The paper proposes two principles of coherence, thus continuing work started in previous chapter. They indeed serve as weak, but precise explications of the notion of coherence as it is used in the current epistemological discussion. After discussing their epistemological setting (sections 10.2-3), the paper considers four ways of establishing these principles. They may be inferred neither from enumerative induction (section 10.4), nor from the nature of propositions as objects of belief (section 10.5), nor in a Kantian way from self-consciousness (section 10.6). Rather, I propose a fairly rigorous way to infer them from an even more fundamental rationality principle of non-dogmatism and an elementary theory of perception (section 10.7).
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(2009). Two Coherence Principles. In: Spohn, W. (eds) Causation, Coherence, and Concepts. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 256. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5474-7_10
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