Abstrsct
Upon his visit to the Tyrell Corporation, Deckard is greeted by an attractive, self-assured, smartly dressed young woman. After coolly fielding a question about the Tyrell Corporation’s owl, she introduces herself to Deckard in the simplest possible terms: ‘I’m Rachael.’ Her self-introduction perfectly captures her confident sense of herself. She no more doubts that she is Dr Eldon Tyrell’s niece than she does that the Tyrell Corporation’s owl is artificial. Her self-assurance begins to falter, however, after she is subjected to an unusually lengthy Voight-Kampff test, whereupon she is summarily dismissed by Tyrell. She is visibly disturbed as she leaves Tyrell and Deckard alone to talk. We soon learn from Tyrell that Rachael is not his niece after all, but is instead a new experimental model of replicant that has had memory implants — an innovation intended to ‘cushion’ replicants’ developing emotions and to thereby make them easier to control. In Rachael’s case, the memories are those of Tyrell’s actual niece.
‘I don’t know if it’s me or Tyrell’s niece.’
(Rachael, to Deckard)
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© 2014 Timothy Shanahan
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Shanahan, T. (2014). Identity. In: Philosophy and Blade Runner. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-41229-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-41229-4_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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