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Trade Agreements

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Palgrave Handbook of International Trade

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Abstract

The topic of trade agreements is a broad one. We will define trade agreements as agreements concerning nations’ treatment of goods, services, or factors of production as these cross borders or have the potential of affecting the economic welfare of foreign nationals. This means, of course, that trade agreements are ubiquitous. Parties to agreements may be national governments or non-government entities such as producers or consumers. Parties may also be international organizations or supra-national political or economic institutions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Fletcher School, Tufts University, USA

    Carsten Kowalczyk

  2. School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Denmark

    Carsten Kowalczyk

  3. Department of Economics, University of Iowa, USA

    Raymond Riezman

Authors
  1. Carsten Kowalczyk
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  2. Raymond Riezman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. American University, USA

    Daniel Bernhofen

  2. Bond University, Australia

    Rod Falvey

  3. University of Nottingham, UK

    David Greenaway

  4. University of Tübingen, Germany

    Udo Kreickemeier

Copyright information

© 2013 Carsten Kowalczyk and Raymond Riezman

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Kowalczyk, C., Riezman, R. (2013). Trade Agreements. In: Bernhofen, D., Falvey, R., Greenaway, D., Kreickemeier, U. (eds) Palgrave Handbook of International Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-30531-1_13

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