Abstract
To govern this nation do we want an operative federal structure? If so, where do we want the balance between national and state power to be drawn and on which issues? Under a national regime, states and localities carry out national instructions; the problem is how to improve their obedience. In a federal regime, states and localities are disobedient. The operational meaning of federalism is found in the degree to which the constituent units disagree about what should be done, who should do it, and how it should be done. In a word, federalism is about conflict. It is also about cooperation, that is, the terms and conditions under which conflict is limited. A federal regime, therefore, cannot be coordinated from the center any more than it can be controlled or coerced. Coordination, as we have seen, does not necessarily imply a coordinator. Under an operative federalism, coordination occurs by interaction among many governments, not by intellectual cogitation by a single one. Federalism means mutuality, not hirearchy, multiple rather than single causation, a sharing instead of a monopoly of power. One can determine if the federal beast is alive only by whether it kicks—and then whom it kicks and who kicks it back. The rationality, responsiveness, and responsibility of a regime, its overall decency and effectiveness, should not depend on its appearance (it may appear untidy) but on results.
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Notes
William I. Goodman, “Organizing for State and Multi-State Development Planning,” mimeograph, 1968, p. 55.
Carlisle P. Runge and W. L. Church, “New Directions in Regionalism: A Case Study of Intergovernmental Relations in Northwestern Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 453–454.
James L. Sundquist, with the collaboration of David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work: A Study of Program Coordination at the Community Level ( Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969 ), p. 242.
William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984 ).
Aaron Wildaysky, ed., American Federalism in Perspective ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1987 ).
William Anderson, “Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, A Budget of Suggestions for Research” (Prepared for the Committee on Public Administration and the Committee on Government of the Social Science Research Council, Chicago, 1964); also, Anderson’s The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? ( Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957 ).
See S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Search of a Meaning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), a superb survey of futile efforts from ancient to modern times.
William Niskanen and Mickey Levy, “Cities and Schools: A Case for Community Government in California,” Working Paper No. 14 (Berkeley: Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, 1974 ), p. 22.
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© 1979 Aaron Wildavsky
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Wildavsky, A. (1979). A Bias Toward Federalism. In: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04955-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04955-4_7
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