Abstract
In Section 1, the subject of the article is presented: the prospect of integrating an essentialist metaphysics into the scientific enterprise. Section 2 collects together a number of claims which are characteristic of essentialism. A species of inference rules, called (PFE)-rules, is introduced, referring to an idea of E. Hirsch's. Supplementing classical logic by the conditional schemes corresponding to a choice of such rules yields a first order theory of which it is claimed that it can be used as the core of an essentialist metaphysical theory. Section 3 presents a definition of a property's essentially belonging to an individual. Chiefly in Sections 4 and 5, it is shown in detail how essentialism as described in Section 2 can be based on this definition and a system of (PFE)-rules. In order to completely achieve this end, Section 5 additionally presents a recursive refinement of the original concept of essential belonging. The article concludes by sketching, in Section 6, the role of empirical research work in the formation of systems of (PFE)-rules.
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Nortmann, U. (2009). Essentialist Metaphysics in a Scientific Framework. In: Rahman, S., Symons, J., Gabbay, D.M., Bendegem, J.P.v. (eds) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_27
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