Abstract
So far we have attempted to establish the main features of American military power from both the conventional and nuclear perspectives without pretending that one is independent of the other. In a superpower confrontation, the utility of conventional forces is as valid as the nuclear deterrent which underpins them; but the credibility of the nuclear balance depends to a large extent on matching the Soviet conventional build-up. At the same time both rely upon the domestic base: technological innovation, the management of defence budgets and the willingness of Congress to vote funds for defence. The strengths and weaknesses of the domestic base are important to recognise, particularly as they cast doubt on the reliability of American forces. As long as the weaknesses persist they will continue to bring into question the credibility of America’s contribution to the Atlantic Alliance.
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Notes and References
Richard Haas, Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy, Adelphi Paper 153 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979) p. 1.
Cited Thomas A. Dine, ‘Politics of the Purse’, in Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler (eds), Congress and Arms Control (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978) pp. 59–96.
Richard P. Cronin, An Analysis of Congressional Reductions in the Defence Budget: Fiscal Year 1971–76 (Washington, DC: CRS, 1976) p. 19.
Cited Peter Foot, ‘Defence Burden Sharing in the Atlantic Community, 1945–54’, Aberdeen Studies in Defence Economics, 20, Summer 1981, p. 12.
James Fallows, National Defence (New York: Random House, 1981).
James Fallows, ‘America’s High Tech Weaponry’, The Atlantic, 247, 5, May 1981, pp. 21–33.
Cited Loren Thompson, ‘The Defence Industrial Base: Going, going …’, International Security Review, 6, 2, Summer 1981, pp. 237–72.
S. J. Deitchman, New Technology and Military Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979),
J. A. Stockfish, Plowshares into Swords: Managing the American Defence Establishment (New York: Mason and Lipscomb, 1973) pp. 150–89.
Murray Weidenbaum, The Economics of Peacetime Defence (New York: Praeger, 1974).
Martin Binkin, Paying the Modern Military (Washington DC: Brookings, 1981).
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© 1983 RUSI
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Coker, C. (1983). The Reagan Administration and the 1980s. In: US Military Power in the 1980s. RUSI Defence Studies Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06909-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06909-5_3
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