Abstract
Most LDCs were externally controlled at the end of the war and therefore excluded from the international debate which led to the establishment of the IMF, World Bank and the GATT. Those that were involved, however, brought to it a commitment to the need for ‘Structuralist’ interventions even stronger than those put forward by the weaker industrialised countries like Britain and France at the time and considered in Chapter 3. Indeed, as Little puts it, the development establishment was in favour of planning trade, and much else, by direct controls, and also in favour of direct governmental initiatives in manufacturing investment.1
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Notes and References
I. M. D. Little, Economic development (New York: Basic Books, 1983) p. 75.
Four Central American countries adopted Article VIII in the 1940s, and two Caribbean and one Central American country did so in the 1950s; by 1981 a total of 35 had done so. IMF, Annual Report, 1981, p. 130.
G. Bird, The international monetary system and the less developed countries, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1982) p. 16.
The figures in the text are taken from E. Bernstein, ‘The International Monetary Fund’, in R. N. Gardner and M. F. Millikan, The global partnership (New York: Praeger, 1968) p. 137;
a critique of intervention can be found in E. Eshag and J. R. Thorp, ‘Economic and social consequences of orthodox policies in Argentina in the post-war years’, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 27(1), 1965.
See J. Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund, 1945–1966 (Washington: IMF, 1969) Vol. II, pp. 378–80.
Details can be found in B. Tew, The evolution of the international monetary system, 1945–1977 (London: Hutchinson, 1977) Appendix A.
Total lending from the Compensatory Financing Facility was only $462.6 million between 1963 and 1971 (M. de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, 1966–1971 (Washington: IMF, 1976, p. 268), while only $12.15 million was lent to assist the International Tin Agreement in 1971
(ibid., pp. 283–4).
The figures up to 1970, together with an account of the Bank’s lending practices, can be found in E. S. Mason and R. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington: Brookings, 1973) chs 6 and 7.
For details see C. Wilcox, A charter for world trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949);
W. A. Brown, The United States and the restoration of world trade (Washington: Brookings, 1950);
K. Dam, Law and international economic organisation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); and
K. Kock, International trade policy and the GATT, 1947–1967 (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1969).
GATT, Trends in international trade (Geneva: GATT, 1958); the quote is from Evans, p. 84.
See GATT, Basic instruments and selected documents, 13th Supplement, GATT, 1965.
K. Morton and P. Tulloch, Trade and developing countries (London: Croom Helm, 1977) p. 58.
Morton and Tulloch, ibid.
See also G. Helleiner, Intra-firm trade and the developing countries (London: Macmillan, 1981) for a discussion of the political influences leading to the tendency for the GATT negotia-tions to favour exporters of capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive products (pp. 75–6).
R. Prebisch, Towards a new trade policy for development (UN E/Conf 46/3) (New York: UN, 1964).
UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations conference on Trade and Development (New York, UN, 1964) Vol. 1, p. 4.
J. Pincus, Trade, aid and development (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) pp. 81–2.
IMF, Annual Report, 1978, p. 40.
Ibid., p. 40.
GATT, Gatt activities in1979 (Geneva: GATT, 1980) p. 16.
R. E. Baldwin, Beyond the Tokyo negotiations (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1979) p. 2.
Main documents of the Group of 77 at UNCTAD V, No. 2, ‘Multilateral trade negotiations: declaration by the Group of 77’, reprinted in K. P. Sauvant (ed.), The collected documents of The Group of77, Vol. II (London: Oceana, 1981) pp. 525–6.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, p. 9.
GATT, Gatt activities in1981 (Geneva: GATT, 1982) p. 27.
L. Dunn et al., In the kingdom of the blind (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1983) pp. 10, 13.
See Catholic Institute for International Relations The renegotiation of the Lomé Convention (London:CIIR, 1978);
A. Rubin, Lomé II, (London: CLLI, 1978).
D. B. Rainford, ‘Lomé II’, in The Courier, Special Issue, 58, 1979, p. 25.
For example, A. J. Yeates, Trade barriers facing developing countries, (London: Macmillan, 1979) p. 172; Little, Economic development, p. 370.
Commonwealth Study Group, Towards a new Bretton Woods (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1983) p. 39.
OECD, Development cooperation, 1983 Review, p. 51.
Ibid., 1972, p. 225; 1983, p. 188.
Ibid., 1983, p. 51.
According to E. K. Y. Chen, foreign firms ‘played little part in the crucial 1962–6 period, when export expansion began to replace import substitution’ in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. Multinational corporations, technology and employment (London: Macmillan, 1983) p. 132.
UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational corporationsin world development, 3rd Survey (New York: UN, 1983) p. 28.
UNIDO, World industry in1980 (New York: UN, 1981) p. 240.
For two relevant investigations, see S. Langdon, ‘Multinational corporations, taste transfer and underdevelopment: a case study of Kenya’, Review of African Political Economy, 2, 1975, and
J. de Coninck, Artisans and petty producers in Uganda, Sussex University PhD, 1980, which deal with the soap and shoe industries respectively.
Here see R. Murray, Multinationals beyond the market (Brighton: Harvester, 1981).
See T. Killick and M. Sutton, ‘Global disequilibria and the non-oil developing countries’, in T. Killick (ed.) Adjustment and financing in the developing world (Washington: IMF, 1982).
For an excellent examination of the problem see J. Williamson, ‘The international financial system’, in E. R. Fried and C. L. Schultz (eds) Higher oil prices and the world economy (Washington: Brookings, 1975).
For an insight into the IMF’s own (unpublished) thinking on both the Chile and Jamaica cases, see S. Holland and E. A. Brett, ‘For a few dollars more’, The Observer, July 1980; for a detailed critique of their role in Portugal, Jamaica and Peru, see Development dialogue, 1982, 2; for a recent analysis of its role in Latin America see Latin American Bureau, The poverty brokers: the IMF and Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1983).
‘The Arusha Initiative’, Development dialogue, 1982, 2; pp. 14–16.
M. Guitan, ‘Economic management and IMF conditionality’, in Killick, Adjustment and financing, p. 86; for a general survey of the conditionality debate, see J. Williamson (ed.) IMF Conditionality (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
Here they assert that ‘the “infant industry” argument may justify some controls’, but if the controls are too severe ‘the resulting distortion of relative prices leads to an ineffective structure of production and investment and eventually to a lower rate of economic growth than could have been achieved otherwise’. IMF, Annual Report, 1983, p. 59. They also make a plea for a reduction in protectionism against LDC exports in DC markets, though without being able to exert any influence over a well established trend.
See D. Schydlowsky, ‘Alternative approaches to short-term economic management in developing countries’, in Killick, Adjustment and financing, p. 118; see also L. Taylor, Macro models for developing countries (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) pp. 50–8.
These are listed and surveyed in G. Kitching, Development and underdevelopment in historical perspective (London: Methuen, 1982).
H. Chenery et al., Redistribution with growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
See, for example, International Labour Office, Employment, growth and basic needs (Geneva: ILO, 1976).
See, for example, B. Belassa, Reforming the system of incentives in developing countries, Bank Staff Working Paper No. 203 (Washington: World Bank, 1975).
For details see E. P. Wright, ‘World Bank lending for structural adjustment’, Finance and development, 17(3), 1980.
New credits agreed by IDA were $3,838 million in 1980, $3,482 million, $2,686 million in 1982 and $3,341 million in 1983. (World Bank, Annual Report, 1983, p. 12).
World Bank, Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa (Washington: IBRD, 1981) (The ‘Berg Report’).
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Brett, E.A. (1985). The LDCs and the Official Agencies. In: The World Economy since the War. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17896-4_10
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