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The Need for Adaptive Logics In Epistemology

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Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science ((LEUS,volume 1))

Abstract

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

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Batens, D. (2009). The Need for Adaptive Logics In Epistemology. In: Rahman, S., Symons, J., Gabbay, D.M., Bendegem, J.P.v. (eds) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-2486-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2808-3

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