Isolation and Formalism 1979–85

Abstract

Vietnam’s military invasion of Kampuchea started on December 25, 1978, with strong military forces, amounting to 12 divisions. Phnom Penh was captured on January 7, 1979; and, three weeks after the beginning of this military operation, all the major cities and main roads were under the control of Vietnamese troops. The Vietnamese did not originally recognize their major role in the occupation, but explained the fall of the Pol Pot administration as a consequence of “the Kampuchean people’s stormy revolution.” However, Hanoi’s own role was not totally denied, as the Vietnamese exercised “their legitimate right of self-defense.”¹ In order to cover Vietnam’s major military role, or at least to give a justification for the new prospective regime of Phnom Penh, the invasion was preceded by the establishment of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) at the beginning of December 1978. This organization, created for practical purposes by Hanoi, did not deny the harmonization of its policy to that of Vietnam’s. At its inaugural meeting, the “Central Committee” of the Front proclaimed its close contacts with Vietnam and Laos in Indochina, and it shared the Vietnamese view that emphasized China’s role behind the Indochina conflict.² After the fall of Phnom Penh, the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, headed by Heng Samrin, was formed on January 8; the new regime adopted the name People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); and finally, on February 18, it signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam.