and moral qualities, education and health to carry out official duties. Although to enter police educational institutions, one can be younger than 18 years but must possess a high school diploma.

Police candidates undergo physiological and psychological tests, testing for alcohol, drug, and other toxic substances. The degree of fitness for service on health is determined by the military-medical commission. A unique feature of recruitment and selection is the requirement of a personal guarantee, which consists in writing the obligation of the employee of the Interior, having a length of service for at least 3 years that he vouches for compliance specified by Russian national restrictions and prohibitions established for employees. A personal guarantee is a written positive letter of recommendation by the guarantor. The guarantor may be a police officer, who has worked in the police department at least 3 years, with no current disciplinary actions and who is not a relative of the candidate. All candidates are hired as a trainee (intern) in the police department for a period of 3–6 months.

Basic police training is provided by training centers located usually in the capitol of each subject of the Russian Federation and established by the department of Internal Affairs. Duration of training is from three to four and a half months. Basic training is required of all individuals who are hired to serve in rank and file positions. Individuals who are accepted to serve as senior officers can be trained through independent study and internships, followed by in-service training or retraining. Length, structure, and content of special training for each job category of employees is determined by the relevant curriculum and training programs developed by educational institutions of the Russian Interior Ministry training centers. Educational programs of special training are coordinated with the police departments and agencies concerning the directions of the operational activity.

This system of police training and education experienced very few changes since the demise of the Soviet Union and suffers from lack of specialized training and education and outdated teaching methods. Entrance tests to police institutions of higher education and specialized secondary education (2 year college) are not job related and do not allow for the selection of individuals best fit to serve. As a rule recruits have to pass exams on the Russian language, social studies, history, mathematics (for some specialties), and physical fitness. Prior to these exams they will pass a criminal background check, medical and psychological testing. It is a disadvantage for police departments that their representatives do not participate in selection of recruits and cannot make sure that prospects are fit for duty. Curriculum for police higher education and specialized secondary education (basic college) institutions is not focused on police skills development and is dominated by humanitarian segments of study such as philosophy, history, political science, economics and finance, education and cultural studies. The majority of these institutions will provide graduates with a law degree. There are 28 police educational institutions with associate, bachelor, master and doctorate programs, including 22 institutions of higher education (3 universities and 4 academies, 15 institutes), with over 100,000 students and trainees annually. All schools are licensed by the Russian Interior Ministry to conduct educational activities and have state accreditation. Annual admission to all police institutions of higher education is about 27,000 students and trainees, who upon graduation are distributed to the units of internal affairs in accordance with the given professions and specializations (Kuzmin, 2008). Special training in educational institutions for the Russian Interior Ministry, training centers is carried out in full-time and distance learning forms. In February 2012 the Ministry of Interior developed a new format for a contract with police officers which requires the employer to train and provide the employee with everything he needs on the job.

Changes in Policing in the Last 20 Years

Political actors in the 1990s quickly realized that the MVD, which was designed by Communists, is more than a law enforcement agency and that it needed restructuring along with the separation of power lines. Throughout the 1990s, the Russian militia functioned in an environment of unclear and conflicting laws (including constantly changing Criminal and Administrative Codes) and protocols, limited funding and equipment, a dysfunctional justice system, and a lack of community support. Following the adoption of the Criminal Code in 1996 (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003), legislators in more than a 100 federal laws made over 3,000 changes and additions to it. In only a few days in December 2011 of the last session of the State Duma adopted 512 amendments to the Criminal Code (Luneev, 2011). In some states, Russian Federation officers have not received paychecks for months; patrol cars are allotted only a couple of gallons of gas per shift; and officers were assigned for lengthy posts in the area of ethnic conflicts mainly in Southern Russia. High turnover was triggered by militia personnel resigning to take better-paying jobs in the booming industry of private security. The remaining members of the militia have limited skills and experience. Legal violations, brutality, torture, racism, corruption, lack of accountability, and unprofessional behavior have damaged the police force’s public credibility.

Because there has been an accumulation of “non-law enforcement functions” and establishing new militia bureaucracies for performing tasks that are distant from the police mission, additional efforts to reform and decentralize were initiated with the separation of the correctional institutions in 1998 and of the firefighter’s service in 2001 from the MVD. Also, law enforcement officers were released from the noncore functions, conducting technical inspections of vehicles, addressing issues of exclusion of illegal migrants from Russia, and monitoring the sobering-up stations. At the same time in the 1990s and 2000s, the Russian Federation witnessed a proliferation of private security forces and the outsourcing of government services related to law and order. Some modest attempts were made to focus local and state law enforcement agencies on operational duties requiring police powers, experience, and specialized training (Sergevnin, 2010b).

Due to major scandals such as mass shootings of civilians by a drunken precinct police chief in Moscow (2009) and multiple cases of brutality and corruption, the new wave of MVD reforms was declared in December 2009, proposing major transformations of the agency. Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev indicated that the law “On Militia” (adopted in 1991) had been outdated and impeded the work. In April 2010, the Ministry proposed to revise some 40 functions that are currently performed by police; in particular, functions to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, which also are overlapped by the Federal Security Service and the Federal Service for Drug Control. To reduce agency attention to the activities of business entities, the police should interfere in the companies’ activities only when there are signs of a crime. The most problematic issue in all the attempts to reform the militia was that all the attempts were from inside of the highly centralized and bureaucratic institution.

The draft bill, “On Police,” was released in August 2010 and was discussed online. According to the pollsters, more than three quarters of the Russian people are to some extent were familiar with the bill. In January 2011, the bill had replaced a 1991 law, “On Militia.”

The law has 11 chapters and 56 articles and builds around declarations of constitutional norms and international principles. Vagueness of many norms of the bill on police is a prerequisite for the subsequent manipulation of the law by the adoption of internal protocols and procedures and establishing regulations on how to apply all of them. Incorporated changes was designed to enhance the federal nature of the police by almost exclusively providing federal funding and eliminating any financial responsibilities in the local and regional budgets. Along with providing funding, the federal center will be appointing all senior police officers in the regions. Before the reform local governments were participating by approving the federal center’s proposed candidates. This was designed to reduce the corruptive influences of the local authorities on law enforcement agencies but also to elevate the independence of local police from the community’s regional administrators and residents (Apparatchik, 2010).

In the general provisions of the bill, the critical organizational principles of the police were not outlined such as the main structural units of the police agency and their main functions, and the basic procedure to appoint and dismiss the federal executives and heads of territorial agencies. Thus, it gives an opportunity for the MVD to generate departmental rulings and protocols outside of the law and to provide a strong basis for manipulating the system (Sergevnin, 2010b).

The principles of police work have not been changed fundamentally in comparison with “On Militia” (1991). However, there are some important provisions such as the required publication of annual reports by the heads of territorial bodies of the police and the release of annual reports to communities by district inspectors. At the same time, no mechanism was proposed to allow the public to influence those law enforcement leaders with unsatisfactory records. Creating a single call center (calls from any point of Russia would be free) is another technical recommendation (Zhigulina, 2010).

The rights and responsibilities of police were enhanced with several additional powers, including the rights to access bank data of any individual without a court order; to compel any person to leave a certain place or remove that person by force if the behavior of this person suggests that he or she may cause harm to life and health, damage property or facilities, or is a real threat to public order and the security of citizens; and to restrict freedom of movement of citizens on the street or other public place for 1 h with the intention to check identity papers without probable cause, to name a few. Some of these rights are in clear contradiction with the Constitution (Kedrova, 2010).

The use of force and measures of coercion exclude the right of an officer to deliver blows to the head, neck, collarbone area, abdomen, or to the genitals. However, the bill has extended the rights of police to produce a shot to defeat the attacker if the person is trying to get something out of his or her clothing without the command of a police officer or to perform other actions that may be considered by a police officer as a threat of violence or an attempt to seize a weapon. Another controversial provision is the requirement to obtain a sponsor (individual pledge or personal guarantee from a current officer) to be hired into a law enforcement agency. With the extraordinary level of corruption in existence, this proposal will not allow people to enter the force on the basis of merit and standards.

The changes give no new face (paradigm) to police and are a desperate attempt to accomplish the reform in isolation from other segments of the criminal justice system. Proposed facelifts could not be profound due to the bureaucratic conservatism of courts, prosecutors, and corrections. There is no clear concept of reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose structure survived more than 200 years (since 1802) and the delinquent intrusions of tsars, commissars, and self-proclaimed democrats (Sergevnin, 2010b).

In 2012, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is introducing new ID cards for the police. These will include the police officer’s rank, surname, first name and the title of the employee. In addition, the police officers who work on the street and are in contact with the citizens will wear on their chest badges with a photograph. In particular, these rules apply to staff patrol and district inspectors (Falaleev, 2012).

The police have the grounds to be frustrated due to infectiveness of courts manifesting exceptional “humanism” to violent criminals such as rapists and murderers. In the period 2004–2009 in Russia, life sentences for murder were used only for 0.2–0.5 % of those convicted of a crime. A maximum term of imprisonment was applied to only 3.2–4.6 % of all murderers. Most of them received light terms and with parole were released from prison after 3–4 years. During the same period from all of 234.4 thousand convicted for causing grievous bodily harm (including death) the maximum term of imprisonment was applied only to two individuals (Ovchinsky, 2011).

Current Trends in Policing

Serious political challenges of the postelection period in 2012 for President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, initiated strong efforts to bring the power-structures under federal control. Formally centralized structure of Interior Ministry was surprisingly decentralized and experienced significant influence from local authorities.

One of the major negative factors that prevented the progressive changes in Russian police is corruption. Corruption in Russia has penetrated each and every political, economic, judicial, and social institution so thoroughly that it has ceased to be a deviation from the norm and has become the norm itself (Cheloukhine & Haberfeld, 2011). In his annual address to the Federal Assembly, Russian former President Dmitry Medvedev noted that the only violation of the law on public procurement costs and “kickbacks” to the most conservative estimate is one trillion rubles per year (Medvedev, 2010b). One of the leading Russian sociologists specializing in corruption, estimated that the value of bribes paid annually by Russians rose from 33 billion dollars when Putin came to power (1999), to more than 400 billion dollars at the end of his presidency in 2008 (Freeland, 2011). The anticorruption watchdog group Transparency International estimates that a third of Russian businesses have been targeted by police in attempted corporate raids. An anti-raider hotline set up by Moscow’s City Hall has reported a tenfold jump in complaints, from 200 to more than 2,000 over the last half of 2009 (Matthews & Nemtsova, 2010).

Some experts indicating deepening dependence on corruptive activities by Russian police fueled by (a) alcoholism, requiring significant resources and pushing to unofficial relations with other police officers, retail nets, and producers of alcoholic substitutes; (b) regular need to provide informal services (meals, hotel, etc.) for the members inspection teams, other inspectors, as well as managers and colleagues on the occasion of their anniversaries, “washing ranks,” awards, retirement, push many officers to negotiate with the owners of restaurants, grocery stores, etc; (c) maintaining informal, sometimes friendly relations with representatives of the criminal underworld, accepting services and valuables from them; (d) entering in personal and business relations with suspects, defendants, witnesses, victims, experts, lawyers, etc (Sopneva, 2009).

According to the MVD Department of Internal Affairs Chief Draguntsov, in 2009 there were identified about 104,000 offenses committed by officers of the interior (17 % increase). The Central Register (State Information Analytical Center of the MVD) identified about 60,000 police employees (18 % increase), including—56,000 for disciplinary misconduct (18 % increase). Against 4,202 employees criminal investigations were initiated (up 11 % more than in 2008) and 2,717 employees (up 9 %) were indicted in criminal court. The analysis shows that the facts of illegal activities of officials of the Ministry of Interior and the FMS of Russia are often related to corruption: abuse of powers (Article 286 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003), abuse of power (285 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003), bribery (st. 290, 291 of The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003), and forgery (292 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 2003; Draguntsov, 2011).

Private policing (security) in Russia was first legitimized upon the enactment of such legislation as the 1992 “Law on Private Protection and Detective Activity in the Russian Federation.” Currently private security companies in Russia provide such services as safety, protection, and emergency services, executive protection, and business security. Recently Russia’s Parliament passed a bill specifying the rights and obligations of private security firms operating in the country. Private security guards are approved to use force, so long as they do not breach a citizen’s constitutional rights. They are also responsible for reporting criminal and suspicious activity to the local law enforcement agencies. The most significant feature of the private security industry in Russia, in comparison with some former Soviet bloc countries, is that private security companies are allowed to possess firearms. In early 1993 in Russia there were over 100,000 private security personnel; in 1999 there were 11,000 security companies, with 165,000 licensed security guards; in 2005 there were 22,000 security companies with 581.8 thousand; in 2009 there were 29,000 security companies with 762,000 employees and in 2010 the number of guards had reduced to 745,000 guards (Scherban, 2012). This private pole force is comparable to public policing today.

There is increasing cooperation between the public and private security sectors in Russia, evidenced once recently by the MVD’s support of the Transport Ministry’s proposal to give private security firms the right to check passengers at railway terminals. Russian government proposed in 2012 legislative amendments that would largely outsource counter-terror efforts at airports and train stations to private security firms.

Summarizing the last 20 years of Russian police development we can see that it is entering a new era of reforming. Russian police is a relic of the Soviet past with strong political and personal loyalty to protect and serve the current power elite; extreme centralization with bureaucratic inefficiency and denial of promoting human rights and security; predatory practices, corruption, and brutality; lack of transparency and unnecessary secrecy to mention a few (Table 5).

Table 5 Russian police in transition from political to reform era

The new generation of police reformers believe in importance of institutional independence from local power brokers and the concentration of management vertical in the federal center. What is not yet in the agenda of the reformers is to establish an agency independent from the federal elites. Also unprecedented need for higher moral and professional standards should be in their focus for next several decades.

Police, the Media and Public Opinion on Police

Russian police were able to use the secretive atmosphere of the Soviet style system way into new regime to hide its weaknesses and inefficiency. Most of the law enforcement data is still for official use only and not available to public.

In the last decade, Russia is actively working to humanize and promote transparency of the police. Recently there media coverage of police work on TV has been increased. Russian leading channels had launched several popular programs such as “Petrovka 38,” “Duty” and other news programs. For more than 10 years radio station “Militia Wave” became a true window for the public. The Ministry of Interior was the first among law enforcement agencies to open the official site called “Public Reception” for the citizens, which in 2011 had received over 10,000 complaints concerning: criminal acts (5,700), the traffic police (about 3,000), violation of the law by police officers (more than 3,500). Over the past 3 years the Ministry of Interior has inspected (audited) 27 regional and branch offices on how they work with citizens. General Prosecutor’s office and representatives of the Russian presidential administration also have been involved in police inspections.

The Russian Interior Ministry is actively working with the Public Council, composed of representatives of public, nongovernmental organizations, prominent public and cultural figures. Board members participate in the discussion of fundamental issues of reform and development of the police, the reduction of criminal repression, isolation, with the development of alternatives to it, the introduction of elements of restorative justice, based on the maximum protection of the interests of victims of crime, humanization of prison, reintegration into society of ex-convicts, etc. After the demise of the Soviet Union the law enforcement system did not go through many changes unlike many other institutions and structures of the state. It is widely accepted that Russian police is inefficient, outdated, corrupt, and lacking basic systems of accountability at every level. In one of the surveys (2002) for question “If You Encountered a Threat to Your Property or of Physical Violence, Whose Protection Would Be the Most Reliable?” only 29 % of respondents answered that it will be police, 28 %—friends and relatives, 10 %—criminal authorities (Kliamkin & Timofeev, 2002).

Public Opinion

According to a series of surveys by the Levada Center, conducted in 2004–2012 only 25–30 % of Russians in trust the police, but more than 80 % of the respondents indicated its lawlessness, over 70 % do not consider themselves protected from the police arbitrariness, 60 % believe that the law enforcement system has deteriorated (Gimpelson & Monusova, 2012). According to public opinion surveys, the Russian people are skeptical about the outcomes of well promoted police reform. The Levada Center (2012) public opinion survey indicated that 72 % of respondents gave a negative answer to the question “Do you think it has a positive effect over the last year police reform (transformation of the militsiya to the police)?” 43 % answered “probably not,” 29 %—“definitely not”; 18 % were satisfied with the reform and 10 % do not know anything about it or could not answer. Also, 72 % of respondents believe that over the past year and a half, police did not work any better or worse. Earlier survey indicated that 29 % of respondents were confident that people should not trust the militsiya to reform itself because there were no social control mechanisms in place (Levada Center, 2010). According to the research center of recruitment portal, Superjob.ru, 57 % of Russians did not support the renaming of the militia to “police.” They did not believe that the name change would solve existing problems. Only 22 % of respondents believed that the renaming of the militia reflected an intent to transition from the Soviet system to a modern one (Ryshkina, 2010).

According to the poll, published in February 2010, 67 % of Russians say they “fear” police, while 81 % say they do not feel safe against arbitrary police behavior and 52 % indicated that police have extorted bribes (Levada Center, 2010). Public opinion surveys indicate that the Russian militia is practicing predatory policing which can be viewed as focusing a significant amount of officers’ efforts on self-enrichment. In 2005, a public survey demonstrated that 31 % of respondents believed that greedy people are hired by the militia; 11 % of respondents felt that the police is hiring the unemployed (Public Opinion Fund, 2009). Recently the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) published the results of a study in which more than 40,000 citizens in 83 regions were surveyed. It was found that the level of confidence in the police to ensure personal and property security has increased from 33 % in 2009 to 52 % in 2011 (Bulavin, 2012). Significant numbers of militia officers do not see their job as a service for the people but, rather, as an opportunity to boost their income. The speedy drift of Russian society to a market economy in the past two decades and the moral vacuum in law enforcement agencies could not prevent the infiltration of pathological materialism ideology among all the ranks.

The public sees police corruption as one of the most negative features of modern day Russian state. In some of the regions, the situation is so bad that public can observe various groups of vigilantes fight back to corrupt law enforcement officials. In 2010, Primorye (Far East state in Russian Federation) regional police received an anonymous manifesto that declared the launch of a retaliation campaign against law enforcement. The statement said the gang was seeking to end the lawlessness, corruption, and tyranny of local police officers, prosecutors, and judges. The authors of the letter pronounced themselves “defenders of Russia” who “have come up against the evil that has enslaved our country and brought the Russian nation to its knees.” Moscow also saw a series of attacks against the police, when unknown attackers set fire to several police stations in various districts of the Russian capital. Videos of the attacks were distributed on the Internet, accompanied by a commentary saying that the torching was meant as retaliation for police corruption (Stolyarova, 2010). In 2009, there were 2,470 publications in media across the country materials dealing with the IA units (54 % increase) (Draguntsov, 2011).

Recent Trends in Research on Policing

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the focus of the majority of researchers switched to the major challenges the nation continues to face in transforming the police from brutal servants of the former Soviet State to servants of the public. Research efforts have been moved to the most critical and vulnerable issues of contemporary law enforcement.

The Russian Federation progressed significantly in political and economic reform before the beginning of the twenty-first century but the criminal justice system remains as it was under the Communist regime centralized, politicized, and militarized police forces. Russia had made little progress in democratizing police relations with the public despite numerous speeches by officials, presidential edicts, and changes to the law “On Police.” But all of it made little difference and police reputation continues to be one of a force that routinely violates human rights, is involved in corruption, and acts primarily in the pursuit of their own interests (Beck & Robertson, 2009; Shelley, 1999).

There is a recent trend in analyzing the Russian police as a predatory policing model for the search of effective methods to reform police organization. Gerber and Mendelson (2008) view three different possible paradigms of police organization. The first, professional police aim to achieve public safety and security (Western Europe, US). The second, police of divided society, mainly operate for the benefit of powerful elite groups. The third, predatory police are indifferent toward public interest or elite groups but mainly focus on extracting money from the market (Gerber & Mendelson).

Ethical norms are the foundation of law enforcement. However, ethical training is not a priority for researchers in Russia. Another recent dimension of research of policing in Russia is the analysis of the structure and mechanism of the informal economic activities of the policemen by Wilson, Kolennikova, Kosals, Ryvkina, and Simagin (2008). This study analyzed the “economic” activities’ of Russian police officers and identifying three categories of police behavior related to economic gain outside their regular wages: (a) consisted of activities that were considered to be police misconduct, only because the actor was a police officer because economic activities by police officers are not permitted by the Law of the Police; (b) police engaged in economic activities during their regular work; (c) involvement in activities which are both an abuse of police powers and material gain.

One of the critical issues of the modern Russian police is the use of force, brutality, and torture. There is almost no research existing on the topic. In the absence of data and reliable research or official government reports, torture has been poorly understood and its extent largely unknown. Professor Yakov Gilinsky reports on surveys conducted by the nongovernmental organizations in five regions of Russia: St. Petersburg and Pskov (North-West of Russian Federation), Nizhny Novgorod (Central Region), Chita (Siberia), and Komi Republic (North of Russia). A survey of citizens found that an average 58 % believed innocent people are tortured by police, and 4 % of respondents reported experiencing torture at the hands of the police (Gilinsky, 2011).

Racism and racial profiling by the Russian police became a new segment of current research. Russian police are practicing limiting the rights of migrants and aggressively harassing them in all the municipalities. It can be result of the state policy to put pressure on legal and illegal immigrants and intricate relationship between the police and the contemporary Russian state (Light, 2010).

The Russian police are heavily involved with counterterrorism activities and counterinsurgency operations especially in Caucasus region which changes the modus operandi and attitudes of many officers toward certain ethnic groups. There was not enough research on the impact of such rotations for law enforcement personnel (Kramer, 2005).

Future Developments in Policing

In conclusion, the period of socioeconomic and political transformation associated with the weakening state’s power facilitated increases in crime, qualitative changes associated with the transition to a new political system, chaotic economic management, and acute social problems. The overwhelming evidence demonstrates that in Russia, the transformation from a totalitarian society to the initial phase of democracy with limited market mechanisms had a severe criminal impact on the nation. The disadvantaged segments of the population are suffering disproportionally from crime and a lack of personal safety, and long-term crime prevention initiatives have yet to be successful. The police force, especially in the transitional phase of Russia and most of the former Eastern Bloc countries, is the most controversial expression of the power of the state. The change is coming from the top of the power structure, and it will serve the interests of the current administration which understands that the corrupt police and criminal justice system are the major obstacles in democratizing society and moving to a transparent market economy.

Local police agencies in Russia (especially in rural areas) have very limited budgets, therefore they are forced to be selective in enforcing the law and the quality of these services is low. One approach that can be effective is consolidation of police services and reduction of enormous law enforcement bureaucracies.

There is an urgent need to establish new criteria for evaluation of police efficacy because Russian police are still using statistical indicators. The efficacy of the police may be measured in a number of ways. Crime control, orderly streets, public support, new technologies, and enhanced skills and tools are a few, and they should reflect major concerns from the citizens.

New emerging crimes in Russia such as cybercrime, biocrime, counterfeiting drugs and goods, sexual exploitation of children and females are highly technological and require a new cadre of professionals and training programs for the police. It would not be an overestimation to predict it to be a necessity to establish web patrol units in all the state jurisdictions of Russia.

As in many other countries, Russian police for the last two decades demonstrated that even enormous and highly centralized systems of resources and personnel could not effectively control crime, and clearly require public support and involvement. Old Soviet style partnerships (voluntary guards, etc.) on a new level of management and training can be the future of national policing strategies.

Drastic and profound changes in demographic dynamics (a reduction of Russians and an increase of both legal and illegal immigration) require crucial attention to racism and racial profiling issues in Russian policing. Ethnic bilingual minorities’ recruitment, diversity and multicultural law enforcement training, and hate crime control (to name a few) are areas that need urgent attention by Russian police policy makers.