Abstract
Measurement of the value of United States bases in the United Kingdom, in terms of whether the UK faces a greater danger or enhanced protection as a result of the American forces stationed there, is necessarily subjective. However, two general trends can be discerned. The first is a growing feeling in the United States that Europeans generally should be prepared to play a greater role in their own defence, and this includes financial contributions. Britain herself has far too long relied upon American and her own nuclear weapons for the bulk of the defence effort, at the cost of running down conventional forces. Duncan Sandys, as Minister of Defence in 1957, presided over a massive cut-back in conventional forces, thereby increasing reliance upon nuclear deterrence. In outlining Britain’s new look defence policy, Sandys said that ‘it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them [Western nations], even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons’.1 As Field Marshal Lord Carver has observed,2 the idea that NATO could avert defeat by initiating nuclear war is dangerous and irresponsible; it can only end in ‘greater defeat’. It is therefore up to the United Kingdom and Europeans generally to reassess the need for the plethora of NATO — particularly American nuclear weapons.
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Notes and References
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jnr, ‘European-American Defence Budget Sharing’, Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 12 no. 2, Summer 1974, p. 198–199.
Alain C. Enthoven, ‘US Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, April 1975, p. 523.
See Paul Buteux: The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NA TO 1965–80 (Cambridge, CUP, 1983). For a general review of the consultation procedure, see pp. 207–213 where Buteux concludes,’ in time of crisis the opportunities for consultation would be limited, and that through their control of nuclear weapons the nuclear powers retain very considerable freedom of action to decide whether or not, or how, to use nuclear weapons. The obligation to consult before making a decision, if such consultations were judged to be both possible and politically and miltarily desirable, can at best only serve to influence the American President’s decision … it cannot ensure that the ultimate decision will be satisfactory to the parties consulted.’
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© 1987 Simon Duke
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Duke, S. (1987). Conclusion. In: US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom. St Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18482-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18482-8_10
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