Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between rule consequentialism and the non-identity problem. It argues that rule consequentialism accommodates person-affecting intuitions without abandoning Parfit’s no difference view. The paper also offers a new model of rule consequentialism—reinterpreting its various features as a series of departures from an act consequentialist ideal each motivated by human finitude and fallibility.
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Mulgan, T. (2009). Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity. In: Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_6
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