Self-regulation as a Tool for Promoting Healthier Children’s Diets: Can CARU and the CFBAI Do More?

Abstract

Food and beverage marketing is but one component in a multifaceted solution to the childhood obesity crisis. It is an important factor, however, and has been under intense scrutiny in recent years. This is an area that poses significant regulatory challenges arising from our legal, political, and cultural frameworks, which protect some advertising as a form of speech and allow companies considerable latitude to produce and sell products. The potentials of industry self-regulation are thus of great interest, with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) urging manufacturers to draw on their “tremendous marketing power and creative know-how” to encourage children to consume nutritious foods (Vladeck, 2011). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has also recommended that industry, together with government, scientific, public health, and consumer groups, “establish and enforce the highest standards” for marketing products to children and youth (McGinnis, Gootman, & Kraak, 2006, p. 12).

This research was funded by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Healthy Eating Research Program.

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Introduction

Food and beverage marketing is but one component in a multifaceted solution to the childhood obesity crisis.¹ It is an important factor, however, and has been under intense scrutiny in recent years. This is an area that poses significant regulatory challenges arising from our legal, political, and cultural frameworks, which protect some advertising as a form of speech and allow companies considerable latitude to produce and sell products. The potentials of industry self-regulation are thus of great interest, with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) urging manufacturers to draw on their “tremendous marketing power and creative know-how” to encourage children to consume nutritious foods (Vladeck, 2011). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has also recommended that industry, together with government, scientific, public health, and consumer groups, “establish and enforce the highest standards” for marketing products to children and youth (McGinnis, Gootman, & Kraak, 2006, p. 12).

In this chapter, we examine the structure and function of the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU) and the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI)—the two primary self-regulatory programs that impact ­children’s food marketing practices in the USA. It has been well-established that self-­regulation can enjoy some benefits over government regulation (see e.g., Sharma, Teret, & Brownell, 2010). For example, neither CARU nor the CFBAI is constrained by First Amendment concerns. Well-designed self-regulatory programs can also “conserve government resources and [be] less adversarial, more flexible, and timelier” (Sharma et al., p. 242). Such programs also face challenges however—as Boddewyn (1989) has noted, “self-regulatory bodies do have to work from the inside rather than sit in judgment” of their members (p. 24). Nonetheless, the reality is that US sociopolitical dynamics have not been conducive to government regulation in this area (see, e.g., Montopoli, 2011; Washington Post, 1978). Thus, the effectiveness of these self-regulatory programs in improving children’s diets has significant public health implications.

Although much has been written about CARU and the CFBAI, little attention has focused on the interplay between them. Although they are structured differently (CARU functions like an administrative agency, with a set of standards (“Guidelines”) that it enforces according to procedural rules (“Procedures”), and the CFBAI is a pledge program), they share several important characteristics. Both are industry-created programs established by the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) and the National Advertising Review Council (NARC).² They both focus on marketing practices targeted at young children (under age 12), and address specific nutritional concerns about food marketing, albeit to different degrees. They also delineate the set of marketing practices to which their programs will apply.

To understand how these programs complement one another, we first need to understand how they operate individually. We studied how CARU’s case process works, and its capacity for addressing food marketing practices. This is significant because if the CFBAI participants’ contractual commitments expire or the program is disbanded, CARU would remain in place. For the CFBAI, our goal was to assess the quality of the pledge firms’ marketing commitments.³ In particular, we were interested in learning how the capacity for children’s continuing exposure to advertising and marketing is affected by CFBAI provisions. We also looked to other model food marketing standards for underlying principles from which the programs might effectively draw.

As we studied the two programs, we noted areas of convergence as well as discrepancies in their functioning, and became interested in understanding more about the ways these two programs can reinforce or undermine each other. We believe that looking at how these programs work in tandem—or fail to do so—provides a fuller understanding of the efficacy of self-regulatory efforts and reveals practical ­suggestions for how to strengthen them.

Research Method

Multiple methods were used to examine the origins, evolution, and performance of the two programs. Our dataset drew on a number of secondary sources including: (1) CARU’s Guidelines from 1975, 1991, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009; (2) CARU Activity Reports (published in the NAD/CARU Case Reports)⁴; (3) CARU food-related case decisions (1975–2011); (4) CFBAI pledge documents (from inception through the summer of 2011); (5) CBBB compliance reports (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011a); (6) international pledge program documents; (7) model food marketing codes [e.g., World Health Organization (WHO, 2010), Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI, 2005), International Obesity Task Force (International Obesity Task Force [IOTF] and Consumers International, 2008)]; and (8) brand portfolios of CFBAI participants, obtained from company websites.

CARU’s case decisions for all food products and companies were analyzed from 1975 (when the first identifiable CARU case was issued) through June 2011. Throughout its existence, CARU has issued two types of cases, formal and informal. Formal cases are available through NARC’s online database (http://www.narcpartners.org), NAD/CARU Case Reports, and a NARC CD-ROM (through 1998).⁵ The formal cases were analyzed using a modified court opinion analysis method known as “case briefing” (see, e.g., Schmedemann & Kunz, 2007). Information from the cases was categorized and then synthesized to determine how CARU interprets and applies its guidelines, as well as to assess trends over time.⁶

A content analysis of the CFBAI documents was also conducted. Each participant’s marketing commitment was compared to commitments made in international pledge programs and to other model food marketing codes. The marketing activities covered (and excluded) by the CFBAI were also examined. Part of this analysis focused on the brand portfolios offered by the participating firms. These analyses were supplemented by a review of external compliance reports (e.g., Center for Science in the Public Interest [CSPI], 2009, 2010; Harris et al., 2009; Harris, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2010a).

Historical Overview: The Self-regulation of Children’s Food Advertising

The potential for a more coordinated interplay between CARU and the CFBAI becomes clearer when their mutual origins and evolutionary paths are traced. The historical roots and trajectories of the two programs are quite different, yet there are underlying commonalities. Both programs were established at points in time when the impacts of food marketing on children’s health were under scrutiny, and government entities were showing interest in acting to address concerns raised by advocates and public health officials. The two programs’ close ties are evidenced by the fact that the CFBAI’s launch was announced in a CBBB (2006) press release that also described significant revisions to CARU’s Guidelines.

In the Beginning—CARU

CARU’s mission is to “promote responsible children’s advertising,” and to set “high standards” that “take into account the special vulnerabilities of children” (CARU, 2009, p. 3). Concerns about deceptive or unfair advertising to children played a key role in CARU’s creation. During the 1970s, consumer advocacy groups filed multiple petitions asking the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the FTC to restrict advertising to children, and food advertising in particular (FTC, 1981). The FTC held hearings (see, e.g., Howard & Hulbert, 1973), proposed a prohibition on the use of premiums and related marketing practices,⁷ and brought cases related to child-targeted marketing.⁸

It was in this context that the NARC created the National Advertising Division (NAD)⁹ in 1972 and CARU 2 years later. Broad consumer protection concerns were expressed in the Guidelines’ initial version, which were developed “to help ensure that advertising directed to children is truthful, accurate, and fair to children’s perceptions” (Children’s Review Unit, 1975, p. 1). Concern about food marketing and its impact on children’s health was also a key factor in CARU’s formation. The early Guidelines included food-related provisions that are much the same as those currently in use (Children’s Review Unit, 1975).

The decade of heightened focus on child-targeted marketing in the 1970s ­culminated with the FTC’s attempted rulemaking now known as “Kid Vid.” The specific impetuses for Kid Vid were petitions filed by consumer advocacy groups focused primarily on the advertising of sugary food products aimed at children and associated concerns about dental caries. In response, the FTC opened a rulemaking to consider whether it should promulgate regulations that would: (1) ban all TV advertising targeted at young children (i.e., under 8 years); (2) ban TV advertising of sugared foods directed to older children (ages 8–12); or (3) require that TV advertising of sugared food products directed to older children also include advertiser-funded nutritional or health disclosures (FTC, 1978). Three years later, criticism of the Kid Vid proceeding, combined with opposition to FTC efforts to address fraud in other industries, led to the passage of the FTC Improvements Act of 1980¹⁰ (Pridgen, 2011). This law suspended the proceeding and removed the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair practices in children’s advertising, prohibited the agency from using funds to engage in rulemaking to address unfair advertising acts or practices for three years, and imposed new requirements and limitations on all future FTC rulemaking procedures, including those aimed at deceptive practices.¹¹ After the Act passed, the FTC staff recommended that the Kid Vid proceeding be terminated (FTC). Then, in 1982, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and its TV advertising guidelines were dissolved after a federal court found some of the guidelines violated antitrust laws.¹² These developments left CARU as the only self-regulatory program focused on child-targeted marketing.

These events, combined with the emergence of the First Amendment’s commercial speech doctrine, created lasting legal and political hurdles to government regulation of children’s advertising and marketing (see Chap. 5 Graff and Piety). Some efforts were subsequently made to regulate, primarily by medium, such as the Children’s Television Act of 1990¹³ and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998.¹⁴ Among the most recent are attempts to address food marketing at a local level (e.g., premiums with children’s restaurant meals).¹⁵ However, in the current landscape, CARU and the CFBAI seem to be the key, if not only, practical mechanisms for addressing the full range of children’s food marketing techniques.

CARU’s Challenge and the Rise of the CFBAI

Just as CARU was launched during a time when marketing to children (and specifically, food marketing) was under intense scrutiny, the 2006 launch of CFBAI occurred against a backdrop of increasing concern about childhood obesity and the impacts of food marketing. The FTC in particular stepped up its activity, holding hearings about marketing self-regulation in 2005, 2007, and 2009. In 2004, Congress directed the FTC to report on industry expenditures for food marketing aimed at children, which it did in 2008 (see FTC, 2008).

During the 2005 FTC hearing, the president of the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) recommended that CARU’s resources and enforcement capacity be strengthened, and the CARU process be made more transparent (Molpus, 2005). The GMA also called for revisions to CARU’s Guidelines to better address the use of product placement, licensed characters, and “advergaming” (integration of advertising into online games). In February 2006, CARU initiated a review of its Guidelines, in consultation with industry. In October of that year, the process fractured due to disagreements between consumer packaged goods and fast-food companies—with the former reportedly being willing to accept more stringent restrictions than the latter (Edwards, 2006). Then, in November 2006, a substantial revision to CARU’s Guidelines and the launch of the CFBAI were announced simultaneously.

Evolution in the CARU Guidelines

The Guidelines have been revised several times over the years to address concerns about new types of marketing and to clarify CARU’s scope of authority.¹⁶ To understand the significance of the 2006 revisions, it is useful to know a little about the Guidelines’ underlying structure. The Guidelines set forth core principles which apply to all child-targeted marketing, regardless of product or medium, and also list specific provisions.¹⁷ At least two of the core principles are relevant to obesity. The fifth principle states that products “inappropriate for children” should not be advertised directly to them, and the seventh urges marketers to capitalize on advertising’s potential to promote positive behavior in children, including physical activity (CARU, 2009).

Since 1996, CARU has distinguished between its “general” Guidelines and those addressing the online collection of personal data from children (under age 13). Our study focused primarily on the general Guidelines, which are divided into topical categories: deception; product presentation and claims; material disclosures and disclaimers; endorsements; blurring of advertising and editorial/program content; premiums, kids’ clubs, sweepstakes, and contests; online sales; sales pressure; and unsafe and inappropriate advertising (CARU, 2009). Several of these categories contain provisions that are linked to food marketing concerns (discussed below).

The November 2006 revisions to the Guidelines signaled some key developments. First, they elaborated on the scope of CARU’s authority, defining “national advertising”¹⁸ and for the first time, adding criteria for what constitutes “primarily directed to children.” Second, this revision brought back a reference to “fair” advertising (the reference in the 1975 version of the Guidelines had disappeared). Further, a new section pertaining to “deception” was added, which reflects ­consumer protection law principles. Provisions addressing the blurring of advertising and editorial content as well as advergaming were also added, as recommended by the GMA. Finally, this revision explicitly reflected concerns about childhood obesity and the impacts of food marketing. The language of food-related provisions relating to overconsumption and disparagement of healthy foods was expanded,¹⁹ and the reference to physical activity was added to the core principles. Despite the fact that it had been publicly reported that minimum nutritional standards and restrictions on the use of promotions in food marketing were being considered, these were not part of the revision (Edwards, 2006).

Launch and Evolution of the CFBAI

Although CARU applies to all firms that market products to young children, the CFBAI is a pledge program that only binds companies that join it through a contract with the CBBB. Ten major food manufacturers were the founding participants in 2006.²⁰ Media companies and marketing agencies, also key contributors to the advertising delivery process, currently stand outside the program.

Similar to CARU, the CFBAI is organized around core principles. A key CFBAI principle states that participating companies commit to advertising that furthers the goal of promoting healthy dietary choices and lifestyles to children under 12. At the CFBAI’s inception, member firms pledged that at least half of their advertising primarily directed to young children would be for messages promoting healthier dietary choices, better-for-you products, or healthy lifestyles. This applied to child-targeted placements in measured media including television, radio, print, Internet (third party websites), as well as company-owned websites, paid product placements, in-school advertising, and the use of licensed characters. Each participant prepared its own pledge, explaining how it would comply with the core principles and describing its commitment and implementation schedule.²¹ Participating firms chose their own standards for defining child-targeted advertising and developed company-specific nutrition criteria (though it was required that these be consistent with established scientific and/or government standards such as the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) dietary guidelines, or the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) standards for health claims). The program became operational in July of 2007, though implementation dates varied across firms.

The CFBAI has evolved in significant ways. As of September 2011, there were seventeen participants who together account for 79% of the food advertising that appears during children’s programming²² (CBBB, 2010a). In 2010, the program shifted its marketing requirements so that 100% of the advertising targeted at children would be for healthy dietary choices or “better-for-you” products, and the “healthy lifestyle” option was removed (CBBB, 2009). The media to which the CFBAI applied was also expanded to include video and interactive games, DVDs (G-rated movies), mobile media (cell phones, PDAs), and word-of-mouth ads, as well as celebrity and movie tie-ins. Though not required, there has been some harmonization across firms in defining the child audience (e.g., at 35% in measured media) (CBBB, 2010a).

As noted above, these developments occurred in a context of significant public and regulatory attention focused on the nutritional profile of products marketed to children, including improved nutrition standards for school foods.²³ In addition, in 2009, Congress created the Interagency Working Group for Food Marketed to Children (IWG) made up of representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the FDA, the FTC, and the USDA. Congress directed the IWG to study and develop recommended standards for food marketing “when such marketing targets children who are 17 years old or younger or when such food represents a significant component” of children’s diets.²⁴ The IWG issued tentative voluntary nutritional principles in late 2009, followed by a more detailed proposal published for public comment in April 2011 (IWG, 2011). These principles would apply to a wide range of marketing activities, targeted both at children under 12 and adolescents. Industry opposition to the proposal has been fierce (see, e.g., Bachman, 2011; Bartz, 2011), including from the CFBAI (e.g., Hernandez & Kolish, 2011; Kolish, 2011a). On the last day of the comment period in July 2011, the CFBAI announced that firm-specific nutrition criteria would be replaced by uniform product category standards by the end of 2013 (CBBB, 2011b).

How well the CFBAI and CARU work in achieving the goals of promoting healthy eating habits and minimizing consumption of nutrient-poor foods has important implications for the future. This has been underscored in the battle over the IWG’s proposed principles. In his testimony to Congress in October 2011, the Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection suggested that the IWG guidelines would be revised in a fashion that is largely consistent with existing self-regulatory initiatives (Vladeck, 2011).

Comparison of CARU and the CFBAI

When looked at in tandem, the differences between CARU and the CFBAI become more a matter of degree than kind. The CFBAI Director has described the difference as follows: “CARU and CFBAI are complementary programs. While CFBAI focuses on what foods are advertised to children, CARU focuses on how products, including foods, are advertised to children” (Kolish, 2011b, note 7). While this description is largely accurate, our study indicates that the distinction is not as clear as it may first appear. For example, as noted above, concern about food marketing was a driving force for CARU’s creation, as well as for the CFBAI. So, both programs address nutritional concerns. Additionally, CARU does address the types of products that can be marketed to children (e.g., disallowing products that are unsafe or inappropriate) (CARU, 2009). Both programs also prescribe how advertisers may market products. It is this area that is perhaps the most illuminating, given inconsistencies between the programs.

CARU’s Role in Monitoring Food Marketing Practices

Food marketing comprises a significant percentage of the advertising aimed at children (e.g., Holt, Ippolito, Desrochers, & Kelley, 2007; Powell, Szczypka, & Chaloupka, 2007), and food companies have readily adopted new technologies to try to reach this audience [see e.g., Montgomery (Chap. 10)]. Thus, we would expect that food marketing would represent a significant percentage of the advertising monitored by CARU.

According to its website (http://www.caru.org), CARU currently has a staff of six attorneys. It has an annual budget of $650,000 (based on 2005 reports) and receives 90% of its funding from children’s advertisers (Mayer, 2005).²⁵ CARU’s staff examines roughly 1,000 advertisements per month on television, radio, print, and the internet. Ads are reviewed for claims that need substantiation or for lack of compliance with one or more of the Guidelines. Firms may also file challenges to competitors’ ads (though they rarely do), and CARU accepts complaints from consumers.²⁶ The NAD/CARU Procedures (2011) (adopted in 1990) prescribe how CARU enforces its Guidelines.²⁷ The Procedures require CARU to issue “case decisions” documenting its findings, which must include information similar to what court opinions contain—the identity of the advertiser; the person or entity complaining about the advertisement (“challenger”); summaries of the advertiser’s and challenger’s positions, and CARU’s decision and reasoning, among other categories. Although CARU’s decisions are not binding, if a party refuses to comply, CARU may refer the ad to the FTC where it will be given priority (Peeler, 2009). Either party may appeal CARU’s decisions to the National Advertising Review Board (NARB).

CARU’s cases apply the Guidelines to specific conduct (or ads), as well as advise industries about the Guidelines’ scope and meaning. These functions are analogous to that of judicial opinions, which both apply and interpret laws. CARU’s staff has conceded that their enforcement tools (publicity or referral to governmental entities) are weak (Lascoutx, 2002). One criticism of CARU (and its affiliate programs) has been that neither the public nor advertisers, particularly advertising agencies, are aware of their existence (Crain, 2009; Mayer, 2005).

From its inception through June 2011, CARU issued 883 formal and 887 informal cases, for a total of 1,770. Of these, 296 cases (17%) were related to food products or companies (150 formal, 146 informal). The vast majority of these food cases have involved challenges to CARU’s general Guidelines (n  =  241), as opposed to online privacy (n  =  40). Challenges under both types of Guidelines were brought in 15 “combination cases.” As shown in Fig. 6.1, CARU’s focus on food ads, reflected as a percentage of all case activity, fluctuates over time, tending to increase when regulatory attention is focused on children’s food advertising (see also Armstrong, 1984). Food ads made up the largest percentage (28.3%) of cases during the late 1970s, dropped significantly in the 1980s to 7–8%, and then increased again in the early 2000s to approximately 20%, as childhood obesity began to capture the public’s attention (see e.g., Nestle, 2000). Beginning in 2004, CARU noted in ten formal cases that it was scrutinizing food ads as part of the food and advertising industries’ assessment of what they could do to help with the childhood obesity problem.²⁸ Thus, similar to formal regulatory bodies, CARU seems to use discretion to allocate resources toward issues of current social concern. However, its food caseload dropped noticeably after the CFBAI was launched (Hoy, Childers, & Morrison, 2012).

Fig. 6.1

CARU case activity (1975–2011)

In reviewing CARU’s case activity, we found that approximately one-fourth of its food cases (n  =  72; 58 formal; 14 informal) involved claims or depictions related to nutrition or health. Figure 6.2 summarizes the Guidelines that specifically address nutrition-related issues, lists the number of formal cases pertinent to each, and provides examples of how CARU has applied these Guidelines over the years. The first two Guidelines in the figure reflect consumer protection law principles, with cases tending to focus on the potential for children to be confused or misled about a product’s nutritional content, qualities or benefits in ways that would be detrimental to their health. The remaining Guidelines address broader concerns related to nutrition and health (such as overconsumption, helping children to choose healthier options when they are available, and avoiding eating snack foods as a meal). As illustrated by the case summaries in the figure, CARU also takes a consumer protection approach in assessing these types of ads—that is, it reviews the ad’s net nutritional message (not just isolated components); from the perspective of a reasonable child; and focuses on the message conveyed, not the advertiser’s intended meaning (Carter, 2009; Sheldon, 2001).²⁹

Fig. 6.2

Illustrative examples of CARU’s food-related Guidelines and formal case activity

In an analysis of CARU’s food cases issued from 2000 to 2010, Hoy et al., (2012) ­organized nutrition concerns raised in these cases into two general categories: (1) advertising should not imply that a food is healthier than it is (via comparative or general nutritional claims, such as fruit content); (2) advertisements should promote healthy eating choices (such as avoiding suggestions of excessive consumption, ­failing to show healthier options available for selection (e.g., milk in addition to soda), or showing snack foods eaten as a meal). We noted that together, these ­categories reflect the fundamental motivations for CARU’s existence. The first encompasses consumer protection law concerns about ads conveying misleading or deceptive impressions to children. The second centers on concerns about food ­marketing’s impact on children’s health, particularly the encouragement of healthy vs. unhealthy choices—which are also precisely the public health concerns that the CFBAI was created to address.

Many of the CFBAI companies have long histories of marketing to young ­children, and their products account for almost 80% of all food ads aimed at this age group (CBBB, 2010a). So, one area of particular interest in our analysis was the representation of CFBAI companies in CARU cases. Figure 6.3 lists the food and beverage companies that have been involved in five or more cases during CARU’s history. Thirteen of the 17 CFBAI companies appear on this list, which might be expected in part given their considerable presence in the marketplace. Simply because CARU challenges an ad does not mean that it violated the Guidelines. For example, of the 16 formal cases involving ads for Kellogg’s products (the CFBAI firm with the greatest number of challenges), CARU found violations in just nine of them. In three cases it determined that the ad complied with its Guidelines; and in four cases, it either made no clear finding or administratively closed the case.³⁰ The listing in Fig. 6.3 suggests, however, that the CFBAI membership spans many of the key food manufacturers. It may also point to firms that should participate in the CFBAI but do not, and/or indicate that some CFBAI companies may be better than others at complying with CARU’s Guidelines.

Fig. 6.3

Food and beverage firms with largest number of CARU challenges

Overall, the nature of CARU’s case activity indicates that it has an important role in monitoring children’s food marketing, and in encouraging advertising that promotes healthy dietary choices. Moreover, these cases, and a comparison of CARU’s Guidelines with the CFBAI pledge commitments, show that CARU can play a part in driving further development of the CFBAI standards in two key areas: (1) defining the child audience, and (2) demarcating what constitutes “advertising.”

Defining Child-Targeted Media

The CARU Guidelines apply to national advertising primarily directed to children under 12. CARU considers four factors when determining whether an ad or marketing practice is “primarily directed” at young children and no single factor is controlling. For example, the first criterion assesses whether the media vehicle in which an ad appears was intended for young children, based on its subject matter, format, audience demographics, and other ads that appear in it.³¹ Thus, the projected demographic is a key factor. For example, in a 2006 informal case CARU noted that it considered a program airing before 9:00 PM with a 35% audience share (ages 2–11) to be “children’s programming.”³² It has also emphasized that audience share is but one factor, stating that “CARU does not rely on any specific percentage of audience demographic to determine if an advertisement is directed to children.”³³ Other factors that CARU has considered include:

• Whether the ad features child actors or depictions of children.³⁴

• Whether the ad includes cartoon characters, premiums, or other features appealing to children.³⁵

• Whether the product is likely to be inherently appealing to children, such as cookies.³⁶

• The fact that characters featured in the ad are “widely licensed” and toys and playsets with these characters are sold around the country.³⁷

• Whether the advertiser markets other products to children.³⁸

So, rather than relying solely on a percentage, CARU reserves the ability to make contextual assessments in determining whether an ad is targeted at children, even in measured media. This flexibility is a positive feature of CARU’s process which allows it to address a range of marketing channels and tools.

In defining what is “primarily directed” at children, the CFBAI framework permits even more flexibility, but one key differentiator is that each company may set its own criteria within the bounds of the pledge framework.³⁹ This has led to significant variation across firms, particularly in the program’s early years. For example, in measured media, “child-directed” audience share ranged from 18% to 50% across firms (CBBB, 2008; CSPI, 2010). Although there continues to be some variation, most firms agree that a 35% share (as of 2010) constitutes children’s programming or media.

Other Views on Child-Targeted Media

Comparison with other model food marketing codes around the world is also ­instructive. On this point, our analysis centered on codes that as a set reflect diverse stakeholder groups and those that could be influential either in the USA or abroad. International groups such as the WHO (2010) and the IOTF (2008) tend to take a tougher stance on what constitutes a child audience, relative to CARU or the CFBAI. In the USA, CSPI (2005) argues that ads shown in media for which children comprise 15% or more of the audience should be considered targeted at children. The IWG (2011) would set a 30% standard for children and 20% for adolescents.

Audience share is but one type of criterion, however. Both the WHO (2010) and the IOTF (2008) advocate for standards that focus on the total number of children who see or hear the advertising. This distinction is significant because children’s actual exposure to advertising occurs not only during children’s programming but also during programs aimed at more general audiences. For example, close to one-third of the TV ads children see appear during prime time shows (after 8:00 PM), which means that children are exposed to many more ads than those explicitly targeted at them (Holt et al., 2007). CARU acknowledged this fact in a 1979 case involving a TV ad for cookies which aired outside of traditional child programming hours.⁴⁰ It ultimately determined that the ad was acceptable, but noted that large numbers of children watch TV during much of the day and night.⁴¹

Both CARU and the CFBAI focus on children under 12. In contrast, the public health community, consumer advocates, and Congress have argued for the inclusion of adolescents (≤ age 17). In 2007, the UK’s Office of Communication (which is similar to the FCC in the USA) enacted regulations that prohibit the advertising of foods that are high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, sugars, or salt to youth under age 16. This increased emphasis on adolescents is consistent with a growing body of developmental research in neuroscience, psychology, and marketing suggesting that teens may be particularly vulnerable to marketing messages for unhealthy foods (e.g., Pechmann, Levine, Loughlin, & Leslie, 2005). Expanding self-regulatory provisions to include adolescents in the USA, however, would require significant revisions to CARU and the CFBAI due to the broader set of marketing activities aimed at this group, and would likely encounter significant industry resistance as demonstrated by the reaction to the IWG proposal.⁴²

In sum, with respect to the threshold definition of what is “primarily directed” to children, this discussion highlights subtle yet important differences between the CARU and CFBAI approaches. Assuming that the CFBAI firms are also expected to comply with CARU, it is puzzling that the CFBAI did not adhere more closely to CARU’s benchmarks for child-targeted media from the outset. Particularly with regard to the 35% composition standard, putting aside whether this is the “best” standard, it is surprising that the CFBAI took 4 years to arrive at a position that CARU publicly declared a few months before the CFBAI launched.

“Marketing” Versus “Advertising”—A Key Distinction

Perhaps the most significant difference between the CFBAI and CARU, however, relates to how the CFBAI defines “advertising.” CFBAI’s parameters for “advertising” exclude aspects of marketing that CARU includes. In doing so, the CFBAI has positioned itself to potentially undermine CARU’s authority over these forms.

In essence, marketing is the discipline responsible for creating, promoting, and delivering goods and services to businesses and consumers (e.g., Kotler & Keller, 2011). A classic conceptual framework captures this set of responsibilities within the “4 P’s” of marketing–product, place, price, and promotion. Advertising is embedded within the promotion component. It is an important element strategically, but is only one part of a much broader and complex set of activities designed to stimulate and manage demand. It is also the most visible component of marketing, and some have suggested, the most amenable to a regulatory (or self-regulatory) approach (Swinburn et al., 2008).

That the primary focus of both CARU and the CFBAI is advertising is apparent (beginning with their names). Yet, the two programs take different approaches in defining what types of marketing activities are covered. CARU defines advertising as “any paid commercial message, in any medium (including labeling), if: (a) it has the purpose of inducing a sale or other commercial transaction or ­persuading the audience of the value or usefulness of a company, product, or service; (b) it is disseminated nationally or to a substantial portion of the [US]…” and the advertiser controls the content (CARU, 2009, p. 5). The scope of what is “advertising” is further fleshed out by CARU’s Guidelines, which refer to specific activities (e.g., celebrity endorsements, cyber space sponsorships) and by its cases.

In contrast, the CFBAI sets forth specific media and marketing activities to either include or exclude, as the case may be. Figure 6.4 provides an overview of CARU’s and CFBAI’s coverage. It is organized by the categories adopted in the FTC’s (2008) report to Congress and has also been used as the basis for the IWG’s (2011) recommendations.⁴³ As is evident from the figure, both CARU and the CFBAI cover an array of communication activities which together represent a substantial majority of advertising expenditures.⁴⁴ A clear strength of these programs is their coverage of media that have traditionally been used to target children (e.g., TV, print) as well as newer forms of digital media (e.g., third party websites, company-owned sites, mobile, video games) that are increasingly being used to reach young audiences (Moore & Rideout, 2007), including those disparately impacted by obesity (see Chap. 17 by Ramirez and Gallion).

Fig. 6.4

Marketing spending and coverage in self-regulatory programs

However, the CFBAI allows its members to exclude some marketing activities (e.g., sponsorships, premiums, packaging) that are included in the model standards outlined by the IOTF (2008), CSPI (2005), and the IWG (2011). This means that the public health community, consumer advocates, and government regulators take a broader view of marketing to children than the CFBAI food companies do. What is potentially more problematic, however, is that the CFBAI allows its members to exempt some marketing strategies and media which both CARU and marketing research have identified as being particularly effective with children.

In-store Marketing and Beyond

The CFBAI explicitly allows its members to exclude packaging, point-of-sale (e.g., displays, promotions), and the use of company-owned characters.⁴⁵ Implicit exclusions include sales promotions (e.g., premiums, sweepstakes, contests), sponsorships of sports-related activities or other events, and general brand ­building. These types of activities are key components in “integrated marketing communications” (IMC) campaigns which use an array of marketing tools to reach their target audiences. Brand messages that appear in multiple media are more easily recalled and more persuasive (Naik & Raman, 2003). The FTC’s (2008) study showed that integrated campaigns are now the norm in food marketing to children and teens (see Chap. 3 by Harrison and Jackson).

In-store marketing, in particular, has become an increasingly important ­component of marketing plans. According to GMA & Deloitte Consulting (2007), the ­grocery store is a “critical and highly attractive touch point to reach and influence consumers” (p. 3) and is considered by many to be a brand’s most important marketing opportunity (see e.g., Nelson & Ellison, 2005; Underhill, 2008). This is consistent with industry data indicating that 70% of all purchase decisions are made in the store (POPAI, cited in O’Dell, 2009). The vast majority (95%) of major grocery manufacturers (which includes the CFBAI companies) are engaged in “shopper marketing,” of which in-store activities are a key part (GMA, 2011). The growth in spending on “shopper marketing” is expected to outpace all other marketing tools in coming years (GMA, 2010). At the same time, expenditures in traditional media are forecasted to decline. In-store displays, sales promotions, and packaging are viewed by many marketing practitioners as among the most effective means of reinforcing brands and impacting purchase.

One argument for excluding these marketing activities from the CFBAI seems to be that they are not aimed at children, but are meant to signal to parents which ­products might have “child appeal” (Hernandez & Kolish, 2011). CARU’s ­inclusion of these activities in its definition of advertising indicates, however, that marketers do direct them at children. And children are indeed being exposed to, and influenced by these marketing tools. Packaging, point-of-sale, and promotions are among the most salient marketing techniques to children (Landon & Gritschneder, 2011, see Chap. 15 by Grigsby-Toussaint et al.). Even very young children can recognize brand logos on packages (Valkenburg & Buijzen, 2005) and recall brand names that they have seen advertised on television (Macklin, 1996). Packaging influences young children’s taste preferences as well. Products presented in attractive packaging are judged to taste better than the same foods in plain wrappers (Robinson, Borzekowski, Matheson, & Kramer, 2007). For overweight children this may be more problematic, given preliminary evidence suggesting that they tend to eat more when foods are presented in a branded package (Forman, Halford, Summe, MacDougall, & Keller, 2009).

Parents recognize the power of packaging in influencing their children’s product preferences and in promoting purchase requests (e.g., Ogba & Johnson, 2010). Surveys of children and teens indicate that some 70% report that they “sometimes” accompany a parent or other family member when grocery shopping (Mintel, 2008). A key reason they offer for doing so is the opportunity to influence food choices—78% say that they sometimes help choose the foods that are purchased; 18% indicate that they always do. Point-of-purchase advertising has also been shown to influence children’s independent purchases (Rexha, Mizerski, & Mizerski, 2010).

Finally, it is notable that the prevalence of youth-oriented sales promotions (e.g., premiums, sweepstakes, tie-ins with licensed properties) depicted on food packages has increased since the CFBAI was launched, with few apparent differences between CFBAI participants and other manufacturers (Harris, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2010b). Sales ­promotions are generally much more effective at inducing immediate sales than a television commercial, which is likely to do more to build brand awareness, image, and ­preference (e.g., Belch & Belch, 2012).

By allowing member firms to exclude sales promotions, packaging, and point-of-sale displays from the scope of covered marketing activities, the CFBAI allows them to define “advertising” more narrowly than what both CARU and industry practice would suggest. The CARU Guidelines identify these channels as among those that raise special concerns when used with young children, and it has issued a number of cases involving these practices. For example, it has issued 13 cases involving food packaging (all formal); 30 food cases involving premiums (20 formal, 10 informal); and 63 food cases involving the use of contests, sweepstakes, and similar promotions (22 formal, 41 informal). Thus, over a third of its total food-related caseload to date (n  =  296) involves marketing activities that the CFBAI has excluded from the pledge framework.

The CFBAI’s exclusion of these activities raises concerns about its capacity to undermine CARU. This potentiality is demonstrated in a 2010 case, where CARU challenged Kellogg’s Pop-Tarts packaging and website advertising on the basis that it could mislead children about the product’s fruit content.⁴⁶ Kellogg responded by asserting that CARU should close the case because it is a CFBAI participant, and (1) packaging is not “primarily” child-directed advertising under the CFBAI, and (2) it does not advertise Pop-Tarts to children because it pledged not to do so. Kellogg appeared to be using its CFBAI participation to attack CARU’s jurisdiction over packaging and as a shield against CARU’s inquiry in general.

CARU found, however, that the advertising was child directed because the ­packaging had cartoon characters and a cut-out premium. CARU also noted that the Pop-Tarts website had a “Kids” section which featured the characters. It concluded that the implied fruit content claim was potentially misleading to children, and should not be made in child-directed advertising in any media, including packaging. Kellogg disagreed, stating that “[u]nder no circumstances can product packaging be deemed to be advertising directed primarily to children under 12.”⁴⁷ But it noted that it had discontinued the packaging anyway, and that it “respect[s] the self-regulatory process and will take CARU’s decision into consideration in future advertising.”⁴⁸

This was the first—and so far only—CARU case where the advertiser’s CFBAI participation was raised as an issue. For example, CARU recently found a Burger King ad did not comply with its guideline that ads with premiums should focus on the product, not the premium. ⁴⁹ Unlike Kellogg, Burger King did not claim that the CFBAI’s exclusion of premiums immunized it from CARU scrutiny. Nonetheless, to the extent that the CFBAI is viewed as a model, it would be problematic if it were to undermine CARU’s assessments of what types of marketing practices are of special concern when used with young children.

Building Strong Brands

Beyond these specific exclusions, there is a larger marketing issue to consider. Advertising is not necessarily the most powerful element in the marketing mix. Often, the “product” strategy (product development, branding) and “place” (distribution channels) components of the “4 Ps” are the strongest bases for building sustainable competitive advantages. Assortment decisions, including the development of new items, reformulations, and determining the scope of product lines, are all central to product strategy. The CFBAI firms have been actively improving the nutritional profile of items they promote to children. Since the CFBAI’s inception, they have either reformulated or created more than 100 products (CBBB, 2010a). This seems to be in the companies’ best interests as well. According to a Hudson Institute report (2011), food companies with a higher percentage of sales in the “better-for-you” category perform better financially.

The building and maintenance of a firm’s brands are also critical to product ­strategy. Branding has been described as the art and cornerstone of marketing (Kotler & Keller, 2011) and its value to firms is well documented (see e.g., Keller, 2008). Scholarly research further suggests that brand equity is a key issue in reaching children. Brand preferences are formed in early childhood (Bahn, 1986). Children recognize brands by ages 3–4; by age 7–8, they can name multiple brands in many product categories, use brand names as key source of product information, and often make requests by brand name (John, 1999).

Under the CFBAI, firms retain significant freedom to promote their brands without reference to specific food items. For example, McDonalds can advertise its master brand to children using its name, characters, symbols, and other brand identity elements. Features such as Ronald McDonald, Playplace, happymeal.com, and Happy Meal toys can help create positive feelings that become linked to the McDonald’s brand and its product offerings. The CFBAI’s willingness to allow general branding (or product line advertising) conflicts with some other food marketing policies noted earlier. For example, the IOTF (2008) recommends that there should be no marketing to children of energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods and brands associated with them.

Although the CFBAI seems to discourage the use of “equity” or product line advertising (CBBB, 2008), it does not explicitly address this issue in its pledge requirements. When discussed, equity advertising is defined as the use of logos for brand or product lines that include both SKUs that meet and do not meet a participant’s nutrition criteria. Company-owned characters and brand names are explicitly exempted (CBBB, 2009). This definition appears rather narrow and leads to confusing situations where, for example, the phrase “Goldfish Central” on pfgoldfish.com is not considered advertising for all Goldfish varieties by the CFBAI. This potential for ambiguity raises the question of whether general branding (e.g., brand names, characters, slogans, branded environments) might directly or indirectly increase children’s brand preferences for a product line that also includes less healthy alternatives.

There is reason to think this may be the case. Within a company’s portfolio, brands play different roles. For example, a driver role reflects the degree to which a brand guides purchasing choices and shapes the usage experience (Aaker, 2004). Typically, a master brand has the dominant driver role, although sub-brands, descriptors, and endorsers may also contribute.⁵⁰ For the CFBAI brands, situations where the master brand plays a major role in building preference and choice seem likely. For example, for a branded product line like Kraft’s Lunchables, we would anticipate that it is the “Lunchables” name that drives consumer purchase rather than any specific SKU or variety. Although a particular meal combination (e.g., Fun Pack Chicken Dunks—Breaded Chicken Nuggets with 100% Fruit Juice) may be eligible for promotion under the CFBAI, the question is whether other less healthy options also benefit because the “Lunchables” name is reinforced when children see ads for the brand in child-targeted media. There is also potential for confusion at the point-of-sale, both among parents and children, when only some alternatives (e.g. flavors or varieties) within a brand are covered by pledge provisions.

To gain some initial insight into this issue, we analyzed the brand portfolios of pledge firms. Our investigation focused on brands that the CFBAI companies have included in their pledges (as of the summer of 2011). All other brands that a firm manufactures or sells but that are not directly promoted to children were excluded. Our essential question was to what extent does a product line where one option qualifies to be marketed to children contain other branded items that do not meet the nutritional criteria that a firm has established for itself?

Figure 6.5 provides some illustrative findings.⁵¹ To aid interpretation, we first offer a brief example. In the listing under breakfast cereals, we note that Froot Loops cereal is offered in three flavor varieties (see column 3). Two of these (Froot Loops and Froot Loops with Reduced Sugar) are listed in Kellogg’s pledge (column 4). The third branded option (Froot Loops with Marshmallows) is not (column 6). So, one of three branded alternatives (33%) does not meet the nutritional criteria the company has established for itself.⁵² In the breakfast cereal category as a whole (across participant firms), only 10% of the pledge brand offerings do not meet self-imposed nutritional requirements. So, in this case, the vast majority do meet these standards.

Fig. 6.5

Illustrative examples: portfolio analysis of pledge brands

However, there is substantial variation both within and across product categories. For instance, although only a small proportion of cereals do not meet company nutrition criteria, for dairy products the percentage rises to 29%; in snack foods to 43%; and in prepared foods and meals, 49% of the pledge brand offerings exceed self-imposed limits. This means that in these latter two categories, close to half of the branded offerings that consumers see in the store are for varieties that fail to meet the firm’s nutritional criteria. Yet, the master or family brand may be advertised to children. For example, ConAgra offers 29 varieties of Chef Boyardee canned pasta, yet only 9 of these are either included in the pledge or could be. The Chef Boyardee master brand can be advertised to children via these 9 options, but there may be as many as 20 additional branded varieties or SKUs (69%) in the store that do not meet the healthier standards. Variation is also evident across brands in the same product category. In the cases shown here, we see that only 1 of 16 (6%) of Kids Cuisine meals, another ConAgra product, do not meet the firm’s nutritional standards. Lunchables, a Kraft brand, stands at 67%. These kinds of disparities are not unique to this category, as evidenced by the snack food and dairy brands also listed in Fig. 6.5. Across all categories (not shown here), from 0% to some 80% of the SKUs for pledge brands fail to meet the firms’ self-imposed nutrition limits. This means that although a child may see an ad for a healthier option, a large proportion of the options available in the store may be for similarly branded items that do not meet pledge standards.

The potential for confusion at the point-of-sale is clear, and may be exacerbated in the future as consumers come to rely on child-targeted advertising as a signal that the product being promoted is nutritionally sound. Moreover, because portfolios may include options with a range of nutritional profiles, brand messages may create confusion for parents and children about which products are “better for you.” Our analysis here only begins to address how the communication opportunities afforded by general branding shape the marketing environment in which children learn and are persuaded. Future research is needed to determine what impact “authorized” brand messages have on children’s preferences and purchase requests for other items in a brand family.

Monitoring, Enforcement, and Evaluation

A key issue in the analyses of these programs concerns the monitoring and ­enforcement mechanisms that have been put in place. Both the WHO (2010) and the IOTF (2008) argue that monitoring and enforcement should be done by neutral and independent parties and that the evaluation process should be transparent. This is currently not the case under the CFBAI. Although the CBBB publishes regular progress reports (CBBB, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011a), neither the data it collects from participants nor its own studies are available for independent review. The CFBAI also has not established a clear process for handling external complaints. CARU does better in that its review process results in published cases that explain its reasoning and outline the advertisers’ positions. It has also improved its transparency over time (e.g., when it largely did away with informal cases in 2004). However, in 2009, CARU stopped reporting the name of the advertising agency in its cases despite the fact that NAD/CARU Procedures require this information.⁵³ This failure to follow its own requirements is puzzling and has the effect of reducing advertising agencies’ accountability. Further, although CARU occasionally opens a case in response to a consumer complaint, there is no mechanism for public explanation when it declines to do so. More generally, some advocates have questioned CARU’s ability to be independent when it is funded by the advertisers it is assigned to monitor (e.g., Kelly, 2005).

At a more basic level, however, there is a distinct disconnect in how these programs are evaluated by various parties. For example, CARU’s sponsoring organizations claim a success or compliance rate of 95% or higher (NARC, 2004 at 95%; Lascoutx, 2005 at 97%).⁵⁴ The CBBB also reports excellent compliance records for CFBAI members (CBBB, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011a). The CFBAI director recently reported to a Congressional committee that it has “changed not only what products are advertised to kids, but the expectations about what should or should not be advertised to kids” (Kolish, 2011b, p. 14).

However, other studies paint a different picture. For example, Hoy et al., (2012) found that only about one-third or fewer of CARU’s food cases between 2000 and 2010 were resolved in the advertiser’s favor (i.e., no modification or discontinuance asked for or offered). Armstrong (1984), who looked at the first 5 years of CARU’s activities, reported that only about 25% of challenged ads were found to be acceptable as-is. Similarly, we found that about 18% (n  =  27) of CARU’s formal food cases from 1975 to June 2011 were resolved in the advertiser’s favor. Thus, multiple independent researchers looking at CARU’s activities across various periods of time all report similar results.

Fried (2006) also challenged CARU’s claim of 97% effectiveness, concluding that “advertisers that have repeatedly violated its guidelines are . . . praised by CARU in press releases for participating in the self-regulatory process,” as long as they agree to consider CARU’s concerns in the future (p. 137). Our systematic examination of all CARU’s food cases supports this conclusion. As noted above, many advertisers have been involved in multiple challenges through the years. Thus, we looked to see among the formal cases involving firms with multiple past challenges, how many times CARU referred to prior cases involving the same advertiser and the same type of conduct. We found a few examples where CARU cited a previous case involving the same advertiser for the same type of conduct.⁵⁵ In one case, CARU’s decision referred to a prior case involving a different advertiser, but similar concerns.⁵⁶

We also found several examples, however, where CARU clearly could have referred to prior cases involving the advertiser and the same type of problem, but did not.⁵⁷ For example, in the mid-2000s, CARU pursued three cases related to potentially misleading fruit content claims (among other concerns) in Sunny Delight ads. Figure 6.2 includes a summary of the first case in 2003, involving Proctor & Gamble (P&G).⁵⁸ Then in 2004, shortly after P&G spun off the brand to create Sunny Delight Beverages Co., CARU opened an informal case with the new company focused on the same concern.⁵⁹ Then in 2007, it brought a formal case, again involving ­problematic claims about Sunny D’s fruit content.⁶⁰ CARU did not refer to any of the prior cases, despite the fact that it found in all three that the ads did not comply with its Guidelines. Fried (2006) noted additional examples involving Kraft and Wrigley.

A similar disconnect occurs with evaluations of the CFBAI. For example, in contrast to reports that CFBAI ads directed to children “usually are for or include nutrient dense foods that also meet reasonable limits on calories, fats, sugars and sodium” (CBBB, 2010a, p. 12), Powell et al. (Chap. 8) report that 88% of CFBAI company ads seen by children in 2009 were for foods high in saturated fat, sugar, and sodium. Kunkel, Gantz, McKinley, and Wright (2009) report similar results for CFBAI ads during children’s TV programming. Further, young children’s exposure to fast-food advertising has increased substantially between 2003 and 2009, ­including ads aired by CFBAI firms (Powell, Schermbeck, Szczypka, Chaloupka, & Braunschweig, 2011). Other studies document the poor nutritional content of fast-food products (Harris et al., 2010a) and cereal (Harris et al., 2009) marketed to children, post-CFBAI implementation.

As these examples illustrate, industry, social scientists, and advocates seem to apply different evaluative benchmarks. The CBBB/NARC evaluation processes do not address the underlying question of what outcomes should be sought and therefore measured. For example, CARU is not wrong to consider it “compliance” or “success” when companies agree to stop running problematic ads, and/or state they will take CARU’s concerns into consideration for the future in situations where ads have run their flight. Those agreements are important. However, this is neither the only conception of “compliance,” nor arguably the most meaningful. According to Boddewyn (1989, p. 23) compliance is achieved when practitioners “improve and internalize higher advertising standards.” In this view, CARU would hold advertisers accountable not just for the specific ad under consideration but also for internalizing the values and norms represented in the CARU Guidelines across all of their marketing efforts.

The CFBAI could take a similar approach. Basic marketing principles indicate that advertising exposure alone is not a sufficient criterion for a campaign’s success. Marketing communication programs are commonly evaluated on a number of dimensions ranging from exposure (reach), to recall, belief and attitude change, and ultimately to product choice (see e.g., Belch & Belch, 2012). It is neither sufficient nor credible for a major consumer packaged goods company or advertising agency to evaluate campaigns solely based on exposure or reach. So, in this case, if the goal is to promote healthier dietary choices, then the appropriate question is whether the program does in fact lead to healthier choices being made. At this juncture, we do not know the answer, and the monitoring system is not configured to allow such a determination.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Kraak et al., (2011) report that the food and beverage firms are the only industry sector to have made “moderate” progress toward fulfilling the IOM’s 2006 recommendations. However, they also identified areas for improvement (Kraak et al., 2011). By focusing on the common roots and missions of CARU and the CFBAI, our study illuminates where the programs have taken inconsistent positions that may ­undermine self-regulatory and public health goals. It also points to specific ways that the programs could improve their processes—both individually and in tandem—to accelerate progress.

The CFBAI focuses exclusively on food advertisers and requires them to apply specific nutritional standards. As a result, the CFBAI has a greater ability than CARU to drive product reformulation and has done so. Nonetheless, CARU continues to have a meaningful role in addressing food marketing issues—indeed, the CBBB (2011a) notes that it reviews the results of CARU’s monitoring activities as part of its CFBAI compliance review. CARU provides important guidance on the definition of “child directed,” including what media should be covered, and which marketing techniques are more likely to raise concerns. Additionally, in at least one recent case (involving Pop-Tarts packaging), it identified a key gap in the CFBAI’s coverage. This case showed that the utility of the CFBAI’s nutritional standards can be limited by the narrower scope of activities to which they are applied. By defining child-targeted marketing in a more circumscribed fashion, the CFBAI operates inconsistently not only with general marketing principles but also with CARU. By allowing these exclusions and by declining to draw on CARU’s precedent, the CFBAI creates an opportunity for some marketers to cast doubt on CARU’s authority. Viewed in this way, the CFBAI could potentially reverse progress that CARU has made in helping firms to avoid problems in their advertising. Other reports have issued important recommendations, such as that all food and beverage companies, as well as media companies, should join the CFBAI (e.g., CSPI, 2010). Our investigation leads us to some further recommendations for improving these programs both individually and in tandem.

• The CFBAI should draw on CARU’s experience and the model standards discussed above, and include packaging, point-of-sale, and the other marketing activities in the pledge program.

• Clear guidelines for “equity advertising” should be included in the pledge framework. For example, the CFBAI could require that a sizeable majority of SKUs for a pledge brand meet promised nutritional standards before the family brand can be marketed to children.

• CFBAI members should be expected to consistently comply with CARU and be able to demonstrate that they have internalized CARU’s standards. For example, the CFBAI might institute a point or demerit system that could be used to rate the CFBAI companies’ performances, across time and across companies, for inclusion in annual compliance reports.

• CARU could consider failure to comply with a CFBAI pledge as a lack of compliance with its Guidelines. It might also incorporate the CFBAI’s nutrition ­criteria so that any product (regardless of CFBAI membership) that does not meet them would be considered inappropriate for children, much as CARU has done with PG-13 movies, vitamins, etc.

• CFBAI participants should develop metrics (KPIs) that track the extent to which they are shifting consumer preference and demand to healthier options as a result of pledge implementation and disclose this information to stakeholders.

• Both programs could take steps to improve the transparency of their operations and monitoring. For CARU, perhaps the most important step is to assess its overall success rate based on measures (publicly disclosed) that indicate to what degree companies adhere to the Guidelines across time and marketing campaigns. For the CFBAI, enabling public scrutiny of its operations, from contracts between the CBBB and the firms, to the companies’ compliance reports, would be an advance.

The public debate about food marketing to children has been highly polarized, frequently marked by acrimony, cynicism, and distrust (see Chap. 4 Williams and Drumwright). Yet, there are at least two key points of agreement between ­stakeholders: (1) that obesity is compromising children’s health and must be reduced; and (2) industry self-regulation is a crucial driver of US children’s food marketing practices. Under current circumstances, there is no time for smugness, nor a place for zealotry in this debate. But there is need for zeal. All stakeholders—including the food and beverage industry, with its vast creative power, resources, and influence—should be working to maximize the potentials of CARU and the CFBAI in promoting healthy food environments for children. Anything less would truly be a shame.