Abstract
An implemented system called ATT-Meta (named for propositional ATTitudes and Metaphor) is sketched. It performs a type of metaphor-based reasoning. Although it relies on built-in knowledge of specific metaphors, where a metaphor is a conceptual view of one topic as another, it is flexible in allowing novel discourse manifestations of those metaphors. The flexibility comes partly from semantic agnosticism with regard to metaphor, in other words not insisting that metaphorical utterances should always have metaphorical meanings. The metaphorical reasoning is integrated into a general uncertain reasoning framework, enabling the system to cope with uncertainty in metaphor-based reasoning. The research has focused on metaphors for mental states (though the algorithms are not restricted in scope), and consequently throws light on agent descriptions in natural language discourse, multi-agent scenarios, personification of non-agents, and reasoning about agents’ metaphorical thoughts. The system also naturally leads to an approach to chained metaphor.
This work was supported in part by grant number IRI-9101354 from the National Science Foundation, U.S.A.
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Barnden, J.A. (1999). An Implemented System for Metaphor-Based Reasoning, With Special Application to Reasoning about Agents. In: Nehaniv, C.L. (eds) Computation for Metaphors, Analogy, and Agents. CMAA 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1562. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48834-0_8
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