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For non-reductionist sociologists, imitation may well be seen as less than exciting because it sounds so superficial. Imitation is learning an act from seeing it done (Rizzolatti 2005). During imitation the person transforms an observed action into an executed action that is similar, or identical, to the action observed (Rizzolatti 2005). I would suspect that some sociologists might see imitation as mere copying and disregard it as cognitively undemanding and even a childish form of behavior.

On the level of common culture, it is also foreign to the western ideology of individualism wherein one is supposed to be independent of others. In certain cases copying can be seen as an inauthentic. But underneath its surface, imitation hides a number of complex processes of interest to sociologists, especially those interested in intersubjectivity.

Taken literally, imitation would be like memorizing a formula without understanding its content, meaning, or application. However, to make imitation useful at all it must be generalized to many situations, and to do that one must understand the principles that guide the imitated act. Knowing these principles allows us to make changes in the imitated act according to the dictates of any number of social situations. There is much more to effective imitation than simply copying what some other person does. According to Dijksterhuis (2005) humans have an enormous capacity to automatically and unconsciously bring their behavior in line with their social environment. He points out that we not only imitate the observable behaviors of others (such as facial expressions or gestures) but also adapt multiple and sometimes rather complex aspects of other’s psychological functioning.

Dijksterhuis sees imitation as an unconscious default mechanism and believes that not doing it is the exception. In contrast to chimpanzees, who are stereotyped as “aping” other apes and humans, it is we humans who are the experts; imitation in the sense given above is, indeed, a rare ability, however, it may be understood at first glance.

While observation alone attests to the existence of imitation in humans, establishing this as fact does not answer important questions about how it works. In Hurley and Chater’s (2005) judgment, the most difficult problem in explaining how the brain creates imitation is the “correspondence theory.” How is the perceived action of another person translated into a similar action by the observer? When a person imitates another person’s hand-movements, one can see his own hands and adjust errors. This is not possible when you are imitating a facial gesture. Hurley and Chater also point to the problems in infant imitation when their bodies are so different from those adults they are initiating.

Imitation and Mirror Neurons Reviewed

It is possible that mirror neurons could answer this problem and that they are the dynamic on which imitation is based. The fact that these neurons fire both when we observe certain actions and when we enact these actions ourselves is not a sufficient explanation of imitation because the question also revolves around the ability to understand the intent of a person’s action and the ability to replicate this intent. In some contexts this entails changing the motor means in order to achieve the inferred ends. Without some apprehension of inner intent, it would indeed be true that all we would have is rote and mindless copying. Understanding the goal is vital to imitating it successfully. In Chapter 5 it was stressed that the replication of the observer’s act, which is simulated on the observer’s motor cortex, makes it meaningful since in a way the observer is doing it himself. Mirror neurons need to have the whole context observed, or at least implied, in order to fire. As we have seen, they do not discharge when movements are observed without any hint of its purpose. The discovery that the mirror system overlaps with Broca’s area and has an essential role in imitation suggests that language may depend on the capacity to imitate because we simulate other’s mouth movements on our motor cortex. In fact, Iacoboni (2008) argues that evolution leads from action recognition through imitation to language. By enabling action understanding, imitation and the human mirror system may be the major basis for the intersubjective sharing of meaning that is essential for language. By now it should be clear that imitation is far from a simple subject and extremely relevant to the broader questions of our social natures and of society.

Furthermore basic capacities to imitate are with us at birth even if our imitative abilities improve over time. At one time, it was assumed that infants needed at least some minimal experience with others before they had the capacity to imitate and that imitation had to wait until they were about 1 year old. However, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) changed this view dramatically. Hand movements were imitated in the first months of life. Facial expressions were possible a few weeks after birth and evidence for the imitation of facial expressions were later found among newborns. The average age of these infants was a mere 32 h old. Once more we have evidence of our profoundly social brain. Imitation is not simply something we learn (Dijksterhuis 2005: 209) although actors can perfect it. Humans share a neural system which has the ability to perceive actions of others and then execute these actions themselves. Mirror neurons discharge in situations of perceiving and of executing. Dijksterhuis concludes that we are wired to imitate.

The Scope of Imitation

Looking at imitation simply as fact, independent of neuroscience, has its surprises too. We are totally unaware of its ubiquitous effect on our daily lives and how much we accommodate to others in the smallest of matters. An early finding was the relationship between imitation and liking the individual whom you are imitating (Dijksterhuis 2005: 210). A correlation of 0.74 resulted from imitations of posture and liking the person imitated. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) went further than correlations and established cause by using confederates. The confederate either shook her foot or rubbed her nose at the researchers’ direction. They found that the confederates who would rub their noses when face to face with a participant evoked nose rubbing in their subjects. The confederate who shook her foot evoked the same behavior in their subjects. The same researchers extended this finding by reversing the process. Now the confederates imitated the body posture shown by the subjects. The subjects who were imitated by the confederates liked the confederates more than did those that were not imitated.

Consistent with the above, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) found that those who wanted to affiliate imitated more. To make their subjects want to affiliate, the participants were presented with subliminal words related to affiliation like “friend” or “together” whereas comparison groups were not presented with such words. The subjects who were subliminally motivated to affiliate did so more than the comparison group not so motivated. When the confederate touched his or her face repeatedly the subjects who had been subliminally motivated did so too. Lakin and Chartrand summarize these studies pointedly. “If we want to be liked, we imitate more without being aware of it.”

On the basis of these findings van Baaren et al. (2003) instructed waitresses to literately repeat the order for each customer on some days. On other days waitresses were to avoid this mimicry. Prior to this, the average tip which the waitresses received in a normal evening was established. It was found that exact mimicry significantly enhanced their tips whereas avoidance of mimicry reduced tipping (van Baaren et al. 2003). They see the function of imitation as a “social glue”:

….imitation of postures, speech, and facial expression lead to greater rapport and liking, to smoother interactions, to mood contagion which can lead to more satisfactory relationships, and even to higher income.

Bargh et al. (1996) primed their subjects with rudeness or politeness. After the priming, they were asked to meet the experimenter at a different room. The experimenter was talking to another confederate when the subjects approached them. Participants primed with rudeness were 60% more likely to interrupt than the unprimed control group.

Other studies took advantage of stereotypes. These were the first to show an effect on behavior rather than simply liking or demeanor. In this case participants were primed with stereotypes of the elderly, words used were slow, grey, bingo, or Florida. When the participants were through with the experiment they walked to the elevator significantly more slowly than unprimed participants.

Another experiment used stereotypes involved in mental performance. In the first case, participants were primed with stereotypes of professors. They were asked to write everything down that came to mind about professors. The remaining participants were not asked to do this. The primed subjects were then asked to answer numerous general-knowledge questions which were taken from the game, Trivial Pursuit. Consistent with the previous study, primed participants did better on the questions than unprimed participants. Another group was asked to think about soccer hooligans who were associated with stupidity. These subjects scored much lower on the same test.

In sum, all these behavioral studies demonstrate the power of stereotypes and their effect on actions such as intellectual performance and interpersonal behaviors that are modeled in our social environments. Dijksterhuis (2005:207) makes the point that the activation of stereotypes and priming does not by itself elicit substantial behaviors but affects the parameters (like walking slowly or fast, elaborating verses being sloppy, etc.) of ongoing behavior. The authors’ other points are that imitation covers an extremely broad domain of behavior. In making us like each other more it leads to smoother and more pleasant interactions. Dijksterhuis implies that imitation is the social glue, but it is a fragile one and imitation leaves out other processes that can draw us together like role-taking, language, and other processes critical to creating intersubjectivity.

Cognitive Psychology and Imitation

If the fact that we imitate and the breadth in which we do so are clear, the neurological foundations for imitation as ongoing processes are far from certain. According to Hurley and Chater (2005) imitation is different from other forms of learning which may look similar on the surface. Depending on the discipline, there are different accounts of these forms of learning. We have seen that there are two cognitive phenomena which comprise imitation.

First, we must make sense of the other’s actions. Second, we need the capacity to replicate it. In this case, the motor means are open and variable. Second, both the goal and the motor-behavioral means for achieving the goal may be activated and there is a broader and more literal replication of what is observed. This implies an understanding of what another person is doing and the ability to use that understanding only in certain conditions (Rizzolatti 2005:56). Whichever the case, the neuroscientific mechanism underlying the understanding of an action has to include a direct matching of that action with its representation on the motor cortex. But direct matching of the action and its motor system is not enough; other brain processes that modify and change the mirror neuron system must compliment it. Rizzolatti thinks that action understanding precedes imitation and (it appears to me) is an additional processes.

The Correspondence Problem. The way in which this understanding is accomplished in the brain is designated as the “correspondence problem,” and its solution is a necessary prerequisite for a full understanding of imitation. According to Hurley and Chater (2005), when we imitate another’s hands, we can observe our own hands although the perspective is different. When we imitate facial gestures, however, we cannot see our own faces. How then is the mapping on the motor cortex achieved? We need to know what mechanisms are involved in such mapping; this becomes even more important when children imitate adults, especially when the bodies of children and adults are so different.

Hurley and Chater suggest that a promising avenue lies in the fact that certain neurons provide a link between perception and action. Some of these neurons are referred to as conical neurons. They fire in two circumstances: when a certain action is perceived and when they reflect “affordances” – i.e., those objects which we perceive will answer to, or allow, our ability to manipulate them. Gallese, in Hurley and Chater (2005: 108), describes conical neurons as firing at the observation of objects of a particular shape and size in the absence of any detectible action directed toward them. On the other hand, mirror neurons are sensitive to the actions of others, but they are also sensitive to equivalent actions of one’s own (Hurley and Chater 2005:3). They can be very specific. Certain cells fire when a monkey brings food to its mouth, but they will also fire when another monkey, or the experimenter ingests food. This is true even when the monkey cannot see his own hand.

Mirror Neurons and Intersubjectivity. Gallese’s (2004:102–118) version of mirror neurons is that they are sources of the sense of having experience of common experience with other people which obviously relates them to intersubjectivity. To him, mirror neurons are part of an automatic understanding of others. Imitation mirror neurons are important for that process.

According to Susan Jones (2005:206) until we have single-cell recordings on mirror neurons in humans, there will always be reason for caution. She says this doesn’t mean that mirror neurons are not involved in imitation, but that we need to know more. There is substantial neurophysiological evidence for the existence of clusters of neurons that become active when actions are both observed and self-initiated. However, Decety and Chaminade (2005: 119) claim that while such activation is necessary, it is not sufficient to form an understanding other’s intentions underlying bodily movements or a sense of agency. They feel that exploring imitation at the neural level can give clues to how we share intentions through social interaction. To them, as well as Gallese and Iacoboni, imitation is the means by which we develop intersubjective transactions between the self and the actions of others.

Iacoboni (2005:88) then summarizes what he considers the most current and meaningful findings on the neural underpinnings of imitation in order to relate it to the neural processes of language and empathy among other domains. The last two capacities are of obvious relevancy to intersubjectivity.

For Iacoboni, the neural basis of imitation is in its first stage. The neuroscience of imitation has been limited by the lack of consensus on its definition as well as the hesitancy of researchers to tackle such complex problems. He, too, starts with neurons in the superior temporal sulcus responding to moving hands, faces, and bodies. What these neurons code is the sight of meaningful interaction between an intentional agent and an object (Iacoboni 2005: 78). However, no neurons of this area have any connection to motor behavior. Iacoboni hypothesized a division of labor between the frontal and the posterior parietal mirror areas. The frontal mirror areas would code the goal of the imitated action and the posterior parietal mirror areas would code somatosensory information relevant to the initiated action. This was confirmed in his lab. Finding a solution to the correspondence issue is especially important because of the critical role imitation plays in developing the forms a foundation for language acquisition.

Brass and Heyes (2005) bring up the intriguing possibility that imitation may be something that mirror neurons do, but this does not mean they are for imitation. Monkeys clearly have mirror neurons but, at least according to some authors, they do not imitate. This places us in doubt that mirror neurons “are for” imitation.

Currently there are two views on solutions to the correspondence problem. Adherents to the specialist solution suggest that imitation is founded on a special-purpose mechanism. Generalist theories take the position that imitation is founded on general learning and motor control mechanisms.

Brain Areas Involved in Imitation

Once again, we need to be aware of that the evidence presented here for the anatomical supports for imitation is in the process of development. We do not have anything close to what could be seen as closure on this subject. Nor do I expect the reader to remember all of the brain areas which will be presented. Hopefully the illustration will suffice to demonstrate the complexity of these matters.

Brass and Heyes (2005) say that the inferior parietal cortex is involved in imitation. But the role of the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus is still an open question. Brain regions involved in imitation are sizable. They include the inferior frontal gryrus (pars opercularis and pars triangularis), the dorsal and ventral premotor cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, the superior parietal lobule, and the posterior superior and temporal sulcus. These areas are consistently active during imitation. There is consensus that the inferior prefrontal cortex is involved in imitation, but controversy exists over the posterior inferior frontal gyrus because of the lack of satisfactory measurements to date (Fig. 9.1).

Fig. 9.1
figure 9_1_141308_1_Enfigure 9_1_141308_1_En

Areas of activation during movement and imitation

Full size image

Why don’t we imitate every movement we see that has intention? We have seen that this happens some times to patients who are “echopractic.” Like Echo in the myth of Narcissus, they involuntarily repeat what the other person says. Cognitive psychologists see a hint to explaining this phenomenon in the fact that cortical areas which are associated with distinguishing self from other produce inhibition of imitative behavior. When the functioning of these areas is diminished this distinction may be negatively affected.

Imitation and Social Theory

Stephen Turner (2007) grants imitation a central place in guiding social theory. In fact, the social environment becomes important only as giving guides for what to imitation. This places imitation and behaviorist learning theory as the primary unit of analysis used to explain human behavior and dispenses with the interactional view so important to sociology as a distinctive field. This implies a one-sided position wherein shared rules determine individual behavior. It also ignores a cybernetic view of society working down to shape (not to determine) the social interaction that maintains it while the interactions of individuals simultaneously maintain the same structure.

He argues that the present core terms of today’s sociology are not in accord with the “developing body of knowledge about the brain and is potentially in conflict with it.” The sociological emphasis on discourse is misguided, he believes, because it is not based on the correlates of mental processes as understood by the cognitive psychologists. This obviously puts another field in charge of sociology and dispenses with the original arguments by Durkhiem which set the boundaries of sociology and made it a distinctive field not reducible to separate individuals. The main purpose of his book is the integration of neuroscience and sociology. Sociology, he says, must be formulated in terms of the “real” properties of the brain. Nonetheless Turner (2007: 369) insists that he avoids significant reductionism:

The idea that sociology ought to be physically and computationally realistic seems to be a very modest and unproblematic constraint. This is not reductionism in any problematic way, though it is certainly not, and this is an important qualification, an approach that is necessarily compatible with the acceptance of particular descriptions favored by traditional social theory such as the notion of society (Emphasis by this author.).

Before reducing sociology to neuroscience, one must consider the difference between cognitive psychology and the work of some influential figures in neuroscience proper. We will remember, for example, that Damasio (1994) opts for a non-reductionist approach, while Brothers, Gazzaniga, and many others are interested in the social nature of the brain. Iacoboni does not presume that mirror neurons take the place of Mead and Cooley’s social accounts of the self. This is the very brain that Turner wants to see as asocial and divorced from society. Brothers would see this as neuroism in the extreme.

This ignores all of the themes flowing through this book. These themes include emergence, nonreductionism, the social nature of the brain, a socially adequate epistemology, agency, and certainly anything close to a transactional analysis. In spite of his disclaimer that he uses a problematic reductionism, he utilizes cognitive neuroscience to argue that every individual brain is the result of individual biography. Everything of significance comes from the brain. Turner (2007:364) rejects the assumption so basic to sociology that different worldviews are associated with different social groups. This is in line with cognitive psychology’s emphasis on the universal character of human cognition (Krpic 2003: 813–814).

Finally, as Krpic (2003) notes, cognitive sociologists Cockerel and Zerubuval keep a distance from cognitive science, claiming that cognitive sociology stems from an opposing epistemological base. This is certainly true on many fronts including Lakoff and Johnson’s argument for an epistemologically responsible philosophy modeled in accord with brain science.

Conclusion

It is clear from the descriptions above that cognitive science has a long way to go before they solve the correspondence problem and come near to closure on a neural explanation of intersubjectivity. However, it is interesting how frameworks as different as sociology and neuroscience arrive at intersubjectivity’s importance for society and the social nature of the individual as well.